Iran Nuclear Deal Options

¶ … nuclear deal with Iran. A tentative agreement has recently been signed, and the final details need to be worked out by the end of June. The parties at the negotiating table have an interest in a negotiated agreement, even if some other stakeholders do not. Given that, while there still risks that the deal may be scuttled or delayed, in all likelihood the deal will pass. The trade-off for the U.S.

will be that it gets some certainty with respect to the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for allowing Iran to have a civilian nuclear program for power generation, subject to strict controls. The paper analyzes the other options on the table and explains why a negotiated agreement with Iran is superior to the other potential alternatives that are available.

Introduction At the time of writing, Iran is engaged in talks with the United States and several other stakeholder nations on a deal is believed to govern how and when Iran acquires nuclear power. The European Union, the UK, China, France, Germany and Russia are also represented at the discussions. The talks are ongoing at this point, but they are believed to be close to resolution.

A tentative deal was reached on April 2nd, 2015, and there is a self-imposed deadline to finalize the details of the deal by the end of June, 2015 (Nasralla, 2015). The deal has many critics, including Israel, but also among other stakeholders who have not been invited to the talks. There is widespread concern, given the unpredictable nature of Iran's religious leadership and the lack of controls within the governance of that country, of any increase in Iran's nuclear capabilities, for any purpose.

Statement of Problem A critical foreign policy issue at present is the pending nuclear deal with Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a pariah state, but is possessed of a strong military and substantial oil wealth. The state has been working to develop nuclear fission capabilities for many years, something that concerns many within the international community. While Iran maintains that it wants only to operate nuclear power plants, many nations including the U.S.

And Israel maintain that Iran wants to acquire nuclear technology in order to develop nuclear weaponry. Such weaponry would in particular represent an existential threat to Israel, a concern heightened by the genocidal rhetoric of the Iranian regime towards Israel, something that has gone on for years. In 2005, then President Ahmedinejad vowed to "wipe Israel off the map" (Richter & Barnea, 2009).

If Iran was a peaceful and trustworthy state, there would be no concerns about it acquiring nuclear technology, but its persistent threats against Israel, and its role as a state sponsor of terrorism, aimed at Sunni Muslims in many different countries, has not only made it a pariah state but created the imperative to ensure that it never develops or otherwise acquires nuclear weapons. At issue is mistrust of the intentions of Iran.

There are several parties that have expressed their concerns about Iran gaining access to nuclear technology, and there are several reasons for this concern. Israel is the most concerned, and their interests in this negotiation are theoretically represented by the United States. The Israeli concern lies with the genocidal rhetoric towards Israel that is near commonplace in Iran, and with the religious government that runs Iran.

Religious leaders are far less inclined towards rational thought, and any clear thinker would have reason to fear that the threat of mutual destruction might not be a deterrence for a mullah who fancies himself a martyr. Israel has at numerous points in the past attacked the Iranian nuclear program. It is all but assumed that Israel created the Stuxnet virus that apparently set the Iranian nuclear program back two years (Katz, 2010), and Israel is presumed to also be responsible for assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists as well.

The current deal is aimed to reducing Iran's nuclear potential (Raviv, 2015). The policy of the United States towards Iran has always been to treat Iran as hostile. The countries had not had official representation in each other's capitals since the Iranian Revolution. For its part, Iran wants a deal because the country has been crippled by sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries aimed at hurting the country's economy in retaliation for pursuing the nuclear program. The talks have gone on for years.

Iran has always maintained that it has the right to enrich uranium and seems to want to use the threat of its nuclear program to gain concessions from the West, including removal of key sanctions (Anishchuk, 2013). Other stakeholders include the Arab states. Saudi Arabia has long opposed an Iranian nuclear deal, because of the threat posed to it by Iranian nuclear weapons. This relates to the power struggle between the two in the region, and the schism between Sunni and Shia Islam.

Iranian allies in the region like Hamas have also expressed concern about the deal, feeling that ay security Iran wins will make the state less likely to lend its support to Hamas and other groups it has long supported in the region (al-Ghoul, 2013). Saudi Arabia feels that Iran's influence thrives on sectarian instability. Saudi's interest includes delaying a deal until it can reduce Iranian influence in the region, in the hopes of getting a better deal later (Al Jazeera, 2015).

The newspaper assert that Israel's primary interest in maintaining the balance of political power in the region as well, though what Al Jazeera writes about Israel should always be taken with a grain of salt. There is considerable risk associated with the nuclear deal. Thought admittedly a biased source, the Anti-Defamation League argues that Iran's foreign policy will be emboldened if it is able to achieve a deal on its nuclear program.

This is one of the reasons why Saudi Arabia is so concerned about the deal, not considering that Iran could hit Saudi with missiles. There is also concern that Iran will be able to test an intercontinental ballistic missile by this year, which may give it the capability to strike against several U.S. interests. The entire Middle East could be destabilized if Iran were to gain nuclear weapons (ADL, 2015).

The group also points out that a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2011 stated that Iran is engaged in activities that pertain directly to the development of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of detonators (ADL, 2015). Internally in the U.S. there is also significant opposition to the deal. The famous letter from the Republican senators demonstrated little more than unprofessionalism and a lack of understanding of basic foreign relations, which was sad to see.

The bigger issue, however, is that the deal will need to be sold to the American people, and President Obama has allowed that Congress could have some sway over a future deal. How this will affect the negotiations is unknown, as this is a multilateral deal. It cannot go through without U.S.

approval, but for its part Iran has a similar issue with its own governmental nuclear committee, so this can be chalked up to domestic politics that does little to alter the scope or content of the agreement (Labott, 2015). Thesis and Hypothesis The working thesis is that a deal with Iran over its nuclear program will be reached.

The tentative deal in place as of April 2nd could still be scuttled if a final agreement on terms is not reached by the end of June, assuming that the self-imposed deadline is not extended. It could very well be extended. The hypothesis is that the deal will be struck, and it will offer some exchange of a limited nuclear program in exchange for assurances that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons. There will be provisions for inspections, for example.

The hypothesis also holds that the deal will lift some of the sanctions that the West, especially the United States, has put upon Iran as the result of its pursuit of nuclear power. The alternative hypothesis is that the deal will be scuttled at the last minute. Predicting Alternatives There are several alternatives on the table. The contents of the tentative deal are at this time little known.

In principle, the deal allows for Iran to maintain some of its nuclear capability, in exchange for removal of some sanctions and for greater guarantee of security for the Iranian state. Israel is already readying its strategy on the assumption that a deal will be reached. If a framework is reached, Israel will reportedly push for the controls against Iran to be tightened, leveraging the framework to improve its own protection against Iran (Casey, 2015).

Iran has already rejected a key tenet of the deal, which was to send most of its uranium stockpile to Russia, on the grounds that the country had spent billions to acquire the uranium and would not simply surrender it (Sanger & Gordon, 2015). It is expected that the null alternative, the deal presented will contain provisions for Iran to maintain a peaceful nuclear program subject to inspections. It now appears that it will be allowed to keep more of its uranium that was originally envisioned.

Observers are split on the effect of this deal. Some feel that it will bring stability to the region, because Iran will have certainty and may even reduce its involvement with terrorist groups. Hamas certainly feel that way (Al-Ghoul, 2013), but they are not alone is speculating that a balance of power will be restored in the region. Al-Jazeera (2015) argued that the balance of power used to be bilateral between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but now a third player, a Turkey-Islamic Brotherhood-Qatar faction, has become a power broker in the region.

Restoring Iran's strength relative to the Sunni nations would, it is theorized, restore the power balance in the region (Waltz, 2012). Certainly, it would bring about a change in the power structure in the region. A second potential alternative is that the deal falls through. This is less likely given the presence of a tentative agreement but it is still a possibility.

There are domestic political pressures in the U.S., and in Iran, that could cause leadership in those countries to either back out of an agreement, or demand concessions that are untenable for the other side. There is also significant opposition from key U.S. allies in the region in Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which seem to have many reasons to oppose any deal with Iran, at least any deal that leaves that country with nuclear capabilities (Sanger & Gordon, 2015).

There are other reasons that the deal could be scuttled. There is not much trust between the counterparties, and ultimately the deal has to be built on trust. Many stakeholders lack trust in Iran, but presumably there are trust issues on that side as well. A third alternative is that the deal is just another in a series of provisional and temporary agreements to guide this process. It is also worth noting that there have been multiple tentative and provisional deals throughout this process.

There was an interim deal in November 2013 that produced a framework for the current tentative deal, but progress towards a deal has been very slow. There is significant opposition, and there is not any firm agreement between the members of P5+1, either (Sebenius, 2014). That deal was seen as potentially a stepping stone -- the point the parties are at today -- or a slippery slope, or even as a stopping point.

It is possible that the current deal is a stopping point, particularly if it eases sanctions substantially, but it is also possible that the deal will just be the first in a series. In particular, if the deal shifts the balance of power in the region too much towards Iran, or if Iran does not disengage from its support of terrorism, or if Iran pursues weapons, there could be future deals forced. The current deal could well just be a stepping stone, future leverage for Iran to exploit.

A fourth alternative is that the deadline is extended. The deadline is self-imposed, which realistically means that if the parties feel that they can reach a deal, but just need more time to do so, they will extend the deadline. At this point, none of the parties wants to talk about this option, in order to maintain the current deadline, but this remains an option.

If the talks break down and the parties are at an impasse, it is more likely that the deal will simply collapse, rather than see the deadline extended. Evaluating Alternatives The deal that is in place right now still needs the final details hammered out. The deal is the one that has generally been considered to be inevitable. There appear to be a few stumbling blocks remaining, and there is no guarantee that a deal will be hammered out by the self-imposed deadline.

There are many stakeholders who may well exert pressure and scuttle the deal as well. If the deal goes through, however, the United States will be bound, along with the other P5+1 to ratify and honor the deal. It is unlikely that Congress will be given the ability to scuttle a deal that they did not participate in the negotiations for, especially after the Senate demonstrated such complete lack of understanding of the situation. The most likely scenario sees a deal made just before the deadline.

The parties at the table have incentive to reach a deal. The U.S. wants to see more peace and stability in the region, and there are many observers who feel that Iran acquiring nuclear technology is more a question of when, rather than if. The U.S.

wants at this point to control that process, with Iran giving up most of its uranium and providing a variety of means for other nations to ensure that Iran does not develop the capacity to build nuclear weapons, in particular since it is likely to gain intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. The deal, then, would create controls for the P5+1 nations with respect to inspections and managing Iran's technological capabilities. Nuclear power plants are going to be allowed, and there may be provisions to help constructing them.

The deal purports to block Iran from developing nuclear weapons, though without specific provisions for external enforcement by non-military means, that element of the deal hinges by and large on trust. The deal may also see sanctions lifted, as the sanctions are in place to create negotiating leverage. The sanctions from the U.S. can be managed at the Congressional level, so there is no guarantee that a nuclear deal would bring about the end of sanctions any time soon.

The deal will also create significant restructuring of the balance of power in the region, even if Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. The mere threat that it could, or that such development is inevitable, is powerful enough to give Iran a boost in terms of its power. This threatens the nations that currently hold most of the power in the region. In particular, Sunni states will be affected as they are not nuclear powers.

Analysts seems divided on whether a more powerful Iran would stabilize the Middle East or destabilize it. The deal will affect America's relationship with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which are critical allies in the region. Iran is not, and may never be, an ally in the Middle East. Thus, any nuclear deal could be seen as a shift in foreign policy for the United States, away from its traditional allies, and towards a new role as peacemaker, reaching out to all regimes in the region.

The wild card in the tentative deal is whether or not Iran actually does attempt to develop nuclear weapons. With sufficient external controls, it might not have the ability, but it might. There may not be much that other countries can do once Iran thinks it has the necessary technology. Should Iran violate the trust that other countries are putting in it, then the deal will prove to be a foreign relations disaster, and a threat to the security of the Middle East. Already, U.S.

allies in the region are developing their strategies to tighten whatever framework the deal creates, in order to leverage the deal to squeeze Iran, the opposite of Iran leveraging the deal to then develop nuclear weapons. It is possible that the structure of the deal will provide that sort of framework, with the result being the possibility of future deals to address any issues or breaches that arise from this deal. The second alternative, that the deal will be scuttled, represents a default to the BATNA of the deal.

The best alternative to a negotiated agreement to this point has been the tight sanctions, and the reliance on Israeli sabotage to manage Iran's nuclear ambitions. This strategy would make more sense if there was a realistic possibility of regime change in Iran any time soon. A scuttled deal would not necessarily damage any goodwill, however, given the difficult of reaching a negotiated agreement and the stakes that are involved.

The United States would still maintain influence in the region, which would likely default to the current power structure, at least in the short run. In the long run, however, there is the risk that the default position gets out of control, as Iran may well pursue nuclear weapons, without any sort of framework for external powers to do anything about it.

This potentiality is likely why there is an attempt to negotiate an agreement in the first place, because if there was no risk under the current situation that Iran could develop nuclear weapons, there would be no need to engage in these negotiations. Clearly, the parties want a deal in order to avoid a scenario where Iran develops nuclear weapons and no external party has the ability to stop them.

With an imperative to create a framework for managing Iran's nuclear ambitions, it is unlikely that this alternative will come to pass. The third possibility, that the deal is one in a series, is also possible. This still implies that the deal will be finalized, but its contents could be limited, or its time frame constrained, in either case paving the way for future agreements. The current status of negotiations is that there have been some provisional agreements in the past, but nothing substantive.

It is possible that this will occur again. It is believed, however, that the parties are developing some trust, and that all parties at the table are sufficiently motivated to reach an agreement, so that there will be an agreement put into place, with the expectation that it will last a significant amount of time. For the United States, a series of deals is less desirable that a comprehensive deal, because it will demand considerably more future attention to this issue, but it could be a necessary compromise.

The fourth alternative is that the deal will simply be extended. This remains a possibility. The BATNA for this deal is that they will arrive at a comprehensive deal, just at a later future date. If there is trust and goodwill, and the belief that a deal can and will be reached given more time, this alternative might be an option. However, it seems unlikely this time, and the parties involved in the negotiations have preferred in the past to stick with the deadlines, however arbitrary.

There has been consistently willingness to continue working towards a deal. While a deadline extension would be disappointing, it would not appear to change much for any of the parties, nor would it preclude a negotiated deal in the near future. Recommendation It is recommended that a deal be signed with Iran over its nuclear program. The recommendation arises because of a few realities. One is that Iran has a large stockpile of uranium and is about to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Two is that the current strategy for managing Iran's nuclear program, sanctions, is little more than a stopgap, and will not be able to stop the Iranian nuclear program in the long run. Sanctions have proven useful in the short run to create the motivation for Iran to negotiate but they are not a long-run solution: a negotiated deal is. The only real issue is the terms of the deal, and that is where it could come undone.

Iran has already expressed hesitation at the last minute with respect to giving up its stockpile of uranium,.