Jurisdictional Responses for Domestic Terrorism Prevention Planning

Jurisdictional Emergency Planning for Domestic Terrorism

Despite the confluence of multiple unprecedented existential threats to the United States and its citizens, including an ongoing global pandemic which is proving remarkably resilient, intensifying climate change and corresponding global warming, as well as Russian and North Korean dictators who are increasingly rattling their nuclear-tipped sabers, many security analysts agree that the most pressing threat facing America today is domestic terrorism. The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the relevant literature to develop an informed and timely discussion concerning the respective roles of the local, state, and federal jurisdictions as they relate to the preparation plan process, mitigation practices, and area evacuation for each jurisdiction. Following this discussion, the paper presents a summary of the research and key findings about preparing for and responding to domestic terrorism threats in an effective fashion in the conclusion.

Preparation Planning

Although it is impossible to predict if and when a domestic terrorism incident will occur, it is still critically important for public and private sector leaders at the local, state and federal levels to prepare for this eventuality in order to minimize harm to persons and property and to facilitate recovery efforts (McEntire, 2019). For this purpose, preparation planning for potential domestic terrorism attacks requires the use of a threat assessment. For instance, according to McEntire (2019), “A threat assessment is a careful study of the targets that might be appealing to terrorists” (p. 210). The proactive activities that are needed for this purpose vary depending on the jurisdiction, but generally include a risk assessment of potential hard targets such as key assets and critical infrastructure (discussed further below) as well as soft targets such as shopping malls, schools and government buildings (McEntire, 2019).

In the event that communities are sufficiently large or contain an inordinately large number of potential targets such as towns near important military bases, civic leaders at the local or state levels may elect to create an emergency response team that is tasked with coordinating such risk assessments and keeping them current (McEntire, 2019). In any event, local business leaders are in an especially good position to help identify potential terrorist targets based on their intimate knowledge of the communities in which they compete.

In the context of domestic terrorism, hard targets that include critical infrastructure facilities represent some of the most prominent potential targets for politically or ideologically motivated individual or group actors. While every community differs in terms of its critical infrastructure, some common examples that would be of interest to state and federal leaders include information and communication systems, grid elements, transportation hubs and networks, energy production facilities, and water systems (McEntire, 2019).

Likewise, state and federal authorities should also identify key assets such as banks, law enforcement and firefighting facilities, hospitals, and large corporations, that are especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In this regard, McEntire (2019) defines key assets as, “Facilities, sites, and structures that are believed to require additional protection from terrorist attacks” The information collected at the local level should be aggregated at the state level and shared with relevant federal authorities for planning purposes.

Mitigation Practices

Although most mitigation practices will be employed at the local level, state and federal organizations also play an important role in mitigating potential domestic terrorist threats. Some evidence-based practices that have proven effective in mitigating against potential domestic terrorist threats at the local level include hardening critical infrastructure resources such as government buildings. In some cases, structural changes and new barrier designs may be required for this purpose which can be coordinated at the state level to ensure uniformity in standards (Preventing terrorism overview, 2022). Likewise, using increased set-backs from streets can help protect sensitive potential targets including government buildings (McEntire, 2019).

At the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security relies on the aggregated results from local and state agencies as well as their own internal reviews concerning what types of technological strategies that domestic terrorists may employ (Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, 2019). In addition, federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security provide valuable guidance concerning other specific mitigation practices that are most appropriate and suitable for various jurisdictions (McEntire, 2019). Further, the Department of Homeland Security also serves as a clearinghouse of nationwide mitigation practices that have been proven effective in mitigating domestic terrorism threats (Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework, 2019). In addition, the Department of Homeland Security also operates the National Terrorism Advisory System which helps keep local and state authorities, first responders and others informed about potential domestic terrorism threats and what practices should be used in response (National Terrorism Advisory System, 2022).

Area Evacuation

As the ongoing nightmare in Ukraine clearly demonstrates, evacuating large numbers of people in hostile environments represents a daunting enterprise. At the local level, it is possible to identify potentially viable evacuation routes well in advance of any terrorist attack, but the exigencies of these so-called “no-notice” threats mean that these planned routes may not be available or they have been compromised due to the impact of a domestic terrorism event (Golshani et al., 2019). In this regard, Golshani and his associates report that, “No-notice emergency events refer to unpredictable disasters such as earthquakes, chemical spills, or terrorist attacks, where it is impracticable to forewarn the public about their occurrence and design evacuation plans for them” (2019, p. 364). Here again, while much of the impetus for identifying potential evacuation routes prior to or following a domestic terrorism attack is on local communities, state and federal departments of transportation can provide timely guidance concerning how best to approach this problem.