Kennedy vs Eisenhower Foreign Policy

Introduction
The military experience that President Dwight D. Eisenhower took to the White House was largely without precedent. In sharp contrast to President Harry S. Truman’s years, some of the White House functions and structures were reorganized – with new positions being introduced in an attempt to promote the efficient running of government business. President John F. Kennedy, on the other hand, sought to ease the bureaucratic structure left by his predecessor. Just as we can compare and contrast the domestic policies of both presidents, and their approach to the conduction of government business, we can also evaluate their foreign policy perspectives with an intention of comparing and contrasting their outlook.
Discussion
Like Kennedy, Eisenhower had a keen interest in foreign affairs. His liking for organization as well as staff work was largely sourced from his role a military commander. Towards this end, he sought to ensure that the integrated policy review system of the National Security Council roped in the Department of State and as Rakove (2013), points out, it was during Eisenhower’s administration that the National Security Council experienced renewal. In seeking to ensure that decision making relating to foreign policy was efficient, Eisenhower embraced a proper organizational structure. Towards this end, the National Security Council was expanded and formalized with its mandate being expanded and some responsibilities such as the preparation and proper coordination of policy papers being amongst the relevant government agencies added (Kinnard, 2012). In the words of the author, “originally the NSC was created by congress as a small advisory body over which the President was to Preside” (Kinnard, 2012, p. 154). Thus, it is important to note that unlike Kennedy, Eisenhower sought to implement a heavily formalized machinery and before making decisions on the appropriate policies to be implemented, he was fond of consulting widely – with some of his key advisors in this regard being inclusive of George Kistiakowsky (science advisor), Henry Cabot Lodge (UN Ambassador), and Lewis Strauss (Atomic Energy Commission Chairman). In basic terms, some of the changes that Eisenhower implemented to the system inherited from President Truman are inclusive of “wider representation at meetings to include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director; a Planning Board which prepared papers for Council consideration; and an Operations coordinating board which” effectively concerned itself with follow-up of the various decisions originating from the President of the United States (Kinnard, 2012, p. 154). While most believe that there was some degree of rigidity in Eisenhower’s foreign policy as a consequence of the heavily formal machinery in place, the fact that he relied on the counsel of an expanded team of advisors means that the seemingly rigid ‘organizational structure’ on this front was not as it appeared. As a matter of fact, it was during Eisenhower’s administration that a number of innovations were seen on the foreign affairs front – with some of the most relevant ones including, ‘open skies’ and Atoms for Peace (Olivia, 2018).
It would, therefore, be accurate to say that Eisenhower ushered in a new national security and foreign policy outlook in the United States. On this front, the key considerations of the said outlook were diverse. In addition to the further promotion of the United States domestic economy while at the same time gathering the energy to successfully execute the Cold War, the U.S. also sought to keep communist aggression in check using its nuclear weapons arsenal (Kinnard, 2012). Further, Eisenhower’s new national security and foreign policy outlook was inclined in the active utilization of the CIA to conduct covert operations. It is also important to note that the Eisenhower administration was more focused on establishing, promoting and sustaining good relations with governments that were deemed to be nonaligned (Kinnard, 2012).
In his inaugural speech, Kennedy sought to clearly define his foreign policy with the words: “let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty” (Dobbs, 2010). Kennedy years saw the adoption of a more informal and modest approach to foreign policy. This was in contrast from the more elaborate Eisenhower national security formation as has been described above. It should be noted that most of the closest advisors of Kennedy were of the opinion that in addition to being complacent, the foreign policy establishment of his predecessor was also suppressed, ineffective, and slow moving (Hook and Scott, 2011). In their view, as presently constituted and structured, the State Department was largely incapable of implementing and furthering their global vision. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy was fond of initiating direct contact with Department of State’s desk officers handling various foreign policy concerns on the operational front. In so doing, he eliminated the Operations Coordinating Board that had been established by Eisenhower to oversee National Security Council decisions and coordinate their effective execution. Essentially, “under Kennedy, informal, ad hoc interagency task forces replaced the formal NSC system as the primary decision-making unit for dealing with international problems” (Hook and Scott, 24). More specifically, Kennedy deemed it fit to rely on McGeorge Bundy in his role as national security affairs special assistant. On his part, Bundy gathered several individuals with a background in the academia and brought them together under the umbrella of the NSC that has been significantly scaled down. The role and responsibility of these individuals was to make sense of the Department of State as well as Pentagon recommendations on foreign policy (Dobbs, 2010). The experts in this case had their operational base at White House’s basement.
Upon assuming the reins of power, Kennedy appeared focused on seeing to it that foreign policy issues were coordinated by a new breed of NSC as well as White House staffers – most of whom were not only young, but also energetic. The said breed of foreign policy staffers did not have a thing for bureaucracy and formality as had been the case under Eisenhower. Towards this end, they largely championed informal channels. Later on, “Johnson adapted Kennedy's informal system to his personal style while also resuscitating NSC formalities for non-urgent business” (Hammond, 1992, p. 180).
Some of the two presidents’ foreign policy initiatives overlapped. For instance the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion that was initiated under Eisenhower was continued by Kennedy. It should, however, be noted that the entire operation was largely a failure as in addition to lacking critical air support, it was largely founded on faulty intelligence. Further, Kennedy sought to build on the Soviet Union negotiations that had been initiated by Eisenhower. In his last term, Eisenhower was focused on easing the hostile relations between the United States and the Soviet Union so as to set the mood for a mutual agreement seeking to ban the testing of nuclear weapons in both the ocean and the atmosphere. In 1959, the Premier of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev paid a visit to the U.S. With this visit came the hope of a substantive treaty. The visit did not bear any progress with regard to arms control. However, this was considered a step in the right direction and as Rakove (2013) point out, there was mutual understanding between the two leaders that further consultations would be conducted – with Britain and France being roped in. It should, however, be noted that nothing of substance came out of the planned summit as a consequence of what came to be known as the U-2 incident. In the words of Beschloss (2016), “the so-called “Spirit of Camp David,” however, reached an abrupt end when an American U-2 was shot down during a reconnaissance flight over Soviet territory in May 1960” (117). Here, relations were frayed after the felling of the U.S. plane by Soviet Union missiles. When the two presidents eventually met in Paris, fallout was inevitable after Khrushchev’s attempts to extract an apology from Eisenhower failed to bear fruit. In essence, this further worsened the cold war. However, the Kennedy administration pursued the deal on limiting nuclear testing and just before his assassination Kennedy was able to secure an agreement that saw the limiting of nuclear weapons testing in the earth’s atmosphere, underwater, as well as in space. Thus, “on August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of difficult negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (JFK Presidential Library and Museum, 2018). In that regard, therefore, we could say that Kennedy succeeded where Eisenhower had failed when it comes to placing limits on nuclear testing and thus the reduction or minimization of hazardous nuclear material. Also, Kennedy succeeded where Eisenhower had failed when it comes to easing cold war tensions at the time. As a matter of fact, as Hammond (1992) points out, this remains Kennedy’s most significant presidential accomplishment. Next, as it has been observed elsewhere in this text, Kennedy inherited and advanced a covert plan to overthrow Fidel Castro – the Cuban leader at the time – from the Eisenhower administration. The plan was, however, a flop.
Both presidents made use of the CIA to advance U.S. interests abroad. In Eisenhower’s perspective, the most effective approach to not only counter the expansion of communists, while at the same time aiding friendly governments during the cold war season, was to make active use of the CIA in covert operations. In no uncertain terms, Kaufman and Kaufman (2009) point out that “President Dwight D. Eisenhower used the CIA to engage in covert operations abroad” (99). According to Kaufman and Kaufman (2009), some of the approaches that the CIA made use of in their various undertakings were largely controversial and they included, but they were not limited to subversion, offering of bribes, as well as assassination attempts. It would be prudent to bring this into perspective by highlighting a few of the instances whereby the Eisenhower administration employed CIA operatives for a certain agenda.
To begin with, in 1953, soon after being elected, Eisenhower deployed the CIA machinery in Iran to help overthrow Mohammed Mossadegh – the prime minister at the time (Wilber, 2006). While there were several factors that lead to this move, of greatest relevance was the move by Iran to nationalize a British oil company by the name Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and fears that Shah Mohammed Reza would have his power and influence significantly undermined by Mossadegh. It is important to note that Shah was a critical partner of the U.S. as far as anti-communism was concerned. Later on, Eisenhower once again deployed the CIA machinery to help overthrow the Guatemalan government. In this case, the move was motivated by fears from the Eisenhower administration that President Jacobo Arbenz Gunzman was getting too comfortable with communists (Hammond, 1992). Amongst other things, Gunzman had undertaken to redistribute land to poor Guatemalan citizens in a largely controversial land reform undertaking. Eventually, he was driven from power by counterrevolutionaries backed up by the CIA. According to the Central Intelligence Agency - CIA (2011), “what unfolded in May and June of 1954 is now a familiar story in US intelligence and diplomatic history: Washington used the CIA and US Ambassador John Peurifoy to support and direct certain Guatemalan military leaders in overthrowing Arbenz's government.”
Enter President Kennedy. Hardly two months after assuming office, Kennedy – relying on intelligence reports from both the CIA and military advisers – authorized the execution of a covert operation to overthrow Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader at the time. However, the plan flopped when most of the assumptions that were incorporated into the entire undertaking failed to materialize. This particular CIA covert operation to overthrow Castro involved Cuban refugees who were opposed to Castro’s leadership. It, however, appeared that Cuban military had gotten wind of the impending invasion and the invading force was quickly neutralized. This left Kennedy with a lot of egg on the face amid repeated denials of U.S. involvement. Further afield, “the failed invasion motivated Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to attempt to place medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba, due not only to his questioning of Kennedy's resolve but also to placate the concerns of Castro” (Lynch, 2000, p. 147). As Lynch (2000) points out, the Bay of Pigs occasion led Kennedy to undertake various restructuring efforts in his administration – particularly when it came to his administration’s decision making organs. For instance, Kennedy transferred the decision-making focus from the CIA to a few of his trusted aides (Rakove, 2013). Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the Kennedy administration still continued to use the CIA to not only destabilize and torment the Cuban regime, but also push for the assassination of Fidel Castro.
It would be safe to say that Eisenhower’s diplomatic initiatives were to a large extent hinged on what Hammond (1992) refers to as nuclear diplomacy. In this case, Eisenhower’s most influential policy adviser was John Foster Dulles. For this reason, in seeking to understand Eisenhower’s ‘nuclear diplomacy’, it would be imperative to highlight Dulles stand on a few issues. Dulles, according to Hammond (1992), was in strict opposition of communism. As a matter of fact, he was clear that nations were either with the Soviet bloc or in support of the ‘Free World.’ Dulles did not also shy away from playing hardball. For instance, in an interview he gave to Life Magazine, he claimed that he had effectively brought the Korean War to an end by sending out word that the United States would not shy away from the utilization of nuclear weapons if the Korean armistice was not signed. Effectively, this was a nuclear threat to the communist powers – particularly North Korea and China. According to Hammond (1992), China could have been motivated by these threats to reach a settlement. As a consequence of this and other factors, China-U.S. relations were strained for some time. This was more so the case with Eisenhower refusal to recognize PRC. Kennedy’s administration, on the other hand, was more reserved in its approach to concerns whose likely outcome was a fully blown confrontation.
Although occurring in different time periods and under a diverse set of circumstances, both presidents’ involvement in Southeast Asia bears some similarities. In this case, it is important to note that both Eisenhower and Kennedy refused to authorize full-scale deployment of troops in the region – and instead opted to advance monetary support, weapons support, and military advice. In seeking to provide context to these assertions, it would be prudent to assess how Eisenhower handled intervention in Indochina and how Kennedy handled America’s involvement in Vietnam to defeat communism. In Indochina, Eisenhower opted to provide the French with military aid as they sought to regain control of the region. In this case, Olivia (2018) points out that “verbal warnings were accompanied by increased US economic and military assistance for the French to offset China aid for the Vietminh” (219). According to Olivia (2018), at some point, the Eisenhower administration was settling up to three-quarters of the French war costs. A true indication of the unwillingness of the Eisenhower administration to commit troops in this case was in 1954 when French troops were encircled by Vietminh fighters in a garrison located in one of the region’s most remote parts. With the situation getting more desperate each passing day, the French made a request for US intervention through an airstrike (Kinnard, 2012). The request was turned down and the French ended up surrendering. When it comes to President Kennedy, it should be noted that with reference to America’s involvement in Vietnam to defeat communism, huge amounts of money were allocated in seeking to enlarge the army of South Vietnam. Although the monetary support was later on graduated to military support, no full-scale deployment of troops in the region was authorized up until Kennedy’s death. Instead, the most Kennedy’s administration advanced to the South Vietnamese government was military support and advise, economic support, as well as political support. The number of American advisers was scaled gradually but it still fell short of a full-scale deployment of troops in the region.
An assessment of the foreign policy of both leaders would not be complete without an analysis of their foreign policy on third world countries. It was during Eisenhower’s time that the demands for non-alignment, nationalism, as well as decolonization from numerous Third World countries became louder and well-pronounced (Hook and Scott, 2011). Eisenhower, according to Rakove (2013), did not appear keen on engaging third world nationalism and as a matter of fact appeared too focused on other competing undertakings (i.e. the Cold War) to take keen interests in third world concerns. Perhaps, it is for this reason that most regard Eisenhower as a sympathizer to strongman and European rule. Kennedy’s approach was in sharp contrast. The decolonization process continued into Kennedy’s rule and as Hammond (1992) observes, Kennedy was keen on establishing good relations with Third World leadership and its people. Indeed, in the words of Rakove (2013), “in the eyes of Kennedy and his advisors, Eisenhower had failed to meet a growing Soviet political offensive in Africa and Asia” (11). Kennedy was convinced that Eisenhower and his administration had largely relinquished or remitted to communists some of the states that were emerging in Africa as well as Asia and Latin America. Towards this end, Kennedy not only placed special emphasis on Africa, but also expanded economic aid to third world countries.
Conclusion
It is clear from the discussion above that both President J.F. Kennedy and President Eisenhower approached foreign policy in ways that were both different and similar in some aspects. The key foreign policy issue that appears shared across the board during both administrations is opposition to the spread of communism. Also, although both presidents sought to defend democracy abroad, Kennedy’s record is more prominent on this front than that of Eisenhower. It should, however, be noted that owing to the fact that both presidents reigned during different time periods and under a diverse set of circumstances, a side by side comparison of their foreign policies is not possible. The viewpoints presented herein offer an informed, albeit generalist, perspective of the two leaders’ approach to foreign policy.

References
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