In refusing to bargain or negotiate with Mr. Bolton, attorney for Mr. Allen, the Postal Service was upholding its contract with the Union to consider the Union the sole bargaining agent for Mr. Allen and other rural mail carriers. The Union's claim that management discounted the information provided by Mr. Bolton because he was a non-bargaining agent is a gross misrepresentation of the occurrence; no real information was provided by Mr. Bolton that had bearing on this case, and management politely but firmly denied to further correspond with the attorney for matters it had contracted to negotiate through the union. Management had stated that Allen would be reinstated should the charges be dropped or Allen acquitted, and until that time the grievance and dismissal were solely labor -- and not criminal -- concerns.

There is no reason that the Union should not be allowed to provide character witnesses attesting to Allen's job performance and overall standing in the community, however these witnesses and their testimony have relatively little to no bearing on the case. Again, the issue that such testimony has direct bearing on is the establishment of nexus, in determining whether or not Mr. Allen's alleged off-duty conduct would have a detrimental effect on his ability to perform his job, or in his customers' appraisal of him in the performance of his duties. Ultimately, unless overwhelming community support and compelling testimony related to Mr. Allen's performance of his job as a mail carrier was presented by character witnesses, such witnesses would have no real legal bearing on the contractual issues at hand, but the Union should not be prevented from presenting such testimony.

One of the multiple arguments central to the Union's case is the level of proof needed and used by management in their decision to dismiss Allen....

Much of the confusion is unnecessary, however; the language of the contract specifies that "reasonable cause" to believe a crime that could result in imprisonment has been committed provides "just cause" for dismissal. both standards apply, then, but to two different aspects. The result of this language is that if management can prove that it had "reasonable cause" to believe Allen had committed the criminal acts for which he had been indicted, it automatically had "just cause" to terminate Allen. Management asserts -- presumably with ample proof, though this is not detailed in the case study -- that arbitrators have consistently upheld a criminal indictment as "reasonable cause" to believe a crime has been committed. As detailed above, an indictment requires the presentation of evidence and allows for a preliminary defense to be mounted. The resulting eleven felony indictments in this case were all the result of consideration by a grand jury of Mr. Allen's peers in accordance with the law; the grand jury found reasonable cause to believe that crimes were committed and committed by Allen, and there should be no need for management to conduct its own investigation as a means of second-guessing an established court procedure.
There is ample proof that Allen indeed committed the acts that resulted in his criminal indictments. Whether or not these indictments stand remains to be seen (at the conclusion of the case study), and management's insistence that Mr. Allen will be reinstated should he be acquitted of the charges or the charges dropped should be honored. The Postal Service was fully within its rights to dismiss Allen in light of his indictments, however, as there was sufficient reason to believe he had committed the crimes. The fact that Allen refused to push for a speedy trial could even cost him some back pay should he be reinstated.