Mind: Overview and Proposed Experiment

¶ … Mind: Overview and proposed experiment 'Theory of mind' refers to the ability to understand the mental states of others, and often implies that an understanding of what we call 'the mind' is universal, although mental abilities may vary between individuals (Gauvain 1998, p.37). The degree to which a theory of mind is influenced by cultural factors remains a subject of fierce debate amongst scholars in the field of psychology.

On one hand, it does seem as if there is a definite physiological component to this cognitive mechanism to understand the mental states of others. Cross-culturally, it seems as if the biological basis of being able to develop a theory of mind begins around age four or five, at least based upon existing literature.

For example, Baka children, members of a hunter-gatherer tribe in West Africa, begin to understand that what they think or feel is not necessarily transmittable automatically to everyone else at this age, similar to Westerners (Gauvain 1998, p.38). Such a universal timetable thus suggests that acquiring a theory of mind on the part of children is comparable to Piaget's understanding of the developmental component to comprehending conservation of matter.

Supporters of hard-wired 'theory of mind' contend that it could have an evolutionary value, noting that success in the social world often demands empathy and also an understanding of the mental processes of others (Gauvain 1998, p.38). Attributing one's own cognitive abilities and mental states to everyone else in the environment is not a useful survival skill, in other words.

However, evidence of the cultural component of a theory of mind lies in children's ability to learn 'social scripts,' like how to play with a toy like a Jack-in -- the Box 'correctly' from watching one's parents (Gauvain 1998, p.38). Furthermore, some theorists, such as Angelina Lillard, suggest even more radically that the entire construct of a theory of mind is bound by culture, noting how witches or outside forces in some cultures are often offered as explanations for other people's moods, rather than differing internal psychologies.

The development of a theory of mind, in other words, is dependant upon one's location within a specific cultural context, and like reading it must be learned, even though there are neurological factors that influence when this skill can be learned. But just like learning to read is not automatically acquired unless it is taught, and not all societies are literate, likewise learning a theory of mind is not automatic, nor do all societies possess such cognitive capacity.

Lillard points out to support her contention that even within Western culture, great variances to the degree a theory of mind is adopted exists within particular social groups. The degree to which children are socialized and the children's educational or socioeconomic status seem to influence their ability to perceive differences between their own cognitive processes and the cognitive processes of others.

Thus, on one hand, individuals with cognitive disabilities that affect their capacity for empathy like autism may appear to have their 'theory of mind' impaired but not their intellect, but in general, assessments of intellectual skill across a number of domains indicate poorer performance by children regarding their 'theory of mind' who are economically disadvantaged. This suggests that culture has a profound effect upon the biological capabilities that enable the person to develop theory of mind, and that such biological tendencies do not automatically activate without cultural prompting.

At very least, there may be several influences contributing to the development of a theory of mind. Acquiring a theory of mind relies upon both the subject's biological capacity to learn a theory of mind as well as cultural forces. But critics of Lillard suggest that learned, social experience may serve a dual role.

These social influences "direct children toward an awareness of the mind and its properties," and there must be that established capacity to have such awareness, even if that capacity can be activated to a greater degree in some individuals than in others, depending on their culture and socialization (Gauvain 1998, p.39). However, because of translating different cultural concepts, cross-cultural studies such as those of the Baka can prove problematic: "How can one know whether similar behaviors have similar meaning across cultures capacity," when designing experiments? (Gauvain 1998, p.40).

It is particularly difficult to elicit responses regarding what a subject things 'another' feels. Thus cross-cultural definitions of a theory of mind are difficult to determine, given that the child's experience is culturally marked by languages and concepts from the start of life. Lillard contends that it is simply not tenuous to claim that the child has core understandings about other people that exist outside of culture, given the degree to which language, manners, rituals, and folk psychological understandings of others are shaped by cultural constraints. (Lillard 1998, p. 44).

Specifically regarding her inquiry about 'folk' psychological understanding in cultures, Angelina Lillard refers to the apparent tendency in other cultures to attribute outside forces, like spirits or witches, as the source of differences in behavior rather than minds. "The crucial issue is how much of folk psychology is the encapsulated product of theorizing within the child and how...much is folk psychology like manners, resulting from culture's often capricious-seeming dictates, combined with the child's developmental level, and how much is it like Piagetian conservation?" (Lillard 1998, p. 44).

Differences in children's experience with schooling and language and their apparent effect on a theory of mind further support Lillard's notion, even if they do not 'prove' her contention (Gauvain 1998, p.40). Some might counter that, although a theory of mind is not synonymous with intelligence, it could develop in consort with other intellectual activities, and much like intelligence is shaped by a variety of forces but there is still some innate 'mindful' quality.

On the other hand, analogizing a theory of mind to intelligence may be even thornier, given whether there is a general cross-cultural definition of intelligence is itself in contention. Critics of Lillard would no doubt point out that empathy and understanding the emotions of others is affected by biology -- teenagers may be more apt to see hostility in faces than their adult counterparts, for example. To specifically test the universality of a theory of mind, using the question of developmental stages might be illuminated through the following.

First, a cross-cultural selection of individuals from a variety, or two different (low or high-context, for example) cultural backgrounds should be pooled. The.