Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L. Ed. 2D 955 Jesse Montejo and Jerry Moore were interrupted during a burglary by the owner of the residence, Lewis Ferrari (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). Montejo was picked up for questioning the next day and after waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966), admitted to shooting and killing Lewis Ferrari during the burglary. When Montejo was arraigned two days later in court, he stood mute as the court appointed counsel.

A few hours after the arraignment, police detectives visited Montejo at the jail (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). During the end of the ensuing discussion, Montejo waved his Miranda rights and agreed to take them to the murder weapon. During the trip to locate the murder weapon, Montejo wrote a letter of apology to the victim's widow.

The defense attempted to suppress the letter of apology during the jury trial, to no avail (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). The conviction was for murder in the first degree and the sentence was death. Montejo appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, using the argument that Jackson v. Michigan (475 U.S., at 626, 1986) should apply. According to Montejo's attorneys, being advised of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel should have invoked a prophylactic protection against subsequent interrogations without counsel being present, regardless of whether the defendant waived his rights. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, citing Montoya v. Collins (955 F. 2d 279, 1992), which they interpreted as holding that a defendant must request counsel before the Jackson rule can be invoked.

Issues Brought Before the U.S. Supreme Court

The overall issue brought before the U.S. Supreme Court was the parameters governing application of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Based on the majority opinion (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009),...

Supreme Court, 2009). Some states have equated notification with invocation, thus preventing police and prosecutors from 'badgering' the accused after arraignment. The Court viewed Edwards v. Arizona (451 U.S. 477, 1981) as sufficient for providing a prophylaxis rule against later waivers; however, Edwards was not interpreted as a complete bar against the defendant seeking out the police voluntarily. In other states, a Miranda warning is considered sufficient notification, but not equivalent to invocation. In other words, a defendant in some states has to request representation unequivocally for Edwards to be invoked.
The majority opinion also discussed at length the problems that the ruling in Jackson v. Michigan creates for the latter states (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). The Court in Jackson held that being informed of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is legally equivalent to invoking this right, and therefore the police must not initiate contact with the defendant after arraignment. The majority opinion held in Montejo v. Louisiana that the Jackson rule is unnecessary because Edwards provides a prophylactic rule against badgering by the police that can be applied to all states. The Court therefore overturned Jackson. The Miranda-Edwards-Minnick rulings, with Minnick v. Mississippi (498 U.S. 146, 151, 1990) finding that a defendant cannot be interrogated without…