Moral Minima (the Good Society,

¶ … Moral Minima" (the Good Society, 2010), Professor Lenn Goodman presents a framework for what he considers the most basic moral principles that underlie an objective approach to universal morality in human societies. In doing so, Professor Goodman first explains the conceptual limitations of the relativistic approach to moral frameworks and then attempts to outline a set of values that satisfy more objective principle of morality that he considers appropriate for use as universal moral standards. Specifically, the author suggests that the most fundamental moral rules are those pertaining to truth, genocide, terrorism, rape, polygamy, clitorectomy, and incest. While Professor Goodman's intentions are admirable and many of his characterizations are accurate, his attempt ultimately falls prey to the very same relativistic reasoning that he sets out to criticize.

Truth vs. Good Faith

Goodman devotes considerable attention to the concept of truth, in which he lays out the conceptual problems of defining truth too narrowly so that the deliberately precise use of linguistics can violate the spirit of truthfulness without necessarily violating the most literal definition of what is meant by truth. He also explains the moral problem of adhering to the truth absolutely or blindly, irrespective of the result, such as in the case of virtuous lies intended to avoid specific types of harms. While the author does explain the limitations of truthfulness at both ends of that spectrum, he never reconciles them or suggests a solution. Curiously, he does not introduce the notion of good faith, which, especially in connection with fundamental principles of virtue ethics, could solve many of the problems associated with both rigid truthfulness that ignores negative consequences as well as narrow truthfulness designed to violate the spirit of truthfulness while adhering to its literal definition. The good faith standard would allow deviations from a general principle of valuing truthfulness based on logically valid (and morally virtuous) exceptions; it would also strictly prohibit deliberate violations of the spirit of truthfulness by precisely chosen words with the narrowest possible definition for the express purpose of circumventing the general obligation to be truthful.

Genocide, Wholesale Murder, and Racial Prejudice

Professor Goodman asserts that genocide is "uglier" than "generic" mass murder, predicated on the additional immoral quality of the genocidal intent over the mere element of scale. However, the author does not substantiate that assertion other than by the a priori statement that the intention to destroy a race, culture, or a linguistic or ethnic identity, or a class of people is, by its nature, worse than murdering the same number of human beings randomly or arbitrarily. It is not clear why this is necessarily true, partly because the very concepts of race, culture, and linguistic or ethnic identity are, themselves, arbitrary. They are arbitrary in that race (in particular) is now understood to be a purely artificial man-made distinction that is not supported by genetic science. Likewise, culture is nothing more than a set of beliefs, values, and norms of groups of people; in principle, they are also completely arbitrary. By Goodman's analysis, the systematic murder of one million people motivated by the specific intention of genocide is morally worse than the systematic murder of one million and one people selected arbitrarily. The author does not explain why the motivation for unjustified murder is such an important distinction; it would seem that unjustified murder is always wrong and that the scale of victims is always a more accurate measure of that moral offense than the reason or intent behind unjustified murder of innocent people.

Polygamy, Rape, Incest, and Genital Mutilation

Professor Goodman's reasoning about polygamy, rape, incest, and genital mutilation represent his weakest line of reasoning. Specifically, his view of polygamy completely ignores the issue of gender inequality and suggests that polygamy is necessarily harmful to women. The obvious counterargument is that this is only true because of the extent to which women are already objectified and comparatively powerless in patriarchal societies. Without underlying gender inequality, there is no reason that polygamy or polyandry could not be appropriate in certain situations.

Professor Goodman suggests that rape is always wrong, which is absolutely true, but hardly because rape is conceptually different from other forms of abuse and exploitation. It violates the rights, dignity, and autonomy of the victim and causes profound harm; on the other hand, rape is undoubtedly "preferable" to many other imaginable forms of torture. Furthermore, the author suggests that statutory rape is indistinguishable from forced rape. That is also untrue: sexual relations that are perfectly legal in many states would be statutory rape in neighboring states by virtue of different statutory definitions of the age of sexual consent.