Movement of Military Air Freight Post 9 11 World

How Military Air Freight Moves in Post-9/11 World

Introduction

The American armed forces seemingly dictate state-on-state war. Its last true challenger in the military arena was the disbanded Soviet Union. The latest conflicts like Iraqi Freedom, Panama, Desert Storm (Iraq), Libya, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan demonstrate that the American military has succeeded in accomplishing its classic military goals against other nations’ armies in various circumstances. Accomplishing military goals of political significance against terrorists, rebels, and other non-state players have been increasingly tricky (Bolkcom & Katzman, 2006). Fighting non-state players was earlier widely perceived as a “lesser included case” as such players were seemingly less of a threat to the nation’s security when compared to well-financed, sophisticated, and far more militarily powerful armies of hostile countries. 

But the 9/11 attacks graphically demonstrated that even small clusters of non-governmental players could take advantage of the commercially available, fairly cheap present-day technology for carrying out highly lethal attacks over large distances. A scant number of contemporary observers regard non-state players as the previously-mentioned “lesser included case.” It is increasingly acknowledged that, in several instances, fighting non-state players poses a distinctive and usually bigger series of challenges as compared to fighting typical military enemies. Decision-makers at the top-level utilize innumerable instruments for finding, tracking, detecting, apprehending, neutralizing, and eliminating terrorist individuals and groups and other non-governmental players. An examination of the latest anti-terrorism endeavors reveals the prominent contribution of military aviation in carrying out the above tasks. Congressional issues include whether the American military aviation is appropriately financed, trained, deployed, equipped, and organized to fight non-state players (Beneš, 2017). In this paper, background information on terrorism and other non-state player challenges will be presented, in addition to the potential contribution of military aviation to operations undertaken against these players. The next section deals with military aviation employment problems against non-state players and potential alternatives to consider.

Challenges of Combating Non-State Actors

The American armed forces can be deployed against nations giving refuge to terrorists or sponsoring terrorist events. The widely-held belief is that the U.S. army is typically well-equipped and trained to face the challenges connected with defeating regular armies of terrorism-sponsoring governments. This paper concentrates on several challenges related to military aviation adoption to combat non-state players, including terrorists directly. The challenges are segregated into the following three groups: operational challenges, cost challenges, and mindset challenges (Perl, 2003).

Operational challenges

As opposed to a country’s army, non-state players can be easily defeated in a direct combat situation. The latter normally do not possess the discipline, equipment, and training defining national armies. The main operational issue lies in actual direct fights with such players as they commonly don no uniforms. Rather, they mostly try to blend in with the domestic civilian population, rendering their identification highly difficult. Furthermore, they seldom congregate into easily identifiable arrangements and largely lack overt logistical processes or large infrastructure. Thus, they pose some “high-value” targets for the American military. Defense Department leaders are well-aware of the challenge presented by this faction, as evidenced by the following statement:

“For many years, though, there’s been a concern that intelligence collection capability rested in the ability to find a tank or an artillery piece hiding in a grove of trees. The problem now becomes how to find individuals hiding in groups of people...This presents a huge problem for us” (Simons & Tucker, 2003).

Non-country entities like Al Qaeda have an obscure framework and leadership. They may be diffuse, operating over great distances. For instance, the Al Qaeda frequently operates via small partner organizations with fluid leadership. If one leader of an outfit gets apprehended or killed, he is swiftly replaced by another. Hence, military strategists might struggle with even characterizing their non-state player targets.

Non-state players, once recognized, usually prove hard to engage on account of collateral damage-linked concerns. Even typical conflicts between nation-states pose such concerns. But when one entity actively attempts at using non-combatants as its shield, it becomes ever-more important to deliver weapons effects extremely precisely. A RAND research summarizes these operational issues:

“...ferreting out individuals or small groups of terrorists, positively identifying them, and engaging them without harming nearby civilians is an extremely demanding task. Substantial improvements will be needed in several areas before the Air Force can be confident of being able to provide this capability to combatant commanders” (Ochmanek, 2003).

Mindset Challenges

To effectively fight non-state players potentially requires approaches, engagement principles, training, policy, and political plans different from typical military warfare. Such changes can together call for a distinctive politico-military outlook for senior military authorities engaged in making decisions.

American lawmakers, armed forces, and the masses prefer short conflicts marked by well-defined conditions for success, conclusive wins, and exit plans. Conventionally, “victory” usually involved absolute surrender on the part of the enemy. However, when it comes to non-state players, to not lose might be how they define the term ‘victory’; that they still exist constitutes a victory for them, an outlook that typifies numerous Palestinian terrorists who resisted against Israeli occupation of Palestine’s territories. They are mostly incapable of achieving swift, conclusive victories and, thus, adopt a protracted war approach; in the words of Searle (2004), “...insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organizations consciously design themselves so that our military and police forces cannot rapidly and decisively defeat them.” To a terrorist, even giving his/her life deliberately for supporting their cause is considered a victory. This is a wholly different paradigm when compared with the historical military aim to limit casualties. The above act is typical of Hamas, Al Qaeda, and other groups who resort to suicide tactics.

The 9/11 attacks may demand and might have already triggered an altered perspective concerning the degree of threat that ought to spur the nation’s armed forces to act. Fear of non-state players such as terrorists getting a hold of weapons of mass destruction (e.g., a chemical, nuclear, or biological weapon) has provoked debate on the nation’s preventative or preemptive deployment military. Though several parties are pro-preemptive strategies for obviating forthcoming attacks on the nation’s interests, how “imminent” may be defined is a highly contentious subject (Lasley & Guffey, 2017). Additionally, preventing rebels’ victory over-friendly states might not suffice to avert such threats. Rather, the nation might wish to obstruct non-state players attempting to occupy large areas of countries as such areas may become training camps for terrorists and their base to commence attacks across the globe. One example of such a threat is the recent unearthing of a rebel chemical weapons laboratory in Iraq’s Fallujah district.

Within traditional warfare settings, militaries mostly aim to avoid civilians or protect them against the consequences of war. But in the case of non-state enemies, civilians might be involved unprecedentedly. To wind the minds and hearts of the masses or not alienate them, at a minimum, they may prove to be a major element of the broad counterterrorism or counter-insurgency approach.

Rebels and terrorists need at least the silent, if not overt, support of residents and citizens for succeeding in their operations. A military general of the U.K. armed forces in charge of counter-insurgency efforts claims, “The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us” (Ochmanek, 2003). But military operations that form the forte of the contemporary military, like precise destruction of edifices or automobiles, might work against the aforementioned minds-and-hearts approach. One research work contends that “counter terrorist military attacks against elusive terrorists may serve only to radicalize large sectors of the (Muslim) population and damage the U.S. image worldwide” (Krueger, 2017).

Cost Challenges

Virtually by definition, a non-state player resorts to cheap techniques and weapons instead of training, deploying and equipping an actual military force. Nevertheless, costs of defense against, or fighting, non-state players may be great. For instance, terrorists may get their hands on MANPADS or man-portable air defense systems for a mere 5,000 dollars. If a terror outfit successfully uses a shoulder-fired missile to shoot down a passenger aircraft, the direct cost of losing an aircraft will amount to more than a hundred million dollars, with much greater indirect costs. Moreover, fielding commercial flight technologies for safeguarding against such threats can cost the nation ten billion dollars in only acquisition costs (Bolkcom & Katzman, 2006). Identification and fielding of techniques and systems for cost-effective battling of terrorists may prove to be a major challenge to rise above.

Aviation Activities Highly Relevant to Combating Non-State Actors

In the proper context, nearly all military aviation activities or assets may help fight non-state players. Nevertheless, some may be more directly relevant as compared to others.

Close Air Support (CAS)

CAS represents an armed forces aviation objective that seems to be highly applicable to non-state players’ challenge. The DOD definition for CAS is air action using rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft against enemies situated close to friendly armies and calls for comprehensive integration of individual air missions with the forces’ movement and fire (Gortney, 2012).

Several functions like adversary tracking, distinguishing between friends and enemies, swift weapon delivery against targets in motion, and close control and coordination of ground and air forces for reducing the likelihood of collateral damage or fratricide, characteristic of CAS, apply to air-based actions undertaken against non-government players. Thus, evaluating the evolution of CAS missions, the main challenges intrinsic to the missions, and how they are being dealt with at present ought to offer a valuable framework to assess military aviation application against non-state players.

The CAS mission has been regarded by many as being traditionally overlooked in support of air-to-air fights and other more thrilling missions. But latest defense departmental activity indicates that CAS has been garnering increasing focus and is now a rising mission area, probably on account of changes in foes’ nature, the evolution of airpower strategy, and technological advances.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) Germane to Air Operations

The American SOFs represent small, specially-trained, and –equipped military entities. Their specialized training encompasses foreign languages, terminal air control, psychological operations, and complex piloting skills. Meanwhile, specialized equipment encompasses MC-130E/H Combat Talon I/II aircraft, and MH-53J/M Pave Low helicopters. These forces, numbering roughly 40,000 marines, soldiers, airmen, and sailors, can be seen in every military service (Feickert, 2010).

SOFs may engage in indirect as well as direct operations against non-state players. Their direct actions encompass gathering intelligence, covert insertion of their forces close to their non-state targets, and carrying out rescue missions to save forces such as the SOF detained or pursued by these entities. Furthermore, they are authorized to catch “high value” members of terrorist organizations. Terminal strike aircraft control constitutes a frequently-reported SOF undertaking against non-state players.

Aviation-Foreign Internal Defense (A-FID)

Further, Special Operations Forces may engage in action indirectly against non-state players. One such key indirect undertaking is giving counsel to friendly foreign nations on FID (foreign internal defense) – one among the main missions of the SOF assigned through the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that led to the American’s creation of Special Operations Command. The defense department definition of FID is “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency” ((Bolkcom & Katzman, 2006). The Air Force Special Operations Command holds that:

“The aviation aspect of FID (aviation-FID, or A-FID) is essentially one of training and advising foreign aviation forces in the sustained use of airpower supporting their internal defense and development strategies. Aviation-FID is employed as a complement to other SOF component operations within various theaters of operation. It includes such activities as support for counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, anti-terrorism, and counter-poaching” (Gentile, 2009).

Air Assets in Military Air Operations post 9/11

Air asset employment against terror suspects or rebel leaders has garnered prominence publicly post 9/11. However, their application didn’t exactly begin only after 9/11, and America wasn’t the first nation to do so. However, post 9/11, the U.S. military seems to be increasingly utilizing airpower during its anti-terrorism missions. American forces have carried out several successful airstrikes on Al Qaeda’s senior leaders and associates.

The Air force’s airstrikes were largely reliant on accurate intelligence procurement from ground sources (commonly allied military and intelligence entities). In major cases, air power-based strikes weren’t carried out owing to the absence of actionable and timely intelligence. Airpower employment, particularly predictor drones, to eliminate terrorist organization leadership is a fairly new practice (i.e., post-9/11); however, American strategists have reportedly been drawing from and expanding on Israel’s experience that of other allies. Israel has been known to adopt this technique for several years now.

Issues and Options

Acquisition Priorities

Defense circles concur that airpower represents one of the main military advantages America has at its disposal. But some exhibit increasing concerns that military aviation concentrates too greatly on calls for combating traditional enemies with no thought for unconventional warfare; further, the American air force’s challenge is: reshaping its force for increasing its relevance within the context of small wars while sustaining the capacity of emerging victorious in big conflicts (McCarthy, 2004). Some hold that the defense department’s broad acquisition priorities continue to be too focused on big “high tech” acquisitions that are most relevant to combating or dissuading peer rivals in inter-state conflicts. If a change is to be effected in military aviation’s acquisition priorities for equipping American air forces fighting non-state players, systems to be considered intelligence; sensors; munitions; unmanned and manned aircraft; and BMC3 (battle management, command, communications, and control).

Sensors, Intelligence, and Decision Making

Improvements in airborne sensors, BMC3, and intelligence, which have the potential to most efficiently improve the nation’s capabilities to fight non-state players, can be ideally defined using broad overlapping functions like detection, decision making, and discrimination. New-generation sensors might be required to fly on such sensor platforms to improve the American forces’ capability to detect and track small adversary fighter groups’ activities. Additionally, improved I.R. (infrared) and E.O. (electro-optical) sensors help detect non-state players in all scenarios. However, one can argue that they are most applicable to remote settings.

HUMINT or human intelligence constitutes another instrument for detecting and keeping an eye on terrorists. But contrary to SIGINT, this isn’t a recognized forte of the U.S. Nevertheless, in several instances, it may be the sole means of identifying terrorist leadership. Though most HUMINT comes under the intelligence community’s domain, the defense departmental SOFs may play their part by questioning apprehended terrorists and undertaking a search of their facilities and equipment (Bolkcom & Katzman, 2006). Such activities may help uncover weapons terrorists have access to and provide insights into upcoming terrorist campaigns.

Aircraft

Strike: Various combat aircraft may be employed for attacking non-state players, but the AC-130 gunships and A-10 Warthogs of the Air Force specialize most when it comes to this mission aspect. Greater utilization of UCAVs (unmanned combat aerial vehicles) here seems promising as well. Even in times of intense need (e.g., when ground forces were struggling to acquire control over Iraq’s Fallujah city), the former wasn’t flown during the daytime (Bolkcom & Katzman, 2006). This failure was dealt with in the following three general ways: improving the survivability of the AC-130, creating a novel gunship based on a better aircraft, or combining unmanned or manned aircraft for offering closer air support.

Airlift: Fighting non-state players such as terrorists can increase focus on airlift competencies because of adversary activity and geography. This can impact modernization and acquisition priorities. Further, mission and role arguments between services may be stirred. The significance of efficient airlifts in missions carried out against non-state players has been acknowledged for some years. Air transport, although argued to be costlier and less effective as compared to ground transport over such distances, was considered vital to safeguarding soldiers’ and civilians’ lives.

Covert Insertion, Extraction, and Combat Search and Rescue. American SOFs operate various highly specialized fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters (e.g., the MH-47E Chinook of the army and the HH-60G Pave Hawk, MC-130E/H Combat Talon, and MH-53J/M Pave Low aircraft of the air force) for stealthily inserting, extracting, and searching for friendly militaries in challenging missions (Liles & Bolkcom, 2004). Several upgrades to extant aircraft are pursued, improving their capacities and extending their lives. No less than three new aircraft are under consideration for use in the future, for stealthy counter-insurgency and -terrorism military forces’ (including SOFs) movement. The V-22 Osprey represents the most advanced concept.