Military Operations Versus Police Operations

MILITARY vs. POLICE INTELLIGENCE Military Operations vs. Police Operations What is the best way to gather intelligence? Strengths and weaknesses of military operations and intelligence vs. police operations and intelligence Although there are certain similarities between the organization of the military and the police in terms of their hierarchical natures and systems of control, their mentalities regarding intelligence-gathering are very different. This makes the sharing of intelligence all the more crucial between these two protective organizations.

A comparison of the military mindset with the police mindset, suggests that law enforcement officials have much to learn from their military counterparts, even though it is not realistic to entirely transpose the military approach to that of police operations. One obvious advantage the military has in terms of its intelligence and operational capabilities is its international focus. The military has trained specialist intelligence analysts with a specific background in the regions under scrutiny. These analysts also have fluency in the foreign language of the region.

"The armed forces tend to have good programmes for developing linguists and seek to identify gaps in their cover of relevant languages. The use of reservists with particular language skills is another valuable advantage when a mission is in an area where the native language is not a 'world language'" (Gillvray n.d. 1). Understanding the language and culture of a high-risk area can make soliciting information far easier from locals and can make it easier to interpret information in general: what may appear to be innocuous in an U.S.

context is not necessarily the case outside the U.S. The military also has a critically different worldview than most police agencies: it is committed to security and gathering intelligence to protect the safety of the U.S., versus gathering evidence to establish guilt or innocence in a court of law.

While police detectives "aim at meeting a specific legal standard -- 'probable cause,' for example, or 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or 'preponderance of evidence,'" the intention of military intelligence-gathering is to paint a more holistic picture of the situation (Berkowitz 2003). Evidence-gathering begins at a discrete point in time: "it depends on whether you want to start an investigation, put a suspect in jail or win a civil suit.

Intelligence, on the other hand, rarely tries to prove anything; its main purpose is to inform officials and military commanders" (Berkowitz 2003). Intelligence gathering is a consistent process vs. The terminal and focused nature of an investigation. "Intelligence analysts -- one hopes -- go to work before a crisis; detectives usually go to work after a crime. Law enforcement agencies take their time and doggedly pursue as many leads as they can. Intelligence analysts usually operate against the clock" (Berkowitz 2003).

Intelligence agents constantly provide feedback to policy makers seeking to make the best decisions they can with the knowledge at their disposal -- they do not wait for an investigation to have 'enough' evidence to proceed to trial. The nature of the 'target' of military intelligence also tends to be different from the focus of police organizations.

Terrorists and enemies of the United States are critically aware that they are being watched and thus are constantly altering their strategy to evade detection, usually in a manner far more sophisticated than the average criminal. Direct patrolling and constant vigilance is a critical component of the military mindset in light of the fact that the enemy is always looking for a way to strike: "Reconnaissance is a normal part of soldiering as are systems to record and utilise information gathered.

The use of directed patrolling, and the specific tasking of patrols, for intelligence purposes is a norm. This can be used for both human intelligence and data collection" (Gillvray n.d. 3). Since 9/11 there has been an attempt to refocus the orientation of police evidence-gathering to make it simulate that of a military organization, given the growing awareness that local law enforcement agencies are on the front lines of defending the U.S. against terrorist threats.

Federal grants were used to fund special intelligence and counterterrorism units within police organizations and fusion centers were created to coordinate evidence-sharing between local and national agencies. However, these bodies have been criticized because the "lack clear guidelines for managing data collection and dissemination" (New report, 2013, The Brennan Center). Also, unlike the military, the police must be mindful of not violating the civil rights of the persons they are investigating, yet another frequent criticism in the reconfiguration of police operations in the post-9/11 reality.

Although police agencies have tried to adopt the 'constant' intelligence-gathering model, there have also been criticisms that this has resulted in an increase in the accumulation of irrelevant data which has led to both an erosion of civil liberties and to difficulties in processing what information has been accumulated.

With a "a loosely coordinated information sharing network with data collected according to varying local standards and with insufficient quality control, accountability, or oversight" there can often be wide variations in the competency of the personnel and the quality of the information (New.