Kennedy had to find out what the other side really wanted. (Ury, 1993, p.12) in 1962, the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States militarily, as Soviet missiles were only powerful enough to be launched against Europe but U.S. missiles were capable of striking the entire Soviet Union. Thus, Khrushchev had used intermediate-range missiles in Cuba because a "deployment in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the Soviet Union," once the missiles were assembled ("An Overview of the Crisis," the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997). In short, the U.S.S.R. wanted security, and security would also mean a safe, and a face-saving way out of the current situation.
Step 4: Reframe
Kennedy shifted to openness, from secrecy, and declared that any nuclear action launched from Cuba against a nation of the Western Hemisphere would be deemed a hostile act upon the United States, and demanded the missiles be withdrawn ("Public Phase," the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997). As tensions escalated, "Kennedy believed that only an invasion or a trade (for missiles in Turkey) would now succeed ("Ends of a Rope," the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997).
Step 5: Build a golden bridge
However, Kennedy did not listen to his most militaristic advisors, who wished there to be an invasion, especially after a U-2 plane that had flown accidentally into Soviet airspace was shot down. Instead, even after receiving conflicting messages, during the public negotiations, Kennedy held onto an original proposal, that...
supervision in exchange for a public pledge from the U.S. not to invade Cuba ("Ends of a Rope," the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997).
Step 5: Use power to educate, even if the other side seems intransigent
This allowed the Soviet Union to save face, even though the United States had not really granted anything significant, as it had no intention of invading. By ignoring Khrushchev's most militaristic language, Kennedy was able to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table, and keep them at the bargaining table, without looking weak. Also, because Khrushchev had put the missiles in Cuba to counteract against American nuclear superiority, Kennedy's promise allowed Khrushchev to say to hard-liners within his own government that he had gained something through his policy, and realized his primary objective without backing down.
Works Cited
An Overview of the Crisis." The Cuban Missile Crisis. 1997. 23 Feb 2007. http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/index.html
Discovery." The Cuban Missile Crisis. 1997. 23 Feb 2007. http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/discovery.html
Ends of a Rope." The Cuban Missile Crisis. 1997. 1997. 23 Feb 2007. http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/rope.html
Public Phase." The Cuban Missile Crisis. 1997. 1997. 23 Feb 2007. http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/public.html
Ury, William. Getting to Yes. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992.
Ury, William. Getting Past No. New York: Bantam, 1994.
