Psychology - Human Observation Human

Psychology - Human Observation HUMAN OBSERVATION Gathering Baseline Information Attractiveness plays a fundamental role in the way that humans respond to one another and can even compromise security functions in law enforcement and private- sector physical security maintenance.

Numerous previous studies have documented the influence of relative attractiveness on the friendliness of strangers, vocational interview assessment (Macionis, 2003), and on the generosity and helpfulness of passersby in situations where there assistance would obviously have been appreciated but were not necessitated by emergency, such as the dropping of paperwork by a cohort in an elevator next to research subjects (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2007).

In the physical security industry, if officers and agents are susceptible to this natural dynamics of gender relations, awareness training should address that potential security lapse and the specific situations in which it may arise. Generally, this issue tends to arise more in connection with the influence of female attractiveness on male behavior than the reverse, as well as more than same-sex encounters (Hockenbury & Hockenbury, 2007; LeVay, 1994; Zuk, 2002).

Theory: In long-term physical security checkpoints such as limited public access facilities or private property, checkpoint staff are responsible for adhering strictly to procedures and protocols. In some security situations involving manned checkpoints, male security staff are susceptible to the influence of female attractiveness in altering their adherence to protocol, particularly in low-level-of-risk situations where officer and agents are, by order, prohibited from exercising discretion, such as permitting access based on personal familiarity where an I.D. card is absolutely required.

It is anticipated that female attractiveness can influence the judgment of male perimeter security agents in certain circumstances. It is not anticipated that male subjects will suspend the rules to permit unauthorized access to attractive female strangers. Rather, it is anticipated that in situations that pose only an issue of technical rule compliance on the part of the agent (but no perceived security risk), female attractiveness can influence the degree to which male security agents adhere to technical rules.

It is also expected that physical appearance is much less likely to influence behavior in all other situations (i.e. male agent/male cohort, and female agent/highly attractive male cohort). Hypothesis: The experimental hypothesis is that where physical security agents are responsible for adhering to technical rules without exception, they are more likely to suspend those rules in innocuous security situations (such as involving individuals they recognize first- hand) when the cohort is an attractive female than for both unattractive females and males.

For the purpose of this experiment, "attractiveness" was determined by (1) objective measurement of facial symmetry known to be a strong determinant of physical attractiveness in humans and myriad other animal species (LeVay, 1994; Zuk, 2002) and (2) subjective responses of independent test subjects rating the physical attractiveness of still photographs of the cohorts. It is hypothesized that male checkpoint personnel compliance with technical protocols will be compromised by the influence of female attractiveness in low security risk situations.

Experimental Design and Procedure: The experiment was conducted on a large government building unscreened access to which is restricted to individuals (mostly federal employees) bearing official government-issued ID cards in which silicon circuitry triggers automatic doors to open, admitting one individual at a time. Individuals without ID cards (such as visitors and citizens representing themselves or conducting other official business in government agency) offices must pass through an X-ray and metal detection screening station.

Existing protocol for checkpoint personnel specifically prohibit security agents from admitting individuals failing to present a building ID card, without regard for whether or not they recognize the individual. At various checkpoints throughout several nonconsecutive days, checkpoint personnel were confronted with situations where they were specifically required to deny access and redirect a person they recognize as working in the building but without an I.D. card.

Because components of the experiment required comparing the responses of checkpoint personnel to strangers and visual acquaintances, the experimenters first conducted a conditioning period that lasted two months in which cohorts were issued official building I.D. cards and used them to enter the building just as ordinary federal employees do for two months before the actual experimental trials. All of the cohorts purposely greeted the checkpoint agents on several different occasions to ensure that the agents recognized them once the experimental trials began.

The experimental trials were recorded via security camera as checkpoint personnel were confronted with the following scenarios involving females of average attractiveness, females rated highly attractive, and males of various levels of attractiveness. The male cohorts were included to control for the possibility that human attractiveness in general influences the types of interactions being studied. Likewise, highly attractive strangers were also used to test whether or not the anticipated results extend beyond formal adherence to mandatory protocol without any perceived potential security risk (i.e.

involving attractive acquaintances) to include situations with perceived genuine potential security risks (i.e. involving attractive strangers). Finally, female checkpoint personnel were presented with the same situations to control for the possibility that attractiveness in general influences the measured behavior. II. Behavior Differences Results: Ten male security checkpoint personnel and ten female security checkpoint personnel were confronted with similar situations.

The researchers recorded the responses of security checkpoint subjects when confronted by average looking males, average looking females, highly attractive males, and highly attractive females in the following circumstances: (1) the individual seeking access is a stranger to the officer; (2) the individual seeking access is someone the officer recognizes. In half the trials, the individual either approached the officer requesting assistance or proceeded to the automatic door but were unable to trigger the mechanism and the officer overseeing that physical barrier or entrance lane responded.

Sometimes, the cohorts pretended to have forgotten their I.D. cards at home; alternatively, others possessed their cards but apparently forgot their turnstile access codes. Specific protocol provisions require the checkpoint agent to deny to any individual seeking access to the "Federal Employee Only" lane except to federal law enforcement personnel bearing agency credentials. In that situation, the checkpoint officer is permitted to override the door mechanism by an emergency control key in his possession.

In all other cases, checkpoint officers are required to redirect any individual without a building I.D. card or whose I.D. card fails to work in conjunction with the turnstile access code entered by the individual swiping a building I.D. card. Checkpoint personnel are strictly prohibited from using their emergency access control override keys in any other non-emergency situation. Data analysis confirmed the experimental hypotheses.

Specifically, male cohorts were appropriately denied access by all checkpoint personnel in every instance, regardless of the gender of the checkpoint agent, or the relative attractiveness of the male cohort. Likewise, average looking female cohorts were appropriately denied access in every instance, irrespective of the gender of the checkpoint agent. Strangers not recognized by the agents were appropriately denied access in every situation, irrespective of the gender or relative attractiveness of the cohort or the gender of the checkpoint agent.

However, in thirty-nine percent of encounters between a highly attractive female cohort and a male checkpoint agent, the agent either used his emergency override key to provide the cohort inappropriate access or violated some other element of standard protocol in connection with rendering assistance instead of redirecting the individual to the screened lane marked "All Visitors." In several instances, male checkpoint personnel did not grant immediate physical access but violated other protocol, such as by temporarily abandoning a post to direct the cohort to the security office to verify identity instead of directing the.