Regional and international responses to the Bainimarama coup

¶ … Regional and International Responses to the Bainimarama Coup

With fewer than 900,000 citizens, Fiji is not a major player in the international community, but it does have strategic significance and is an important trading partner with Australia. The tiny enclave, though, has experienced more than its fair share of political turmoil in recent years. A series of coups began in Fiji in 1987, followed by another in 2000 and yet another in 2006. These events have, not surprisingly, been disruptive to the island's political and social progress and much of what was accomplished following Fiji's independence from Great Britain in 1970 has been lost as a result. The 2006 coup has been widely criticized by the international community and some actions, such as sanctions by Australia and New Zealand and expulsion by various international organizations have taken place, but Commodore Bainimarama remains in power and elections have been postponed once again until 2014. To determine what events led to these outcomes, this paper provides a review of the relevant literature to assess the regional and international responses to the Bainimarama coup, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

Review and Assessment

Background and Overview

It was not even two full decades following Fiji's independence in 1970 that the trouble started -- and international observers universally blame the Fijian military for at least two of the coups that followed. For instance, according to Goiran, "Among the Pacific Islands states, Fiji is remarkable in many ways. In particular, it is special for the political role of its military. Sitiveni I Rabuka, who was a lieutenant-colonel and number three in the Royal Fiji Military Force, carried out the first military coup d'etat in 1987, and Commodore Frank Bainimarama the most recent, in December 2006" (2008, p. 8). Subsequently, on May 29, 2000, President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara resigned his office and the armed forces commander, "Frank" Bainimarama, imposed martial law in Fiji (Lea, Milward & Rowe, 2001). Although all three coups were led by the Fijian military, they differed in substantive ways. In this regard, Goiran adds that, "The various coups d'etat have been very different in nature. Twenty years ago, the servicemen declared that they intervened to protect the interests of the Melanesian Fijians, which were seen by the nationalists as endangered by the accession to power of a multiracial government" (2008, p. 9).

By contrast, the coup that took place in December 2006 was characterized by Bainimarama as being necessary in order to place the country back on the road to democratic reform, a response he emphasized was required to counter the ethnic Indian-based, pro-Melanesian policies of then-Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase (Goiran, 2008). Following these events, signs did in fact indicate that Fiji was making progress in achieving such democratic reforms, and a new constitution in 1997 provided more egalitarian policies and peaceful elections were held in 1999; however, another coup -- this time led by civilians (the so-called the George Speight Team) -- in May 2000 resulted in a sustained period of political upheaval (Emde, 2005).

Although elections conducted in August 2001 installed a democratically elected prime minister who were reelected in 2006, the second-military led coup in December 2006 by Commodore Frank Bainimarama ousted the prime minister and Bainimarama installed himself as acting president (Fiji, 2011). Thereafter, Bainimarama became the interim prime minister and continues to thwart efforts to implement free and peaceful elections today (Fiji, 2011). The country's civil liberties have been restrained and freedom of the press has suffered as well (Fiji, 2011). The 2006 coup by was rationalized by Bainimarama in a statement to the United Nations as follows: "The military, with great reluctance was forced to remove the then government of Fiji...politicians, in league with those who employ terror as a tactic to push a racial supremacy and corrupt agenda, had become a threat to the safety and security of our people.…[Furthermore, the aim was]…elections based on equality, equal suffrage, human rights, justice, transparency, modernity and true democratic ideals" (Bainimarama in O'Keefe, 2010, quoted at p. 5).

A former New Zealand diplomat who witnessed the 2006 elections firsthand provides some interesting observations concerning what took place. According to Green (2008), by most accounts, the 2008 general election was fair and represented the popular will and any irregularities that occurred were the result of the elections being called early rather than any particular incidents of misconduct on the part of governmental officials. Green adds that, "Attacks on the conduct and outcome of the polls aired since the coup should be seen for what they are: ex post facto justifications of an unconstitutional seizure of power by supporters of the coup" (p. 19). The range and types of regional and international responses to this coup are discussed further below.

Regional and International Responses to the Bainimarama Coup

According to Ungerer (2007), the response to the Bainimarama coup by Australia was largely underwhelming and reflected the general moribund aspects of the country's foreign policy efforts during the second half of 2006. In this regard, Ungerer reports that, "The Australian foreign policy establishment plodded along without any great sense of wanting to take the lead on the major issues of the day. Although Australian initiative appeared lacking, international conflicts and diplomatic crises proved as resilient as ever with a military coup in Fiji again disrupting any notions of regional stability (2007, p. 267). Likewise, the United Nations initially responded to the coup by threatening to reject further operations by Fijian soldiers in its international peacekeeping operations in response to the coup (O'Keefe, 2010), but decided against this response because of the importance of these peacekeepers to the UN's operations despite the fact these hired guns provide the Bainimarama government with sorely needed funds (Messner, 2009). Although such fence-sitting was not universal, it does reflect the lack of substantive responses by the international community to the unconstitutionally installed government of Commodore Bainimarama.

A summary of the regional and international responses to the Bainimarama Coup using a content analysis approach is provided in Table 1 below, with key words and phrases highlighted in bold. This approach is congruent with the guidance provided by Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) who note, "Content analysis involves drawing representative samples of content. The data collected in a quantitative content analysis are then usually analyzed to describe what are typical patterns or characteristics, or to identify important relationships among the variables measured" (p. 2).

Table 1

Summary of Regional and International Response

Country/Organization

Summary of Response to Coup

Australia and New Zealand

On December 6, 2009, Australia sanctioned Fiji focussed on "high level contacts between the two countries: defence and sports links; and development assistance links of an intergovernmental character"; in addition, Australia and New Zealand partners immediately placed bans on travel by members of the military and interim government, their associates and extended families. In addition, existing visas held by these people were revoked. Fiji was also excluded from the Recognised Seasonal Employer policy and Pacific Access Category visas meaning that Fijians were not eligible to be brought to NZ to undertake seasonal work. In addition, all sportspeople and teams faced similar restrictions on travel and transit and NZ teams intending on competing in Fiji were encouraged to cancel their activities. All defence cooperation was severed and Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) personnel (and their families) were expelled from NZ (O'Keefe, 2010, p. 7). Thereafter, Australia and New Zealand pushed for a wider international condemnation of Fiji's military rule; both countries have indicated that economic sanctions remain a possibility, in addition to those still in force following the 2006 coup. On 14 April 2009 the Australia-Fiji Business Council issued a statement, which condemned the abrogation of the Fijian Constitution (Key regional reactions and international responses, 2009, p. 4).

United States of America

On 10 April 2009, Richard Aker from the U.S. State Department said: The United States is deeply disappointed by the collapse of Fiji's political dialogue process and the abrogation of Fiji's constitution, which we see as movement away from the goal of returning Fiji to democratic governance and its formerly leading role in the Pacific. We are concerned by the implications this abrogation holds for the future of judicial independence, media freedom, and democracy itself in Fiji. The U.S. continues to oppose Commodore Bainimarama's actions and proposals, and has called for the reinstatement of constitutional processes and democracy in Fiji (Key regional reactions and international responses, 2009, p. 5).

The Pacific Islands Forum

The PIF urged the Fijian interim Government to respect its commitment from the 2007 PIF summit to hold elections by March 2009. At a special leaders' retreat in Port Moresby in January 2009, the PIF leaders called for the restoration of democracy in Fiji 'without further delay'. In response to April's political crisis in Fiji, the Secretary-General of the PIF Secretariat, Tuiloma Neroni Slade, expressed his deep disappointment with the abrogation of the Fijian constitution and developments since 9 April. He also said that the Constitution represents the expression of the collective will of the Fijian people, and that it exists for their benefit and protection. Mr. Slade added that there is now 'no assurance of commitment to an early return, through elections, to democratic constitutional governance for Fiji, as Forum Leaders have long been urging on the Interim Administration' (Key regional reactions and international responses, 2009, p. 5). In addition, Bainimarama's military regime was suspended from the PIF for breaking promises to hold elections in 2009 (Pacific leaders tackle impact of global crisis, 2009).

The Melanesian Spearhead Group

Vanuatu's Foreign Minister George Wells said that the MSG encourages Fiji to comply with the timetable for elections for March 2009 (Key regional reactions and international responses, 2009, p. 6).