Are the Characteristics and Requirements of a Limited War as Envisioned by Corbett Still Relevant During an Age of Great Power Competition? As the United States and its allies seek to counter the significant naval threat posed by Iran and its proxies in the Red Sea during the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and Chinas rattles its maritime sabers against the...
Introduction Sometimes we have to write on topics that are super complicated. The Israeli War on Hamas is one of those times. It’s a challenge because the two sides in the conflict both have their grievances, and a lot of spin and misinformation gets put out there to confuse...
Are the Characteristics and Requirements of a “Limited War” as Envisioned by Corbett Still Relevant During an Age of Great Power Competition?
As the United States and its allies seek to counter the significant naval threat posed by Iran and its proxies in the Red Sea during the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and China’s rattles its maritime sabers against the Philippines in territorial disputes over the South China Sea, the question is begged whether the characteristics and requirements of a “limited war” as envisioned by British naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett are still relevant during an age of “Great Power” competition. The fundamental concept of proportionality in a limited war advocated by Corbett was that military force in general and naval power in particular should only be used to achieve carefully defined and limited political and strategic objectives rather than attempt the total annihilation of an adversary.
In sum, Corbett believed that successfully prosecuting limited wars demanded a nuanced comprehension of the strategic context of a conflict combined with adept diplomacy and the leveraging of a nation’s naval might. In other words, Corbett advocated a proportional response that was commensurate with a nation’s military capabilities. Likewise, Corbett promoted limiting the use of military force to secure political objectives, concentrating naval efforts on economic coercion, blockades, and dominion over vital maritime passages. Moreover, Corbett emphasized that maritime forces must remain flexible during times of hostilities and they must ensure timely responses to shifts in political dynamics. This view was based on Corbett’s dictum that adaptability is absolutely essential for victorious outcomes in limited conflicts. In sum, through careful statesmanship and flexible naval forces furthering restricted strategic goals, the escalatory fires of war could be contained, in Corbett’s calculus.
It is important to note, however, that Corbett’s approach to limited war is only effective when all of the combatants play by the same rules. For instance, Corbett also stipulated some key features of the successful outcome of a limited war, including most especially clearly articulated limited aims between the warring parties, the maintenance of strong peacetime relations between the belligerents thereafter, and an overarching mutual desire to minimize hostilities and the corresponding sacrifice of national blood and treasure. While total warfare such as that waged in World War II by both the Axis and Allies aims to completely disarm opponents and bring them to their knees, limited wars use only measured force to secure concessions around specific points of controversy. While these are laudable goals, empirical observations and the historical record confirm that asymmetrical warfare tactics are becoming increasingly commonplace – and deadly in effect. Crucially, limited wars prosecuted by “Great Powers” must limit the scope and methods of their operations to prevent uncontrolled escalation such as being witnessed in the Red Sea and South China Sea today.
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