Saudi Arabia and Iran

¶ … longstanding territorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran, regarding three islands in the Persian Gulf. The first dispute is with respect to the island of Abu Musa, which is claimed by Sharjah. The other is with respect to Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs, both of which are claimed by Ras al-Khaimah. All three are presently viewed by the international community as territory of Iran. The issue dates back to the formation of the UAE.

The former colonial power, the United Kingdom, transferred the islands to Iran at this time, in 1971, ostensibly in exchange for Iran dropping its claim to Bahrain. This paper looks at the dispute between the UAE and Iran over these islands, both in its historical context and in terms of its modern manifestations. Historical Context The dispute over the status of Abu Musa pre-dates the formation of the UAE. The island was under control of the British for most of the 20th century.

Abu Musa sits in the middle of the Persian Gulf, not adjacent to either Iran or to Sharjah. There was never a significant population on the island prior to recently. The island became strategic, however, for two reasons. One is that there is likely abundant oil reserves in its vicinity and the other is that the major shipping lane for oil tankers out of the Persian Gulf is through a channel in between Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

For these reasons, the dispute over the status of these islands has remained unresolved. In 1968, the UK announced that it was going to pull out of the Persian Gulf, essentially leaving the area in the hands of the various emirs. At that point, Sharjah had de facto control over Abu Musa. On this announcement, Iran made claims on different Gulf territories, most particularly on Bahrain, which has a Shia majority living under Sunni rule. In 1969, Iran dropped its claim to Bahrain.

In 1971, with the British leaving, Sharjah and Iran reached an agreement that would allow Iran to have military forces on Abu Musa, and for the two countries to split revenue from the oil fields. Iran stationed military forces on Abu Musa per this agreement, but then also stationed forces on the Tunbs, causing uproar among all Arab nations (American.edu, no date). Those islands, while unpopulated, were claimed as territory of Ras al-Khaimah. In 1971, Sharjah joined the United Arab Emirates to form that independent nation.

Ras al-Khaimah joined in 1972, the last of the seven emirates to join. A complicated factor is that the UK was never officially a colonizer. It was a "protecting power," not colonial owner of the lands in question (Kaikobad, no date). As such, the UK never had title to the islands; it negotiated with Iran and Sharjah but it never had the power to give the islands to Iran.

Sharjah negotiated the deal, but it appears that there was no discernible benefit to Sharjah, which lends credence to one of the claims that they have today, which is that they signed the deal under a form of duress. The Tunbs were part of the deal that the UK made with Iran; Iran simply seized them. Iran-Arab Relations One of the contextual issues in this conflict is Arab-Iranian relations. The Arab nations practice Sunni Islam, while Iran practices Shia Islam.

This ancient schism in Islam has created long-lasting tensions between Iran and the Arab states. Iran's short-lived claim to Bahrain relates to that country having a Shia majority population, but a Sunni ruler. As the largest Shia power, Iran tends to support Shiites anywhere else that they live. The schism in Islam always lingers in the background in Iran-Arab relations.

Earlier this year, a rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran spilled over into other parts of the Muslim world, largely on sectarian lines after Saudi Arabia executed a Shia leader (Shoichet & Castillo, 2016). Oil Probably the most important contextual issue is oil. Abu Musa has substantial oil reserves, and the channel between the islands is the deepest part of the Persian Gulf. As such, it forms a major shipping lane. Control over this lane represents an opportunity to gain control over much of the Gulf's oil supply.

There are ways around this -- pipelines through Oman, for example, but ultimately most of the Gulf's oil still travels through the Strait of Hormuz, and this channel is one of the most important pathways for ships to travel the route. Iran presently controls this. The oil revenues and strategic importance of the islands has been a contributing factor in the intractability of the conflict. Iran in particular needs the oil revenue to help its economy, though Ras al-Khaimah also has a need for revenue generation.

For its part, Sharjah is one of the wealthier emirates, oil or no. Current Situation With respect to the islands, the status of their sovereignty remains in dispute. The international community recognizes them as Iranian, because of the deal that the British made with Iran for Abu Musa, seizure of the Tunbs notwithstanding. The UAE did not exist at the time of the deal, and therefore did not have a say in the matter, though both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah maintain their claims.

That their emirs were effectively shut out of the process by the British is one of the reasons the dispute is ongoing. The UAE has maintained that it holds sovereignty over the islands, based on historical claims. Iran maintains that possession of the islands. It has military forces on all three, and there is a small civilization population on Abu Musa. Iran has argued that under international law, neither Sharjah nor Ras al-Khaimah had authority to occupy the islands, as they were not legal states at the time; Iran was.

As such, any claims that they subsequently had when the UAE was formed are invalid. The UAE also argues on the basis of historical claim to the islands. The UAE makes the claim that Sharjah entered into the agreement under duress -- Sharjah was afraid that Iran would seize the islands by military force. With Britain's withdrawal, Sharjah was suddenly left with little means by which it could counter Iran. It agreed therefore under threat of attack is the line of reasoning.

Sharjah specifically cites that Iran took the Tunbs by force when Ras al-Khaimah did not cede them as evidence of Iran's intention to seize all of these islands by military force (Zwaagstra, 2013). The current deterioration of diplomatic relations between the Iran and the Arab world, the UAE included, decreases the likelihood that these parties will enter into negotiations. At various points, there has been talk that such negotiations could be initiated, but Iran has not serious motivation to do so.

With UAE withdrawing a lot of its diplomatic representation, the environment for entering into dialogue is not a healthy one at present, and the dispute looks to remain unresolved for the foreseeable future. Iran has militarized the islands as a show of force in the Persian Gulf. In particular, it has "deployed Chinese HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles" on the island, as well as on Qeshm and along the Iranian coast." All three islands have Iranian military presence, though there have not been any reports of incidents involving these forces.

The Way Forward The current diplomatic issues between the UAE and Iran may preclude talks at this point. The way forward, however, does involve discussion between the relevant stakeholders. Iran's interest is almost assuredly related to the oil and the shipping channel. This is why Iran was interested in the islands in the first place in 1968. While both countries are arguing historical claims, such claims are entirely a pretext. These islands were uninhabited and nobody had much presence on them at all.

They were not subject to Iranian claim prior to Britain's announcement that it was going to pull out of the Gulf. For Iran, the security is likely more important an issue than the oil. Iran has substantial reserves, but being able to control this particular shipping channel is a means by which Iran can exert some influence over security in the region. Presently, the United States, with its fleet based out of Bahrain, is the guarantor of security for the major shipping lanes leading to the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran likely sees the islands as a hedge against U.S. aggression -- not the basis for the original claim in 1968 but certainly a factor today, where Iran needs to extend its power in the region, and these islands do help Iran to consolidate its influence in the Persian Gulf. The UAE's interest is more complex. It held the islands prior to Iran's move in 1971. Whatever Sharjah thinks of the deal that was made, Ras al-Khaimah saw Iran take over its islands unauthorized.

The rest of the Arab world stands in support of Ras al-Khaimah on this issue, including the rest of the UAE. Abu Musa's oil is of value to Sharjah and if there is any known oil relating to the Tunbs, that would definitely be of value to Ras al-Khaimah, which is not blessed of oil wealth. Control over Persian Gulf shipping lanes is one factor that might influence the UAE, but is just as likely to influence its Arab backers. With the U.S.

ensuring security, the Gulf states feel less need than Iran for a counterbalance, but nevertheless they are all lending their support to the UAE on the issue, which reduces the desire of the UAE to back down from its claims. That these are not the major emirates in terms of their own internal political power (Abu Dhabi runs pretty much everything, and Dubai whatever is left) also creates incentive -- these are important issues for emirates that do not garner all that much attention with the central government.

The position of the UAE in its media is that Iran seized Abu Musa, which is not exactly a factual position. But this is the information presented to the citizens of the UAE. The UAE has lodged formal complaints with the United Nations regarding Abu Musa (The National, 2008). One of the claims is that there was only a signed memorandum of understanding between Iran and Sharjah, and that this did not give Iran sovereignty over the islands.

Indeed, that was the case -- Iran was allowed to station military there but that was not explicitly handing Iran sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is de facto sovereignty if not de jure, to have just one country with a military presence on the island. The UAE contends that Iran has been in violation of the agreement since 1980. Iran recently built two new buildings on the island. The first is a marine rescue center and the second is a shipping registration office.

The other GCC states backed the UAE at the UN, and also in GCC meetings, where the body denounced Iran for its construction on the islands. The construction was, ultimately, a provocation to the UAE, but did not result in a material alteration of the dispute. What is interesting here is that the interests of the different parties are not mutually exclusive. Iran's main interest is control and power, while the UAE sees the issue more as a prestige issue and possibly about money as well.

Ultimately, there is a pathway forward. The parties, however, have not engaged in productive rhetoric. The underlying tensions created by the Sunni-Shia schism also undermine the ability of these parties to meet, much less have a meeting of the minds. Some arrangement like a 100-year lease on the islands for Iran would allow Iran to maintain control over the shipping lane for as long as oil is being shipped out of the Gulf and would return money to Sharjah and to Ras al-Khaimah for that right.

Sovereignty would either lie with the UAE or at best remain unresolved. However, Iran's bargaining position with respect to the islands is strong. There is no meaningful historical reason for the UAE claim -- nobody lived on these islands. Further, Iran is now in possession of the islands. The international community has a low level of motivation to enter into this dispute.

That so many Sunni countries side with the UAE is not of any particular consequence -- they are merely supporting their Sunni brothers against a Shia country, so their support is less about a reasoned position than it is about an ancient rivalry. The UAE has some bargaining position based on the fact that the UK was never owner of the lands and therefore had no right to negotiate them away for Iran.

This point is really only in dispute by Iran, but yet the international community has shown little inclination to address the issue. The UAE certainly has a proper and legitimate claim to the Tunb islands, if not Abu Musa, which at best can maintain its disputed status. Delving into the finer points, there is the question of merit with respect to the UAE's argument about duress -- under international law the principle of duress is typically held to a high standard.

The threat of imminent Iranian takeover would not cause Sharjah to cede Abu Musa.