Sun Tzu -- the Art

Sun Tzu -- the Art of War

There are numerous ways to benefit from Sun Tzu's brilliant narrative, so many diverse and worthy interpretations and applications, and this paper will -- through the literature -- critically analyze the relevance and the references appropriate to The Art of War.

"There is a reason Sun-Tzu's The Art of War is popular among management and law students, but not among medical interns and engineers. The former are preparing for professional roles within institutions that have important adversarial features [but] the latter are not…"

(Heath, 2007, p. 359)

Jason B. MacDonald and Kent E. Neupert (writing in the Journal of Strategic Marketing) use their scholarly article to point out that the poignant phrases and messages in The Art of War fit right into the correct strategies for marketing professionals. The writers are quick to point out that the very first Western translation of The Art of War was done in 1772, in France, and the first English translation appeared in 1905. That is a long time for this powerful story -- that was written around 400 B.C. And contains advice and strategies that are so relevant and applicable in 2010 it is stunning -- to languish unseen by anyone but the Chinese people. Around 716 A.D. The Japanese translated The Art of War into their language, "over a thousand years before it appeared in the English and French-speaking West" (MacDonald, et al., 2005, p. 293).

MacDonald asserts early in the article how Sun Tzu's ground and terrain can serve as a "parsimonious typologies of competitive market situations" that can certainly be used by anyone working a marketing position. Just as Tzu emphasizes again and again in his story, marketers should avoid direct "battle with a competitor" if they can win another way. But above all, a marketing person, like the general going to war, should "Know the enemy, know yourself," and "your victory will never be endangered" (Tzu quoted by MacDonald, p. 294).

One thing Tzu addresses quite often is the importance of knowing the "terrain," the lay of the land, the geography where the battle or strategy will be taking place. On page 295 MacDonald references terrain and gives credit to Tzu for the adroitness of his narrative in regard to terrain. "Accessible" is one aspect that Tzu references and MacDonald jumps on that, pointing out that markets that are as equal to you and to the enemy are "accessible markets" and because of that no one producer of goods or services has "a large enough hold on the market" to keep another out of that market (p. 295).

When a company -- like Priceline, for example -- rushes in to establish a market where there are few competitors, it has carved out a terrain and defined that terrain. However, Tzu's book suggests that in these kinds of situations, "the invading army needs to focus on securing the most advantageous ground (or market segment in this context)" (MacDonald, 2005, p. 295). Did Priceline heed Tzu's advice? MacDonald doesn't think so. Priceline spent "much of their early capital on broadening their product offering to other markets" like garage sales and even "gas sales," MacDonald points out.

Hence, rather than securing its terrain, Priceline allowed other companies (Travelocity and Expedia in specifics) to "…come in and take the most profitable sector of the market, online air tickets to business customers," the author recounts (p. 295). In MacDonald's opinion, Priceline lost its edge by spreading their "army" too thin and allowing the competition to come in and seize some of the ground Priceline had initially controlled.

When the terrain a company enters is "…equally advantageous for the enemy or me to occupy" MacDonald then believes that ground is considered "key ground" (p. 299). Key ground is essential ground to defend and going by Tzu's theory that terrain should be fought "to the death to defend it," MacDonald asserts (p. 299). His example of a company in this context is Goodyear Tire Company; the U.S. market is "key ground" for Goodyear in the same way that the European market is "key ground" for Michelin, and hence, "in both cases, it makes little sense for one to attack the other's key market" because the incumbent company will likely have "greater resolve to protect it," the author continues (p. 300).

Though MacDonald didn't use Tzu's poignant passage in the first paragraph of Chapter Six, it is very germane to the marketing strategies that MacDonald alluded to. "Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight," Tzu explained in that first paragraph. That would be like Michelin in Europe, there first, fresh for any challenge from Goodyear. Tzu went on: "…Whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to the battle, will arrive exhausted," and again that would be Goodyear, a "Johnny-come-lately" into the European tire market milieu.

Kenny Ratledge writes in the journal Coach & Athletic Director that a smart football coach will use Tzu's theories to his best advantage -- and Ratledge asserts that some great coaches have in fact used military strategy (Woody Hayes, Bobby Knight, for example). Ratledge quotes Tzu -- "If the enemy is in superior strength, evade him" -- to point out that if a football team knows its opponent is superior offensively, "It would be prudent to avoid taking him on man-to-man" (Ratledge, 2003, pp. 24-25). Ratledge takes Tzu one step farther, suggesting that if your opponent's defense is superior to your offense, it would be wise to "run an option-oriented attack" that allows your team to run away from "certain defenders" and leave them "ineffective" (p. 25).

Any football coach knows that disguising formations and strategies is a practical and smart way to keep the enemy off balance. Ratledge likes the Tzu passage about deception: "When near your enemy, make him believe you are far away; when far away, make him believe you are near." This passage is another example of how the philosopher Tzu can say a great deal with just a few words; less in this case is more, and breaking it down into simple concepts is a winning strategy when a coach is building a case for victory with his players.

Based on a thorough reading of The Art of War it would seem logical and practical for a military person in 2010 to pay attention to what Tzu wrote 2,500 years ago about military strategy. That connection is made by author Check Teck Foo. writing in the journal Chinese Management Studies, Foo draws a "metaphorical parallel between a pilot in the cockpit of the latest, ultra-modern U.S. fighter F22" and a CEO in the driver's seat of a corporation (Foo, 2009, p. 178). Yes, Foo explains, there is a huge difference between the pilot's cockpit in a fancy and high-tech fighter plane and the laptop of a chief executive officer; however, the need for "deadly accurate…reflexive decisions is the same" (p. 178), and tapping into Tzu's strategy can work for both the CEO and the fighter pilot.

Foo writes that his article was inspired by the "system of systems thinking" (SoS) in The Art of War, and he embraces the wartime strategies of an F22 using Tzu's ideas. "If we extrapolate the approach of Sun Tzu and if he was to design a fighter jet," he likely would have designed "specific actions by the pilot for a given dogfight scenario," Foo explains (p 180). And by using Tzu's examples of military strategies, a corporate CEO or the pilot in the cockpit of an F22 will be doing what Tzu did 2,500 years earlier -- "organizing for flexibility by observing and thus grasping the essential nature of water."

Dr. Gregory Evans has written an editorial in the journal Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (Evans, 2004, p. 252) that embraces The Art of War in a different context than previous authors in this paper. Evans bemoans the fact that he retired early due to "…years of diminishing reimbursement for surgical procedures" as well as "the rising cost of malpractice insurance" and the high overhead of keeping an office (p. 252). Evans is also upset that due to the $38 billion deficit in California's economy, there wasn't much opportunity for a doctor whose specialty is reconstructive surgery to become involved in education either. He was recalling in the editorial that the two groups he is affiliated with, the American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS) and the Plastic Surgery Educational Foundation (PSEF), have currently launched a series of challenges that cry out for attention because the reimbursements for surgical procedures has been dwindling down to very little in terms of doctor compensations.

With that attitude in his mind he took a long plane flight to Asia and read The Art of War during the flight; in planning the latest advocacy actions that ASPS and PSEF are launching, Evans equates their strengths to those presented by Tzu's book. "One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture," Evans quotes Tzu; and "…one who can be victorious attacks… [and] the victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle" (Evans, 2003, p. 254). Evans wondered if in fact the two organizations have not heeded advice from the likes of Tzu: "…Can we be more proactive, anticipating and knowing what our 'enemies' are planning?" he wondered (p. 254).

Evans (p. 254) also wonders if Tzu has a relevant point -- "When it is advantageous move; when not advantageous, stop" -- and explains that perhaps his organizations would be better off if they realize "…the wall is solid and not passable" and hence "walking around the end of the wall is the better forward progress." Knowing what terrain to do battle on is part of the key in wartime maneuvers, according to Tzu, and Evans (p. 255) realizes the same is true for his national organizations. "The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions that they must prepare to defend will be numerous," Evans quotes Tzu on page 255. With that last passage in mind, Evans admits that in his field of reconstructive surgery, it is "hard to know the territory" because the medical environment is changing all the time.

Finally, Evans' editorial quotes from Tzu as to how victory can be obtained "…through the unorthodox." Hence, Evans posits, an "orthodox" approach to gaining more leverage in their portion of the medical market "may be used in unorthodox ways" because an orthodox attack when it is unexpected -- which it apparently would be in this case -- "may be unorthodox" (p. 255). It would appear that Evans may be stretching a bit in his analogies, because his "cause" appears to be based more on prestige and money than anything helpful to society per se. Still, if he is zeroing in on new and better academic approaches to plastic surgery, that rings a bit more pertinent to society than just national recognition and higher income levels.

Meantime Edward O'Dowd and Arthur Waldron (both professors at Princeton University) go into great detail to flush out sections of The Art of War that are worthy for use today by military commanders. After thoroughly covering the history of how and why Tzu created this strategy, and the historical implications, on page 27 the authors state that rather than a "systematic analysis of the phenomena of war and strategy" Tzu's work can be considered "…a set of aphorisms compiled into one document by a long series of commentators and editors." In other words, what is published today as The Art of War is really an edited serious of passages and quotes from ancient writings -- some of those having been lost and never recovered.

The authors use several examples of how Asian military commanders have used Tzu's strategies; during the Vietnam War, for example, the North Vietnamese agreed to attend the Paris Peace Talks, not to help find a compromise, but rather to "…feed the enemy with hope and consequently heighten divisions in the enemy camp" (p. 28). It was also an attack on the American strategy of trying to find a compromise, O'Dowd writes, because the North Vietnamese knew full well American public opinion was loudly and profoundly against the war, and hence, in the eyes of the North Vietnamese, the enemy (U.S.) showed signs of "fatigue and internal stress," words right out of The Art of War (p. 28). Moreover, knowing the enemy as well as yourself, a Tzu maxim, means (O'Dowd) that the "competent strategist should," as Tzu insisted, "exhibit the coyness of a maiden until the enemy gives you an opening" (p. 29).

After you see that opening, Tzu continues, quoted by O'Dowd, you "…emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you" (p. 29). Basically, the entire Tzu strategy is to place the enemy in a "chaotic" condition, O'Dowd mentions often in his scholarly piece. O'Dowd uses an example taken from the Korean War to link Tzu's book with warfare in the 20th Century. If the military leader in battle knows the "enemy's dispositions and potential strength while hiding his own from the enemy" the battle will go the way of that leader. An example of this occurred in November, 1050. The U.S. Second Infantry Division (in Korea) was battling the Chinese in the village of Kunu-ri, but was being hit hard by the Chinese from the north. So the Americans withdrew and headed south on Sunch'on Road.

But the Americans did not know that the Chinese snuck around the right flank of the Americans' Second Infantry Division and around the "left flank of the First Marine Division" and hence, the Americans were blocked. "Chaos was the result," O'Dowd writes, and "the American units collapsed" (p. 30). The commander of the Chinese troops, Lin Biao, later wrote about his troops' strategy, and it sounded a great deal like quotes from The Art of War: "When attacking an enemy on the march…engage him in a frontal attack while the main forces attack his flank. Cut him in two…" (p. 30).

In the publication Journal of Business Strategy, journalist Bernard Boar has some fun pretending to write letters to -- and receive letters from -- both Sun Tzu and Machiavelli. For the purposes of this paper, only the questions and answers from Sun Tzu will be reference albeit both characters' responses are valid and entertaining too. "Dear Sun," Boar writes, "What do I need to do to establish a shared agenda, common purpose…across my entire organization," as I'm having problems with "organizational conflict" (Boar, 2007, p. 16). He signed it, "Organizationally challenged." In his make-believe "Dear Abby" styled missive, Boar has Sun responding like this:

"Dear Challenged: Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious…Those skilled in strategy achieve cooperation in a group…Employ the entire force like employing a single individual" because after all, Tzu continues, "Strategy is a problem of coordination, not of masses" (Boar, 2007, p. 17). What Boar might also have included from The Art of War is Tzu's line at the end of Chapter Three: "He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all ranks" (McAlpine, 1992, p. 226). When asking Sun Tzu "…which comes first, strategy or organization" the author produces this answer: "Structure depends on strategy. Forces are to be structured strategically based on what is advantageous" (pp. 17-18).

Even though the meaning of Sun Tzu's succinct paragraphs and sentences may seem obvious to the Western reader, and the meaning appears to be totally straightforward and clear, according to Derek M.C. Yuen, "…many of its hidden premises and abstract reserves are lost during translation" (Yuen, 2009, p. 183). For example, on page 189 Yuen brings in Sun Tzu's quote, "…One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture" but "…One who can be victorious attacks"; what this is actually saying, according to Yuen's interpretation, is that the intelligent thing for the military leader to do is attack "the enemy's plans" at the operational and tactical level. This is really all about making the enemy's moves more predictable, Yuen continues, not just a statement of the obvious. In fact, Yuen sees that Tzu's entire philosophy is Taoist in substance, and that this example embraces the functionality of "yin-yang," the "dialectical engine of Chinese strategic thought" (p. 189). In fact, the author asserts, while Tzu's readers figure he's just giving sound military advice, the reality is more along the lines of the yin and the yang -- to wit, "any concept proposed without considering its opposite is only half a concept" (p. 189).