Urban Warfare the Latter Years

Urban Warfare The latter years of the 20th century saw unprecedented raise in terror organizations and activities within cities across the world. These organizations have seemingly gained courage and infiltrated key urban areas in an attempt to fortify their operations. From Nairobi to Afghanistan, the likes of Al Qaeda secretly occupy buildings waiting patiently for the opportune time to launch a surprise attack on American embassy or citizens. The situation has been worsening as even the 21st century gains momentum.

In his advice, Sun Tzu warns the military to restrain themselves from any form of combatant action in urban areas, unless the circumstances direly need their involvement. This paper seeks to discount Tzu's concern as at the same time suggests some interventions war centered in urban areas. American military training is mostly conducted in relatively isolated terrain. Despite the expansiveness of the grounds, the absence of urban-life reality limits the effectiveness of the training.

Nowadays, the terror groups have found comfort in urban areas as they remain rest assured noncombatants and civilians could as well as serve as their shield. In fact, the American military action in Mogadishu flopped because of the strategy the enemy employed: where women and adolescent boys were used as their shield.

Considering that the rules of engagement aims at minimizing casualties as much as possible, it is a wake-up call for the American military to rise in arms against Tzu's lousy advice, devise proper strategies for urban area military engagement, and engage the enemy without fear of casualties. In military operations, a relatively stationary target enjoys significant advantages to an assailant in motion. In addition, the assailant significantly bears the casualties.

Since the American army is often drawn into the military action, it crucial for them to devise mechanism that would significantly minimize the negative impacts of the attacks aimed at dislodging the enemy from their hiding zones. In one of the suggestions, Leonhard (2003) calls the modern joint force to conduct information siege operations rather than conduct a medieval siege of an entire walled city. Intelligence operation in cities will reveal, in addition to other things, the exact locations of the enemy.

Once the locations have been pinpointed, the interagency task force can then besiege him with a combination of forces, surveillance, robotics, and media and combatants gas aimed at making the enemy's position untenable. With this in effect, the enemy is bound to be drawn out of their hideout and appropriate military action such as arrest or open fire taken. In view of the suggestions presented, it is indeed a momentous time that military training be taken a notch higher.

The reality of the 21st century leaves the defense forces with little choices, if any, as far as engaging terror groups in urban areas is concerned. The events in Mogadishu, where the U.S. military underperformed expectation, should serve as a revelation that the mighty of the forces does not necessarily guarantee success. Instead, intelligent operations should be incorporated at all costs. As such, the integration of interagency operations into the military must for the primary.