Virtue Ethics in Christ's Sermon on the Mount

Virtue Ethics

Aristotle notes that “if then there is an end for our activity, this will be the good to be accomplished; and if there are several such ends, it will be these” (p. 316). In other words, the idea of virtue ethics is that the most moral course of action is that which leads one to his final absolute end, which is happiness. Aristotle suggests that virtue is what can make man happiest. This idea is essentially repeated in Hawthorne’s story “The Great Stone Face,” for it is about a succession of people who try to live up to the ideal of the Great Stone Face in the mountains only to have it revealed that they have character flaws which prevent them from being the fulfillment of the local prophecy of one being born who is great enough to be the living embodiment of the Stone Face. The problem with each of the characters is that ultimately he has been living for himself and either some vanity or pride or lack of charity has prevented him from having the kind of benevolence that truly goes with greatness. But Ernest shows this benevolence in his preaching, and the writer suddenly recognizes him as the Great Stone Face. Yet Ernest waves him off for his end is not to be praised but rather to preach to others. He does not want this praise. It is for this reason that he more and more resembles the Great Stone Face. He has the character that the mountain face depicts. In this manner, the story exemplifies Aristotelian virtue ethics, for it is a story about what is really man’s ultimate end—himself or some greater glory? Those seeking their own glory do not find the happiness they desire. Those receiving praise are not satisfied, for they cannot supply the happiness they seek. Where does this happiness come from ultimately?

The fact that Ernest is “still hoping that some wiser and better man than himself would by and by appear, bearing a resemblance to the Great Stone Face” at the end of the story shows that Ernest does not recognize his own end as one of being praised and glorified (p. 375). Ernest recognizes his end as otherworldly—so he cannot find true happiness here. Some would see in this a paradox, but for those with a religious view of human nature it makes sense. It is really not much different from the principle-based view of Frankena, however.

Frankena argues that virtues correspond to principles, so if one has the virtue of benevolence it is because he has lived according to the principle to act benevolently (p. 376). Virtue cannot really be understood without principles. It is not a matter of arguing that virtue is what will lead one to happiness; this is an insufficient system of ethics, Frankena suggests—and indeed it may be for at the end of the story no one is really happy. Some are because they think the prophecy has finally come true, but Ernest is not happy at all with this idea and he can’t be since he is only human and not of the level of divinity that would be required in order for the prophecy to actually find fulfillment. Essentially it is an allegory for Christ, and that is the happiness that everyone is meant to seek, for it is Christ that provides the true framework for virtue ethics, even if Aristotle created the idea well before Christ ever existed.