This paper examines the ethical dimensions of the Bobby Glick case, in which a new accounting employee concealed that he had previously attempted — and failed — his CPA examination. Using three major ethical frameworks, the paper evaluates whether Glick's deception constitutes a moral violation. From a utilitarian perspective, no tangible harm resulted; from a deontological standpoint, the act of lying is inherently wrong regardless of outcome; and from a virtue ethics lens, the concealment reveals a troubling character flaw inconsistent with professional integrity. The paper also considers mitigating factors, including Glick's youth and inexperience, and closes with a broader reflection on professional ethics and moral agency in accounting.
The paper demonstrates the technique of multi-framework ethical analysis: rather than committing to one moral theory, the author uses utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethics lenses in sequence, explicitly contrasting their conclusions. This approach is standard in applied ethics writing and shows the student's ability to hold competing frameworks in tension while arriving at a reasoned overall judgment. Citations from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lend authoritative philosophical grounding to each framework introduced.
The paper opens by presenting the least-damning interpretation of Glick's behavior (utilitarian), then methodically builds toward harsher ethical verdicts through deontological and virtue ethics analysis. A counterargument from Glick's perspective is embedded mid-paper before the virtue ethics critique, followed by mitigating factors and a closing analogy that generalizes the lesson to all professions. This structure — steelman, critique, nuance, generalize — is a hallmark of strong applied ethics writing.
From a strictly utilitarian perspective, the scenario outlined in the Glick case may not appear especially morally questionable. Glick, as a new and untested employee fresh out of college, was naturally apprehensive about how his competency would be perceived. He studied, successfully passed his CPA exam, and acquitted himself admirably on the job. No one was harmed by his concealment; indeed, his firm benefited from having a highly competent employee who cared about his professional reputation.
However, viewing professional ethics from a purely utilitarian perspective is extremely problematic. Professional ethics by its nature assumes certain standards that professionals must uphold, even when the consequences are not harmful — and even when the consequences of an unethical action are arguably good (Driver, 2009). For example, someone without a CPA license could lie, obtain employment with a CPA firm, and perform wonderfully for ten years. This would still be wrong and unethical according to the standards of the profession, because when someone pays for the services of a CPA, that person should receive the services of a licensed CPA. Even if clients benefited from the work of the unlicensed practitioner, his actions would remain wrong.
In contrast, utilitarianism (also called consequentialism) holds: "Consequences — and only consequences — can conceivably justify any kind of act, for it does not matter how harmful it is to some so long as it is more beneficial to others" (Alexander & Moore, 2012, p. 1). From a consequentialist perspective, Glick's subterfuge — or anyone's — is not wrong so long as the outcome is good. In this case, the only harm was the hurt feelings of Glick's employer, while the benefit of Glick passing the exam and delivering high-quality service far exceeded any negative result.
From a deontological ethical perspective, however, lying is wrong regardless of consequences (Alexander & Moore, 2012). Even if no harm was done, Glick did not merely conceal the fact that he had previously taken the exam — he also lied. Had he not passed on his second attempt, it is likely he would have continued to lie and maintained the impression that he had been a first-time taker when he was not. This behavior also signals to the firm that he was willing to withhold relevant information — specifically, his prior failure — from his employer.
Glick might counter that not being a first-time passer was a matter of personal pride, and that failing a section on the first attempt does not indicate incompetence. In fact, it is more common to fail at least one section than to pass all sections on the first try. He was, in effect, more competent than the firm assumed, since he had already passed when his colleagues believed he had not yet done so. Clients therefore received more experienced and competent attention than they believed they were getting, as Glick served them with the full knowledge of someone who had already studied for and passed the examination.
It is ultimately not possible to fulfill the responsibilities of a professional role without possessing professional integrity. Even if firms are not themselves ethical agents, professionals who work within the guidelines of their established professions are regarded as moral agents, and clients who contract their services do so expecting those professionals to abide by a moral code (Marcoux, 2008). Consider, for example, two orthopedic surgeons who are both technically competent. One possesses high professional ethics and will not recommend knee surgery unless he genuinely believes the patient will benefit. The other wants to build a reputation for complex surgical procedures and always recommends surgery, even when the patient's health, personality, and lifestyle may not warrant it. Both surgeons may know how to perform the operation, but only the first is truly honoring the medical profession's foundational principle to "do no harm" and ultimately to heal the patient. The same standard applies in accounting: technical competence alone does not constitute ethical professional practice.
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