ADA vs. UK Disability Discrimination Act: A Comparative Analysis

Introduction and Methodology

In 1990 the United States Congress passed a body of legislation regarding the rights of disabled people in the United States. In 1995, Parliament signed a similar act into law also guaranteeing the rights of disabled people. Though each law has been amended to various degrees since its initial implementation, there remains a great deal of room for improvement. Among the primary differences between the two pieces of legislation is the extensive structure and scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) relative to that of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA). Among the primary pitfalls of the ADA is its seemingly vague and relatively undefined language, as well as several loopholes resulting from such poor construction (Stowe, 2000). For the DDA, it is the exceptionally narrow scope that defines the vulnerability of the legislation. Because the DDA is modeled in part on the ADA, the five additional years of practical implementation of the ADA may prove instructive in the further amendment and correction of the DDA.

Both of the acts studied for this paper are part of the public record. Access to the acts in their entirety is available via governmental organizations as well as not-for-profit non-governmental interest groups working specifically for the rights of the disabled. A careful analysis of the acts themselves, court decisions, and scholarly works on the topic of the acts and their implementation provided the basis for the comparisons and conclusions drawn herein.

With the Civil Rights Movement, which culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, came an increased awareness of individual rights and protection from discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act, passed by Congress in 1990, is a civil rights law that protects the rights of individuals classified as legally disabled. The definition of disability includes a physical or mental impairment that significantly limits a major life activity (Stowe, 2000). This definition has been amended over time to correct for conditions within the power of an individual to remedy, such as poor eyesight immediately correctable using lenses, as well as current substance abuse (Schwochau & Blanck, n.d.). It has also been amended to include formerly unclassified learning disabilities such as dyslexia. The definition of disability is necessarily broad, citing the limiting of a major life activity as the primary criterion for inclusion. The implications of an act protecting individuals against such discrimination are system-wide throughout law, commerce, and entertainment. To enforce such a code requires the development of discrete sets of criteria enforceable locally as well as nationally in the context of both public and private entities (DeLeire, 2000). In order to best serve the purposes of such an act, the language would need to include specifications regarding policy, practice, and physical space where applicable.

Overview: Civil Rights Foundations and the ADA

The act is composed primarily of five title sections: employment, public entities, public accommodations, telecommunications, and miscellaneous provisions. Each of these titles represents a specific functional area of the legislation developed to ensure the most complete and effective protection for minority populations. Of particular interest in the context of this paper is the third title, governing public accommodations.

Title III of the ADA is a complicated provision to enforce. The ambiguous language present even in its name indicates that, while this area of legislation is necessary, an effective implementation strategy has perhaps yet to be fully developed (Stowe, 2000). Title III specifically guarantees that no individual may be discriminated against on the basis of disability with regard to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases, or operates such a place (Stowe, 2000). Though construction on such sites after the successful passage of the ADA was expected to comply with the code, provisions within the legislation also account for existing structures and the necessary renovation of those structures in order to comply, within reason. The specific definition of a place of accommodation includes places of lodging, recreation, transportation, education, and dining. Implicit within that listing are stores, care providers, and places of public display (Stowe, 2000).

One of the most significant problems facing the ADA is the ambiguous nature of its language. Though a degree of ambiguity is necessary — since being overly specific risks leaving part of the target population unprotected — the resulting disputes over what specifically "public accommodation" includes have been the cause of nearly all court decisions involving Title III since its enactment.

The leading question remains whether a public place of accommodation must be defined as a physical structure. Though the legislation provides numerous examples of "places of public accommodation," it offers no specific definition of the term. As a result, judges must decide based on terminology that currently has no established legal definition (Stowe, 2000). It falls within the purview of specific courts to determine the scope of the term. This ambiguity has led to a number of significant precedents being set on either side of the issue. Furthermore, the relative necessity of a physical location is disputed. With the advent and exponential growth of technology and the internet, it has become legally relevant to determine whether a company's website or phone service must be designed in compliance with the ADA (Grabois, Nosek, & Rossi, 2005).

Title III of the ADA: Public Accommodations and Language Ambiguity

Whether individuals may bring suit regarding websites was tried in California federal court in 2006 when the National Federation of the Blind brought suit against Target, citing that because their website was not readily or fully accessible to the blind, the company was in violation of Title III of the ADA (Stowe, 2000). Though the case was ultimately settled for more than $9 million, Judge Patel stated that the case was precedent-setting in that it broke ground in developing the limitations of the term "public accommodation."

Also prominent in the debate is whether Title III includes organizations not specifically tied to a physical place, as well as goods such as insurance policies, which can be considered under the "goods and services" portion of the legislation. It is held that the spirit of Title III was to free disabled individuals from discrimination imposed by public places, either in terms of physical access to their premises or access to their services. This "spirit" of the law has not been upheld in some precedent-setting cases; however, the consensus among cases tried has been that a wider definition of public accommodation and the goods and services accountable to the legislation is preferable to a narrower one (Stowe, 2000).

The ADA was amended in 2008 by President George W. Bush, with the amendments taking effect on January 1, 2009. The most notable change resulting from this amendment was the broadening of the definition of disability. Prior to this amendment, there was a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove their disability. This burden was pervasive not only in businesses and recreational centers but in education as well. In cases brought against Boston University, for instance, students who claimed disabilities were deemed ineligible unless they had documented proof of said disability (Stowe, 2000). Two landmark cases — Sutton v. United Airlines and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams — saw the plaintiffs' claims dismissed as being unable to prove grounds for an ADA violation.

In Sutton v. United Airlines, the plaintiffs were twin women who applied for jobs as airline pilots and were denied the positions as a result of their poor eyesight. They filed suit because simple corrective surgery would have improved their vision to meet the minimum requirements for flying. Because the women suffered from a disability that could be corrected, the courts dismissed the case, stating that they could not be considered disabled — even though it was this very condition that ultimately resulted in their denial of consideration for the position.

In Toyota Motor Manufacturing KY Inc. v. Williams, the case concerned specifically the responsibility of an employer to make adjustments to facilities to accommodate disabled employees. The plaintiff, Miss Williams, was diagnosed with Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a chronic disorder requiring special wrist supports to prevent further injury and the discomfort caused by repetitive stress. Her employer, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, did not provide her with the necessary equipment to facilitate continued safe and healthy employment. The case was dismissed on the grounds that Carpal Tunnel Syndrome did not ultimately constitute a disability, as it was deemed not to substantially limit one or more of Miss Williams's major life activities (Schall, 1998).

In addition to lightening the burden of proof and broadening the definition of disability, two additional changes resulting from the amendment positively affected the impact and effectiveness of the legislation. The amendment clarified that judges are not permitted to assess possible mitigating factors — such as medication, corrective surgery, or specialized equipment — in determining whether an individual is disabled. This change is directly related to the Sutton case. Furthermore, the amendments clarified the definition of major life activities, which relates directly to the Williams case, in which a judge had determined that Carpal Tunnel Syndrome was not a significant impairment to major life activities but merely precluded the plaintiff from completing specific workplace tasks. Though the language of the Act remains somewhat ambiguous, these changes help clarify and protect its original intent.

Within the context of Title III, there are two notable exceptions to the physical alteration mandate (Stowe, 2000). First, historical buildings listed on the National Register of Historic Places may abstain from structural or facade changes that would in some way be detrimental to the historical value or integrity of the structure. Such places whose architecture is of specific historical relevance may cite that protected status as a reason for non-compliance with Title III guidelines.

The second exception applies when the necessary amendments are beyond a business's financial means. Extensive renovation and redesign of buildings can be extremely costly, and it is not the intention of Congress to impose financial burdens on businesses that would drive them to ruin (Stowe, 2000). Necessarily, a large Fortune 500 corporation would be better able to afford required remodeling than a smaller local business. If, through the presentation of complete financial records and projected costs of renovation, it can be demonstrated that a company cannot reasonably afford to adhere to the statute, they will be permitted to make only those changes they can afford without fear of prosecution.

There is an additional exception in the context of "goods and services." Title III is designed to protect disabled individuals from discrimination or less favorable treatment as a result of their disability. In terms of businesses that provide services, it is much more difficult to determine the extent of their due diligence in ensuring that individuals partaking of those services are not being treated unfairly or excluded. In the context of insurance providers and lending organizations, this becomes a particularly difficult and ambiguous legal area. In an effort to avoid class action lawsuits against corporate healthcare providers and businesses that engage in commerce with other businesses rather than with individuals directly, a specific exemption was put in place ensuring that only businesses dealing directly with individuals were potentially liable for non-compliance with Title III.