This paper explores business ethics in the aviation industry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It outlines the responsibilities of airlines, airports, the Federal Aviation Administration, and federal government in maintaining passenger safety and security. The paper compares pre- and post-9/11 security protocols, discusses the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, and identifies remaining vulnerabilities in aviation security. It also addresses ethical tensions between enhanced security measures and the privacy rights of passengers and employees, and proposes solutions — including biometric identification and smart card systems — to help the industry meet its ethical obligations to all stakeholders.
The paper demonstrates applied ethical analysis within a real-world industry context. Rather than treating ethics as abstract theory, it maps specific industry practices — screener standards, bag matching, profiling programs — onto ethical principles such as duty of care, privacy, and stakeholder responsibility. This approach of tethering ethical argument to empirical evidence is a core skill in business ethics writing.
The paper opens with research objectives and methodology, then moves through the responsibilities of aviation stakeholders before September 11, the security failures that enabled the attacks, and the legislative and operational responses that followed. It then critiques remaining gaps and proposes further enhancements, before addressing the tension between security and passenger privacy. The conclusion synthesizes the ethical imperative for the industry to act. This funnel structure — from broad context to specific recommendations — is well suited to applied policy analysis.
On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists passed through several security checkpoints at three United States airports and proceeded to hijack four commercial jets. The horror began at 8:45 A.M. Two hours later, more than three thousand people were killed in New York City, rural Pennsylvania, and Arlington, Virginia (Duffy, 2002).
The attacks shattered the nation's sense of safety and security and forever changed the way people travel across America. In response to the tragic event, increased pressure was placed on the aviation industry to develop and implement higher ethical standards. Because millions of people fly daily and rely on airlines, as well as on the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of aviation procedures, the entire aviation industry must work together to keep passengers safe and secure.
This paper addresses the subject of business ethics in the field of aviation and emphasizes the effects of September 11 on the aviation industry. Through discussing the responsibilities each part of the aviation industry holds toward air travel, it provides a clear analysis of why enhanced business ethics concerning safety and security are of the utmost importance.
The paper compares security features before September 11 with those implemented after, in an effort to determine how they have improved and what they are still lacking. In addition, it discusses the rights of aviation employees, shareholders, and passengers to determine which security and business procedures are appropriate and which are invasive.
Airlines have an ethical responsibility to provide the highest level of security to their passengers, who place their lives in the hands of the airlines (Sweet, 2002). Aviation security is primarily the responsibility of the aviation industry, which includes the major airlines, their security companies, the airports, and airline trade associations such as the American Transport Association.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for assessing the level of threat to commercial aviation based on information received from intelligence sources. The FAA must subsequently establish procedures to address this level of threat and work to enforce those procedures within the aviation industry. The aviation industry is then responsible for implementing those procedures (Wells, 2001). The airlines must purchase insurance for aviation disasters, recognizing known risks including hijacking and terrorism. The FAA, airports, and the aviation industry are provided with information from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies and must develop contingency plans to address threat levels, including the use of sophisticated screening equipment.
Aviation managers are found in all airlines, as well as in transportation support fields and local, state, federal, and international regulatory agencies (Wells, 2001). It is the responsibility of aviation managers to study and analyze aviation, determine what can be done to make it safer, and develop new products and techniques designed to increase aviation security.
Airlines have, since September 11, expressed concern over the education and training of aviation pilots, and many are considering raising the requirements for these positions. The FAA has issued new guidelines for training flight crews in dealing with potential threats, especially hijackings (Sweet, 2002). The basic strategy for airlines has shifted from passive to active resistance by crewmembers.
Flight crews must now address additional security procedures in areas such as food handling and maintenance, where direct access to the plane has historically lacked security oversight. Airlines are now advising their crewmembers to treat any type of passenger disturbance as suspicious, act as a team in a threatening situation, and land the airplane as soon as possible when faced with any threat.
Airlines are now enforcing stricter minimum requirements for flight crew, including 50 hours of classroom training, 60 hours of on-the-job training, and a formal examination for screeners. All flight crewmembers must be U.S. citizens and hold a high school diploma.
A pilot is more than just someone who climbs aboard an airplane and flies it. Pilots hold major responsibility toward their passengers, as they are considered the eyes, ears, and brains of the aircraft. Pilots check weather conditions and plan safe routes (Wells, 2001). The pilot must also completely check the aircraft to ensure that all systems are operating properly and that all control surfaces and electrical equipment are functioning correctly. During the flight, pilots must monitor their progress and maintain communications with air traffic control facilities on the ground (Morrison, 1986).
As a result of September 11, pilots face even greater responsibility. Pilots are now being trained on how to operate the new cockpit doors and how to assess threats on the other side of the door (Sweet, 2002). Pilots are encouraged to make every attempt to land the plane rather than try to control situations inside the cabin — that is the job of air marshals, who will increasingly be a presence on every flight. As a result of September 11, air marshals are now placed inconspicuously on aircraft, equipped with ammunition and trained in security services.
The September 11 terrorist attacks caused more than 3,000 deaths, billions of dollars in property damage, and a dramatic decrease in public confidence regarding air travel (Duffy, 2002). Immediately, aviation security became of the utmost importance to the U.S. government, the aviation industry, and the public (Sweet, 2002).
Before September 11, three groups provided aviation security: airlines, airports, and the Federal Aviation Administration (Wells, 2001). Air carriers and airports provided most of the security, while the FAA regulated the industry. There were a variety of aviation security problems involving computer security, access to aircraft and airfields, and the detection of dangerous objects.
One of the most important features of the airline industry is its transportation network design. With its hub-and-spoke structure, passengers from various airports gather at central hubs and then depart for their destinations (Coughlin, 2002). This system creates interdependencies that give rise to what economists call an externality — a situation that exists whenever the consumption or production activity of one consumer or firm affects the well-being of others throughout the network.
The events of September 11 clearly demonstrated that the lack of aviation security in one location could affect the movement of passengers, airports, and airlines throughout the entire system. The existence of this externality offers an economic rationale for governmental involvement in aviation security. Unregulated private markets are less likely to provide sufficient aviation security, because the security policies of one location may not account for the spillover benefits conferred on others throughout the network (Duffy, 2002). The role of government is therefore to regulate private providers, subsidize them where necessary, and provide aviation security publicly.
As a result of increased federal government involvement, there has been a substantial increase in resources devoted to aviation security. The government has funded large increases in the use of labor resources — including passenger and baggage screeners, law enforcement officers in airports and on aircraft, and administrators — as well as capital resources such as passenger and baggage screening machines, access-control systems, and reinforced cockpit doors (Coughlin, 2002).
Although security guidelines prior to September 11 required airport screeners to confiscate dangerous items, including box cutters, from passengers, the airlines — which were in charge of security at the time — allowed terrorists to get several box cutters past airport checkpoints (Salant, 2002).
Prior to September 11, the Air Transport Association, representing major airlines, and the Regional Airline Association, a trade group for smaller carriers, published the main security guide for airlines. This Checkpoint Operations Guide was designed to implement FAA security regulations. However, prohibiting box cutters on airplanes was an industry requirement, not a government mandate — the FAA actually allowed airline passengers to carry blades less than four inches long before September 11.
Airlines often did not invest the time or money to check passengers thoroughly before September 11. According to Rep. John Mica, chairman of the House Transportation subcommittee on aviation, the FAA did have strict guidelines for screening standards in place, yet they were not being properly enforced (Salant, 2002). This combination proved to be a recipe for disaster.
"The whole security process was in disarray," said Mica. "When you don't have the personnel with any standards, and you don't have the FAA adopting specific rules, you have no one to enforce it." (Salant, 2002)
Within months of September 11, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Bush subsequently announced that the TSA would fall under the proposed Department of Homeland Security (White House, 2002).
"For the first time, airport security will become a direct federal responsibility, overseen by a new under secretary of transportation for security," said Bush. "Additional funds will be provided for federal air marshals. And a new team of federal security managers, supervisors, law enforcement officers, and screeners will ensure all passengers and carry-on bags are inspected thoroughly and effectively."
By mid-November 2002, more than 55,000 TSA screeners were in place at 429 commercial airports across the United States. Each TSA screener hired was required to be a thoroughly trained U.S. citizen with a high school education and fluency in English. By January 1, 2003, all checked luggage was to be screened by an Explosives Detection System machine. The number-one requirement of TSA screeners was to ensure that aviation security was enforced before passengers boarded planes.
As a direct result of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) implemented a September 11 Security Fee, applying to all airline tickets sold on or after February 1, 2002. The fee was set at $2.50 per flight boarded, with a $5 maximum for one-way travel and $10 for a round trip. The charges applied to domestic and overseas flights originating at U.S. airports.
This fee was designed to help pay for the federal government's costs of providing aviation security services. According to the DOT budget office, approximately $900 million was projected to be raised from this fee in fiscal year 2002. The funds were designated for passenger and baggage screeners, security managers, and law enforcement personnel at airports, as well as for the purchase of explosive detection systems.
President Bush also established a federal grant fund of $500 million to finance aircraft modifications that delay or deny access to the cockpit (White House, 2001). Funded projects included developing and implementing devices that:
While the federal government's Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 includes many strong measures to boost the security of air travelers — including a requirement to screen all checked luggage — aviation studies reveal that at the beginning of 2002, still only 10% of luggage was actually required to be screened for explosives. In addition, the act did not require airlines to match all checked bags to passengers on board domestic flights.
The pressure therefore remained on airlines and airports to address the government's shortfalls regarding aviation security. Airlines expressed concerns over the cost of bag-matching and further screening, arguing that it would cause too many delays.
Several airlines, including JetBlue Airways and Alaska Airlines, had already implemented additional security procedures as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks (Wald, 2002). JetBlue's security enhancements included a bag-matching policy and improved cockpit doors. JetBlue also installed cameras in several of its planes and expected to install them on all aircraft the following year. Two cameras are visible — one outside the cockpit door and one at the rear galley — while two additional cameras are hidden.
JetBlue spent more per door than any other commercial carrier, considerably more than the steel bars many carriers installed. JetBlue's chief pilot noted that their cockpit door design would stop anything, including a bullet.
Prior to September 11, cockpit doors consisted of little more than a paper-thin barrier that served as a symbol of security rather than a functional deterrent (Sweet, 2002). Since the terrorist attacks, the federal government has required a major upgrade to keep terrorists away from the flight deck. The FAA mandated the strengthening of cockpit doors, and all air carriers have since installed new and improved versions.
Thousands of commercial airplanes have installed cockpit doors featuring a variety of designs, ranging from steel bars locked across a traditional door to fully bulletproof models (Evans, 2002). The FAA minimum requirement calls for all long-term solutions to be able to withstand a round of shots fired from an AK-47, as well as fragments from an exploding device such as a hand grenade.
In an effort to improve aviation security beyond minimum requirements, many airlines are exceeding FAA standards to improve flight deck security and reassure travelers that flying is among the safest ways to travel.
Airports must now encourage passengers to allow extra time when traveling, as heightened security measures have increased the time needed to properly screen travelers. Most airports now recommend arriving two hours before a domestic flight and three hours before an international departure.
When checking in passengers and at the boarding gate, airlines must insist on seeing a government-issued ID. At the screening point, airport staff must ensure that only ticketed passengers are permitted beyond the security perimeter. Carry-on luggage must be limited and monitored. All electronic items — including cell phones and laptop computers — must be screened, in addition to any metal items.
When screening passengers, airport security is required to confiscate the following items: knives; cutting and puncturing instruments; corkscrews; athletic equipment that could be used as a weapon; fireworks or explosives; flammable liquids or solids; matches or lighters; household cleaners; pressure containers; and all weapons and firearms.
All articles loaded onto an aircraft — including passengers, baggage, catering, mail, and cargo — must be electronically screened. Airports should incorporate full-body, highly sophisticated electronic scanning machines. While not yet mandatory, airlines should also implement a policy requiring bag matching on all domestic and international flights. A variety of critical unsecured situations currently exist, including procedures for bags left on board for passengers who miss connecting flights or who do not remain on their initial flight.
In addition, the Department of Transportation should loosen tracking and reporting criteria for "on-time performance" to ensure that the focus remains on security. As airlines compete to win back customers, security risks being subordinated to on-time performance metrics. Loosening DOT performance tracking would allow airlines to focus more squarely on security issues.
Immediately following September 11, airlines required domestic crews to conduct security briefings prior to boarding passengers. However, airlines have increasingly overridden this important security measure in favor of on-time performance. The TSA is currently only required to review its federal screener program once a year; the aviation industry should take the initiative to conduct ongoing reviews to prevent screeners from being intimidated, bribed, or underperforming. Increased deployment of the Federal Air Marshal program should also be implemented.
As of this writing, there is no accurate employment verification system for airline staff. Counterfeit documents and badges remain a threat to aviation security. Airlines should invest in a Smart Card system, which would enable better tracking of employees.
Additional ethical business standards for airlines include:
Many airlines and airports have simply addressed the symptoms of security problems rather than the underlying causes (Kidd, 2002). In order to develop and implement higher ethical standards in aviation security, the entire aviation industry must take security to the next level. This means equipping all security and flight personnel with information systems that identify, authenticate, and assess passengers and employees, as well as screen and track bags, cargo, and other assets (Dullum, 2002). These systems would complement federal guidelines and provide greater visibility to security personnel.
Airlines seem to be concentrating on a variety of efforts to get passengers back on their aircraft (Kidd, 2002). However, it is imperative that they do not neglect security in their marketing efforts. Before travelers will return in force, they must feel that airline security will protect them and view flying as the best way to travel.
Airlines fear that enhanced security measures may result in extended delays and uncertainty among passengers. They are aware that business travelers will not tolerate the loss of productivity and convenience, and may seek other methods of travel. If the aviation industry allows security to take a back seat to convenience, it is displaying unethical behavior toward its shareholders, who have a stake in the economic success of the business.
The aviation industry has thus far relied on minimal security enhancements, sticking to the minimum requirements mandated by the federal government, including baggage screening, bag matching, and the use of dogs trained to detect contraband. While effective in keeping illegal or threatening materials off aircraft, these measures are insufficient (Dullum, 2002). A trained terrorist who is willing to commit suicide is inherently threatening, even without a weapon. Therefore, the biggest ethical concern for the aviation industry should be detecting threatening people as well as threatening materials.
This means airlines must focus on travelers' identification and authentication from check-in through boarding, with risk assessment beginning at the point of reservation. These measures would complement the detection solutions already in place.
One solution has proven effective in accurately identifying passengers. Travelers register for the program either online or at an airport by completing a brief questionnaire that requires much of the information typically needed when applying for a credit card. A background check is then conducted using commercial, travel, and law enforcement data. If the check clears, biometric information — in the form of an electronic fingerprint, hand geometry scan, iris scan, or facial recognition — is captured and encoded on a smart card. The passenger then uses this smart card to access dedicated "trusted passenger" lanes at security checkpoints, allowing them to bypass longer queues. This addresses airlines' concerns about delays, as it gives passengers the option to voluntarily relinquish some of their privacy in exchange for expedited screening.
U.S. Department of Transportation. www.dot.gov.
Wald, Matthew. "Traces of Terror: Airline Security; U.S. Considers Requiring Cameras Providing Cabin Views." The New York Times, 2002.
Wallis, Rodney. Combating Air Terrorism. Brassey's, 1998.
Wells, Alexander. Commercial Aviation Safety. McGraw-Hill, 2001.
You’re 71% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 2 sections.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.