Aviation Business Ethics and Post-9/11 Security Changes

Introduction and Research Objectives

On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists passed through several security checkpoints at three United States airports and proceeded to hijack four commercial jets. The horror began at 8:45 A.M. Two hours later, more than three thousand people were killed in New York City, rural Pennsylvania, and Arlington, Virginia (Duffy, 2002).

The attacks shattered the nation's sense of safety and security and forever changed the way people travel across America. In response to the tragic event, increased pressure was placed on the aviation industry to develop and implement higher ethical standards. Because millions of people fly daily and rely on airlines, as well as on the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of aviation procedures, the entire aviation industry must work together to keep passengers safe and secure.

This paper addresses the subject of business ethics in the field of aviation and emphasizes the effects of September 11 on the aviation industry. Through discussing the responsibilities each part of the aviation industry holds toward air travel, it provides a clear analysis of why enhanced business ethics concerning safety and security are of the utmost importance.

The paper compares security features before September 11 with those implemented after, in an effort to determine how they have improved and what they are still lacking. In addition, it discusses the rights of aviation employees, shareholders, and passengers to determine which security and business procedures are appropriate and which are invasive.

Responsibilities of the Aviation Industry in Safety and Security

Airlines have an ethical responsibility to provide the highest level of security to their passengers, who place their lives in the hands of the airlines (Sweet, 2002). Aviation security is primarily the responsibility of the aviation industry, which includes the major airlines, their security companies, the airports, and airline trade associations such as the American Transport Association.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for assessing the level of threat to commercial aviation based on information received from intelligence sources. The FAA must subsequently establish procedures to address this level of threat and work to enforce those procedures within the aviation industry. The aviation industry is then responsible for implementing those procedures (Wells, 2001). The airlines must purchase insurance for aviation disasters, recognizing known risks including hijacking and terrorism. The FAA, airports, and the aviation industry are provided with information from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies and must develop contingency plans to address threat levels, including the use of sophisticated screening equipment.

Aviation managers are found in all airlines, as well as in transportation support fields and local, state, federal, and international regulatory agencies (Wells, 2001). It is the responsibility of aviation managers to study and analyze aviation, determine what can be done to make it safer, and develop new products and techniques designed to increase aviation security.

Airlines have, since September 11, expressed concern over the education and training of aviation pilots, and many are considering raising the requirements for these positions. The FAA has issued new guidelines for training flight crews in dealing with potential threats, especially hijackings (Sweet, 2002). The basic strategy for airlines has shifted from passive to active resistance by crewmembers.

Flight crews must now address additional security procedures in areas such as food handling and maintenance, where direct access to the plane has historically lacked security oversight. Airlines are now advising their crewmembers to treat any type of passenger disturbance as suspicious, act as a team in a threatening situation, and land the airplane as soon as possible when faced with any threat.

Airlines are now enforcing stricter minimum requirements for flight crew, including 50 hours of classroom training, 60 hours of on-the-job training, and a formal examination for screeners. All flight crewmembers must be U.S. citizens and hold a high school diploma.

A pilot is more than just someone who climbs aboard an airplane and flies it. Pilots hold major responsibility toward their passengers, as they are considered the eyes, ears, and brains of the aircraft. Pilots check weather conditions and plan safe routes (Wells, 2001). The pilot must also completely check the aircraft to ensure that all systems are operating properly and that all control surfaces and electrical equipment are functioning correctly. During the flight, pilots must monitor their progress and maintain communications with air traffic control facilities on the ground (Morrison, 1986).

As a result of September 11, pilots face even greater responsibility. Pilots are now being trained on how to operate the new cockpit doors and how to assess threats on the other side of the door (Sweet, 2002). Pilots are encouraged to make every attempt to land the plane rather than try to control situations inside the cabin — that is the job of air marshals, who will increasingly be a presence on every flight. As a result of September 11, air marshals are now placed inconspicuously on aircraft, equipped with ammunition and trained in security services.

Security Before and After September 11

The September 11 terrorist attacks caused more than 3,000 deaths, billions of dollars in property damage, and a dramatic decrease in public confidence regarding air travel (Duffy, 2002). Immediately, aviation security became of the utmost importance to the U.S. government, the aviation industry, and the public (Sweet, 2002).

Before September 11, three groups provided aviation security: airlines, airports, and the Federal Aviation Administration (Wells, 2001). Air carriers and airports provided most of the security, while the FAA regulated the industry. There were a variety of aviation security problems involving computer security, access to aircraft and airfields, and the detection of dangerous objects.

One of the most important features of the airline industry is its transportation network design. With its hub-and-spoke structure, passengers from various airports gather at central hubs and then depart for their destinations (Coughlin, 2002). This system creates interdependencies that give rise to what economists call an externality — a situation that exists whenever the consumption or production activity of one consumer or firm affects the well-being of others throughout the network.

The events of September 11 clearly demonstrated that the lack of aviation security in one location could affect the movement of passengers, airports, and airlines throughout the entire system. The existence of this externality offers an economic rationale for governmental involvement in aviation security. Unregulated private markets are less likely to provide sufficient aviation security, because the security policies of one location may not account for the spillover benefits conferred on others throughout the network (Duffy, 2002). The role of government is therefore to regulate private providers, subsidize them where necessary, and provide aviation security publicly.

As a result of increased federal government involvement, there has been a substantial increase in resources devoted to aviation security. The government has funded large increases in the use of labor resources — including passenger and baggage screeners, law enforcement officers in airports and on aircraft, and administrators — as well as capital resources such as passenger and baggage screening machines, access-control systems, and reinforced cockpit doors (Coughlin, 2002).

Although security guidelines prior to September 11 required airport screeners to confiscate dangerous items, including box cutters, from passengers, the airlines — which were in charge of security at the time — allowed terrorists to get several box cutters past airport checkpoints (Salant, 2002).

Prior to September 11, the Air Transport Association, representing major airlines, and the Regional Airline Association, a trade group for smaller carriers, published the main security guide for airlines. This Checkpoint Operations Guide was designed to implement FAA security regulations. However, prohibiting box cutters on airplanes was an industry requirement, not a government mandate — the FAA actually allowed airline passengers to carry blades less than four inches long before September 11.

Airlines often did not invest the time or money to check passengers thoroughly before September 11. According to Rep. John Mica, chairman of the House Transportation subcommittee on aviation, the FAA did have strict guidelines for screening standards in place, yet they were not being properly enforced (Salant, 2002). This combination proved to be a recipe for disaster.

"The whole security process was in disarray," said Mica. "When you don't have the personnel with any standards, and you don't have the FAA adopting specific rules, you have no one to enforce it." (Salant, 2002)

Within months of September 11, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Bush subsequently announced that the TSA would fall under the proposed Department of Homeland Security (White House, 2002).

"For the first time, airport security will become a direct federal responsibility, overseen by a new under secretary of transportation for security," said Bush. "Additional funds will be provided for federal air marshals. And a new team of federal security managers, supervisors, law enforcement officers, and screeners will ensure all passengers and carry-on bags are inspected thoroughly and effectively."

By mid-November 2002, more than 55,000 TSA screeners were in place at 429 commercial airports across the United States. Each TSA screener hired was required to be a thoroughly trained U.S. citizen with a high school education and fluency in English. By January 1, 2003, all checked luggage was to be screened by an Explosives Detection System machine. The number-one requirement of TSA screeners was to ensure that aviation security was enforced before passengers boarded planes.

As a direct result of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) implemented a September 11 Security Fee, applying to all airline tickets sold on or after February 1, 2002. The fee was set at $2.50 per flight boarded, with a $5 maximum for one-way travel and $10 for a round trip. The charges applied to domestic and overseas flights originating at U.S. airports.

This fee was designed to help pay for the federal government's costs of providing aviation security services. According to the DOT budget office, approximately $900 million was projected to be raised from this fee in fiscal year 2002. The funds were designated for passenger and baggage screeners, security managers, and law enforcement personnel at airports, as well as for the purchase of explosive detection systems.

President Bush also established a federal grant fund of $500 million to finance aircraft modifications that delay or deny access to the cockpit (White House, 2001). Funded projects included developing and implementing devices that:

Conclusion

While September 11 has driven significant improvements in aviation security — making flying safer than it was before — aviation business standards have not yet reached the level of safety they should, nor are they as convenient as a healthy aviation industry requires.

The fundamental goal of aviation security is to know exactly who is on the plane, be confident that those passengers do not pose a threat, and be certain they are not carrying anything threatening. Advanced ethical business standards in the aviation industry must address both the core underlying problems and their visible symptoms.

The fact remains that as long as travelers have concerns and questions about the safety and security of air transportation, the economic health of this industry will not be able to prosper. Therefore, the aviation industry must take the initiative in implementing and enforcing enhanced business ethics to protect its employees, passengers, shareholders, and ultimately the entire industry.

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