How Otto von Bismarck Achieved the Unification of Germany

Introduction: A New Order in Europe

Many centuries of international relations history demonstrate a recurring pattern: a dominant power emerges each century and reshapes the prevailing system of international relations according to its own values. The seventeenth century, for example, was characterized by French influence, as French monarchs prioritized the national interests of their centralized, mono-national state. The eighteenth century became famous for the British conception of equilibrium — the idea that no European country should grow stronger than any other, Britain included. The nineteenth century followed a similar pattern when Germany under Bismarck created a new order in Europe, one in which military and economic strength became the decisive factors of international relations. The French theory of raison d'état — using any method necessary to achieve success in national foreign policy — was thus replaced by Bismarck's conception of Realpolitik, which treated aggressive force as the primary instrument of statecraft.

"Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismarck was the defining personality of his era: a unique statesman who achieved remarkable success, the consequences of which shaped major events in Europe throughout the twentieth century. A unified, strong, and powerful empire was the chief result of his shrewd diplomacy and assertive — sometimes even aggressive — politics. Bismarck succeeded in forging an entirely new nation united by the ideology of a new German Empire, one strong and powerful enough to protect the German people and to vindicate them against the European powers that had long hindered Germany's development. A unified state had been the dream of millions of ordinary Germans, and at last that dream was realized: a new era of German history had begun. Europe was compelled to respect the new state, and every European monarch understood they would now have to reckon with this emerging power.

Prussia's Rise and Bismarck's Early Career

Germany had remained a fragmented territory for many centuries, consisting of weak states cooperating with one another only as small parts of an ineffective confederation. Such an arrangement offered little prospect for political, economic, or cultural development. Germany remained an outdated territory, living apart from the progressive processes unfolding in leading European countries such as France, Britain, and even Russia. Of all the German states, only two were comparatively strong: Prussia and Austria, each a potential center for the unification of all German lands. Austria was the leading state within the German Confederation but lacked a strong national economy, being primarily an agricultural country. Prussia, by contrast, was a rigidly ordered state — in essence a police regime — that was deeply antidemocratic yet the most industrially developed part of fragmented Germany, and it also maintained a formidable army. It was ultimately this state, and its statesman Otto von Bismarck, that became the driving force behind German unification.

Bismarck was a typical Prussian aristocrat whose political views at the outset of his career were decidedly conservative. He joined the Gerlach group of conservative aristocrats and devoted himself to preserving the aristocracy from bureaucratization; his early political outlook was thoroughly traditional and reactionary. Over time, however, he recognized the weakness of this ideology and came to see Prussian hegemony within the German Confederation as the essential precondition of any significant political success. Prussia — the state he held dearest — was to become the dominant power in northern Europe and unite all German lands, even at the cost of war. As a Prussian politician, "he refused to put up with Prussia's traditional role as junior partner to Austria..." (Imanuel Geiss and Fred Bridgham, The Question of German Unification: 1806–1996, p. 44). He recognized that only through the exercise of power and an aggressive foreign policy could Prussia succeed, as the "Iron Chancellor" himself declared: "The position of Prussia in Germany will not be determined by its liberalism but by its power..." (Bruno Schneider, The Great Unification, p. 289).

Bismarck's political career began in 1849 when he was elected to the Prussian Landtag (Chamber of Deputies). He was subsequently posted to St. Petersburg, where he studied the workings of Russian diplomacy and became a consummate practitioner of foreign affairs. Russian Chancellor Gorchakov recognized and valued his talents. Bismarck was then sent to Paris as Prussian minister, and eleven years of diplomatic practice proved invaluable to his future efforts, since the success of German unification depended in large part on how foreign powers would respond to a newly unified Germany.

Diplomacy and the Road to War with Austria

October 1862 marks a turning point in German history: Otto von Bismarck was appointed Minister-President of Prussia and began pursuing his long-held ambitions. The outlines of his strategy are evident from a conversation he held with British Prime Minister during a visit to London that year, in which he stated his intention first to reorganize and strengthen the Prussian army, then to declare war on Austria, and, following victory, to unite Germany. His first major diplomatic success was converting Russia into a Prussian ally. He persuaded Chancellor Gorchakov and Tsar Alexander II that German and Russian national interests were aligned, resulting in a military agreement under which both countries would fight against a common enemy. This was a significant achievement: Austria understood that the agreement had been concluded not merely to suppress a Polish rebellion but to shield Prussia from any external military threat.

After assuming the role of Minister-President, Bismarck undertook a comprehensive reorganization of the Prussian army, increasing its size despite resistance from the Landtag, whose members did not appreciate the true purpose of his military preparations. His first targets were two small German territories held by Denmark — Schleswig and Holstein — whose populations sought independence from both Denmark and the German Confederation. The Confederation authorized a military intervention, and Bismarck ensured that Prussia and Austria jointly conducted it, intending to use this collaboration with his future adversary to his own advantage. By February 1864, Holstein and Schleswig had been captured by the allied forces and divided between Austria and Prussia.

His next objective was Austria itself, but Bismarck understood that going to war with the Habsburg state would require either active international support or, at a minimum, the neutrality of the major European powers. "As a safety measure, Bismarck wanted to keep at least a wire to St. Petersburg open for as long as possible, even making early concessions..." (Geiss and Bridgham, The Question of German Unification: 1806–1996, p. 53). He calculated, correctly, that Russia would not intervene to prevent Prussia from defeating Austria — its longstanding rival. Having secured Russian goodwill, he promised the French leadership certain Austrian territories in exchange for French neutrality, a shrewd maneuver that neutralized two of the most powerful states on the European continent. An examination of Bismarck's letter to Minister von Manteuffel confirms that he viewed conflict with Austria as inevitable: "I wish only to express my conviction that, in the not too distant future, we shall have to fight for our existence against Austria and that it is not within our power to avoid that, since the course of events in Germany has no other solution." (Bismarck's Memories, p. 431).

Conclusion: Bismarck's Legacy

Ultimately, we must acknowledge that Otto von Bismarck was the central figure in German unification — an exceptionally self-directed, talented, and active politician who understood the complexities of his era and found the most effective path through them. He was a consummate master of foreign policy who exploited the weaknesses of both enemies and allies while sparing millions from needless conflict. The wars he waged were, in his view, genuinely necessary to preserve the German nation from the tragedy of continued fragmentation; it must be noted, however, that the crimes of Wilhelm II and Hitler were in some sense a continuation — and a distortion — of the precedents Bismarck established. Although Bismarck himself was not a malevolent figure, his successors lacked the wisdom to heed his counsel: they launched wars against Russia, a country Bismarck had explicitly warned could never be defeated by Germany. All of Bismarck's achievements were directed toward securing German national interests, not toward conquering other nations — a fundamental distinction his successors failed to grasp. The harsh methods of his politics can be understood in the context of his time and the formidable problems he was called upon to solve, and by any measure he solved them successfully.