Burglary and Dwelling House Status Under Virginia Code § 18.2-89

Facts

Jimmy Stewart, a renowned Hollywood star, purchased a getaway cabin in western Virginia. Jimmy intended to use the cabin — located deep in the woods — at least once per month for long weekends. He hired an interior designer to furnish its ten rooms and equipped most of them, including the kitchen and a bedroom. The kitchen contained a table and chairs as well as cooking and eating utensils, while one room held a mattress and blankets. However, Jimmy lost his prestigious status in Hollywood, fell into financial hardship, and eventually moved to Japan for a sitcom role.

Following his move to Japan, Jimmy's plan to use the cabin each month was never fully realized. After an initial three monthly visits, he did not use the cabin for two years. Nonetheless, the house still had electricity, running water, and some food in the refrigerator.

Burglars broke into Jimmy's cabin and stole everything in the basement storage area. The local county sheriff arrested one of the burglars, named Black Jack Smith, after he attempted to sell stolen furniture at a local police bazaar. He was charged and convicted of burglary under Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-89 (1950). Through his attorney, Swifty Lazaar, Black Jack appealed the court's ruling on the grounds that Jimmy's cabin was not a dwelling house.

Issue

Should Jimmy's cabin, at the time of the burglary, be considered a dwelling house pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-89?

Analogous Case: Giles v. Commonwealth (2009)

In Giles v. Commonwealth (2009), the court held that a house is regarded as a dwelling house under Code § 18.2-89 when it is used for habitation, including periodic habitation. The court further found that the burglary statute contains no frequency requirement, meaning a house need not be physically inhabited on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis to qualify as a dwelling house under the statute.

In that case, defendant Christopher Lee Giles was convicted of breaking and entering Mr. Thornton's house with intent to steal. Mr. Thornton had used the house as a vacation home after inheriting it from his mother three months prior to the break-in. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's ruling, which found Giles guilty of burglary and sentenced him to twenty years in prison. The defendant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which also upheld the Court of Appeals' decision.

The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had not erred in affirming the circuit court's judgment. It reasoned that the Commonwealth had presented adequate evidence of habitation because Mr. Thornton intended to use the property for habitation purposes, albeit on a periodic basis. The absence of a frequency requirement in the burglary statute was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction.

Conclusion

Pursuant to Code § 18.2-89, Jimmy's cabin is considered a dwelling house at the time of the burglary. There is sufficient evidence to prove that the cabin was a dwelling house at the time of the incident. Therefore, Black Jack's guilty verdict should be upheld by the Court of Appeals.

Under the burglary statute, a house used for habitation — including periodic habitation — qualifies as a dwelling house. Moreover, a house does not lose its dwelling status simply because an individual is absent for either a regular or irregular period of time. Periodic habitation does not require that the residence be used at fixed intervals, so long as it is used for habitation purposes.