This paper examines a scenario in which a casino-hotel, referred to as DWI's Queen of the Nile, faces terrorist threats demanding it bar patrons of Arab or Middle Eastern descent. The paper analyzes why DWI cannot comply with those demands under Titles II and III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, drawing on the landmark Supreme Court rulings in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung. It also addresses DWI's parallel legal duty to protect its employees from workplace violence under the Occupational Health and Safety Act and common law. The paper concludes with practical recommendations for engaging law enforcement, temporarily closing the casino, and developing a comprehensive security plan before reopening.
The paper demonstrates applied legal analysis: it identifies a legal question, cites the controlling statute and precedent cases, explains how those authorities resolve the question, and then translates the legal conclusion into concrete business guidance. The use of Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung to establish Commerce Clause jurisdiction is a strong example of building an argument through analogous case reasoning.
The paper opens by framing DWI's dual dilemma — patron discrimination versus employee safety. It then resolves the discrimination question through statutory and constitutional analysis. Next it shifts to workplace safety obligations under statute and common law. It closes with a step-by-step recommended response, including law enforcement notification, temporary closure, and a security plan. This problem–law–solution structure is typical of applied legal writing at the undergraduate level.
This scenario places DWI in a difficult legal position, because it has a duty to its patrons and a duty to its employees. DWI could acquiesce to the terrorist demands and refuse to allow patrons who appear to be of Arab or Middle Eastern descent, thus ending the threat of violence. However, doing so would place DWI in direct violation of federal anti-discrimination laws. Keeping the business open, on the other hand, places DWI's employees in danger and could violate DWI's obligation to provide its employees with a safe workplace. The threats against the guests and the property made DWI aware of potential danger, and an employee was injured as a result of that danger.
DWI has a duty to ensure that the injured employee receives appropriate care and compensation. It also has a duty to protect its other employees, who have understandably been reluctant to return to work since the sniper attack. In addition to these legal duties, DWI must address serious financial concerns. If DWI has to shut down the casino until the threats can be traced and eliminated, it will lose revenue during any downtime. Furthermore, any type of shutdown may be seen as acquiescence to the terrorist demands, and several groups have threatened to boycott DWI if it gives in to the blackmail.
DWI absolutely cannot bar patrons on the basis of race or national origin. Titles II and III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 absolutely bar discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in public accommodations, enjoin establishments from engaging in such discrimination, and establish rules for desegregation (P.L. 88-352, 201 et seq. and 301 et seq.). The affected business, the Queen of the Nile, is a casino and hotel, which firmly falls within the definition of a public accommodation.
The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has already been firmly established. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), the Supreme Court examined the Act to determine whether Congress could prohibit discrimination in accommodations. The challenge in that case was that if a hotel was not likely to serve customers traveling interstate, then the Commerce Clause could not be used to justify a law impacting that hotel's obligation to serve potential patrons. The Supreme Court struck down that challenge and affirmed that the Commerce Clause could be used to justify such laws for all hotels.
Likewise, in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could constitutionally be applied to restaurants. Although the Court did not suggest that all restaurants had the possibility of serving interstate travelers, it still found that the Commerce Clause applied because much of the food served in restaurants moves within the stream of commerce, thus triggering Commerce Clause application. The combined result of those two cases is that all public establishments in the United States are barred from race-based discrimination. Therefore, DWI absolutely cannot acquiesce to the terrorists' demands and attempt to bar any of its Arab-American or Middle Eastern customers.
Resolution of that issue still leaves DWI with an important concern about moving forward in its business. As clear as DWI's legal position is towards its potential patrons, it may also have a legal duty to its employees to provide them with a safe workplace. According to Gary Watkins, while there is no definitive law stating that employers will be held responsible for their employees who experience workplace violence, both the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 181 of 1993) and the common law support the idea that employers can be held responsible when their employees are injured as a result of workplace violence (2008). Generally, this is the case when a person's job puts them at increased risk for violence, such as when that person works as a cashier.
Casino employees already work in an environment that increases the potential for violence. Casinos generally feature large amounts of cash on the premises, a substantial amount of alcohol consumption, and patrons who may have lost significant sums of money. Due to these factors, even without the additional threats of violence from the terrorists, it seems clear that DWI would have some type of protective duty towards its employees. Combined with the fact that specific threats have been made against the hotel by a terrorist group that has already demonstrated its willingness to carry out those threats, it would be an absolute disaster for DWI to move forward in its business without addressing those threats.
Moreover, it is clear that DWI's internal security staff is inadequate to deal with these threats, given that one sniper attack has already occurred. DWI needs to immediately inform law enforcement. It should begin by contacting the local police force and reporting the shooting and the threats, then notify the state police, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security. The FBI, the primary federal investigative organization, and Homeland Security, which specifically deals with terrorist threats, may have the resources necessary to identify the source of the terrorist threat and eradicate it in a timely fashion. DWI should work with those agencies to develop a safety plan for the casino. DWI should also make the threats public so that its employees and potential customers have knowledge of them and can make an informed decision about whether to visit the casino.
DWI's situation illustrates the tension that can arise between an establishment's anti-discrimination obligations and its duty to maintain a safe environment for employees. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung, leaves no room for DWI to comply with the terrorists' demands. At the same time, the Occupational Health and Safety Act and common law principles compel DWI to take the threats seriously and act decisively to protect its workforce. By engaging law enforcement, temporarily closing the casino, and implementing a robust security plan, DWI can fulfill both of these legal obligations and position itself to resume normal operations as safely and quickly as possible.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Retrieved March 4, 2009 from Findlaw Web site:
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Retrieved March 4, 2009 from Findlaw Web site:
Title II of the Civil Rights Act (1964) P.L. 88-352, 201 et seq. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from Findlaw Web site:
Watkins, G. (2008). Addressing workplace violence: is there a legal duty on employers to take appropriate steps to prevent exposing employees to workplace violence? Retrieved March 5, 2009 from Workinfo.com Web site:
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