Constitutional Models, Political Parties, and Rational Choice

Introduction

Constitutionalism and noble representative government are concepts and practices that have existed longer than the American Republic. The existence of these concepts provided the foundation for the formation of the American democratic experiment, acting as essential ingredients in that process. Since the founding of the American Republic, various constitutional models have been established in attempts to respond to governance issues that emerge from time to time. These different models have provided the foundation for governance practices aimed at better governing society. Some notable examples include the 18th-century Madisonian and Hamiltonian constitutional models and Ernst Barker's normative democratic theory, which differ significantly with regard to their major components.

Madisonian and Hamiltonian Models vs. Normative Democratic Theory

The 18th-century constitutional models relied principally on principles introduced by Madison and Hamilton. The Madisonian constitutional model emphasized separation of powers and checks and balances, while the Hamiltonian model emphasized a strong, unitary president. In Federalist Papers nos. 48–50, James Madison argued that developing a government and a Constitution to oversee governmental powers is not, by itself, adequate protection against intrusions that result in the tyrannical concentration of all governmental powers in the same hands (Garrison, 2008). As a result, he introduced a constitutional model that divided governmental powers between federal and state governments, distributed authority among three branches of national government, and separated the Legislative Department into two chambers — the House of Representatives and the Senate (Madison, Federalist 47, 48, 51). The accumulation of all powers — executive, legislative, and judicial — in the same hands may be precisely regarded as the very definition of tyranny.

By contrast, Alexander Hamilton's constitutional model emphasized a strong, unitary president through centralizing the executive power of the national government. This model was developed on the premise that energy in the executive is a leading attribute of good government. A feeble executive, in Hamilton's view, contributes to feeble execution of governance-related processes and activities. Hamilton emphasized the need for a strong unitary president on the basis that executive energy is essential for safeguarding the community against external attacks and for the vigorous administration of the laws (Hamilton, Federalist 70).

These constitutional models, which dominated governance practices in the 18th century, differ from the normative democratic theory advanced by Ernst Barker. Barker's theory postulates that a governance system must proceed through different stages, including party, electorate, parliament, and cabinet (Barker, 1942). By suggesting that a system of government progresses through these four major stages, Barker drew upon the British model in constructing his normative democratic theory. He introduced his model through a classic argument for government by discussion, which initiates the party model of government.

One of the major differences between the 18th-century Madisonian and Hamiltonian models and Barker's theory relates to political parties. Unlike Madison and Hamilton's constitutional models, Barker's normative democratic theory treats parties and rational choice as core components of governance systems. This emphasis was based on the belief that parties are attractive because they provide order, accountability, and efficiency in governance. Madison, by contrast, stressed intentional, balanced government, while Hamilton's model centralized power. A second difference concerns factions: Barker proposed that factions enable the electorate to exercise programmatic choice, whereas Hamilton and Madison considered factions as components that weaken the national interest (Woll, 2010, p. 58). Third, the 18th-century constitutional models were rooted in political reality, while Barker's theory has been criticized for seemingly ignoring political realities. The Madisonian system is regarded as realistic because it is based on the laws of normal political behavior, whereas Barker's model is comparatively idealistic, being centered on democratic ideals rather than political realities.

The Framers' View of Political Parties

As reflected in the Madisonian and Hamiltonian constitutional models, the Framers of the Constitution viewed political parties quite differently from how Barker's normative democratic theory does. The constitutional and governance models developed during the framing of the Constitution did not include political parties, implying that such factions were not intended to play an important role in the political process. According to Philips (2012), the system of representative democracy established in the late 1780s was primarily an experiment by the Framers, in large part because no other country at the time had a functioning democratic representative government.

The Framers viewed political parties as factions that would contribute to the division of the republic. As a result of this view, they did not mention political parties in the Constitution and regarded them as a grave danger. In their writings, the Framers referred to political parties as factions constituting the greatest evil under the Constitution, warning that they would divide the republic into competing groups under rival leaders, each striving intensely against the others.

Furthermore, the Framers considered political parties to be engines of corruption. Such bodies would provide a framework for ambitious, dishonest, and cunning men to undermine the people's power and seize the reins of government for themselves. Political parties, in this view, would become tools through which the interests of selfish minorities could be pursued at the expense of the common good of the majority (Madison, Federalist 10). Parties also tend to favor a president who capitalizes on the arts of demagoguery and treats the entire country as his personal political domain (APSA Committee on Political Parties, 1950). In essence, according to the Framers, political parties were never meant to exist.

Conclusion

Constitutionalism and representative government are concepts that have existed for a long period of time and have been utilized in developing several constitutional models. The 18th-century Madisonian and Hamiltonian models differ from Barker's normative democratic theory with regard to the inclusion of political parties and their grounding in political realities. The Framers of the Constitution viewed political parties as factions that would divide the republic and serve as engines of corruption. Barker's model, by contrast, places parties and rational choice at the center of governance, making it the most accommodating of democratic norms among the three frameworks examined.

References

APSA Committee on Political Parties. (1950). Towards a more responsible two-party system.

Barker, E. (1942). Reflections on government.

Garrison, A. H. (2008). Hamiltonian and Madisonian democracy, the rule of law and why the courts have a role in the war on terrorism. In Papers from the February 2008 conference: Terrorism & justice — The balance of civil liberties. Retrieved from https://www.ucmo.edu/cjinst/Issue8.pdf

Hamilton, A. (n.d.). The presidency. The Federalist No. 70.

Landwehr, C. (2005, May). Rational choice, deliberative democracy, and preference transformation. Studies in Social and Political Thought, 11. Retrieved from https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=11-3.pdf&site=412

Madison, J. (n.d.). Federalist 47, 48, 51.

Madison, J. (n.d.). The Federalist No. 10.

Philips, T. (2012, September 1). Political parties were never meant to be. Retrieved from http://www.localelectors.org/2012/09/01/political-parties-were-never-meant-to-be/

Woll. (2010). Political parties and the electorate. Retrieved from http://boballey.org/trinity5/AP%20Exam%202009/Woll%20Chapter%204%20Political%20Parties%20and%20the%20Electorate.pdf