Crew Resource Management and Cross-Cultural Aviation Automation

Introduction: Automation and Safety in International Aviation

A defining feature of modern aviation is automation. Automation has been part of aviation far longer than it has been part of any other industry, and aviation has been multicultural since the first transatlantic flight. In light of recent global changes in aviation — particularly following major terrorist incidents — there is a much greater international need for a culture of safety that alleviates the rational fears of the public. The challenges of international collaboration are now more important than ever. Chief among those challenges are the ways in which pilots and managers view automation and how they use it. The aviation industry is, in many respects, a trendsetter in the field of human–computer interaction, having grappled with the complexities of technological advance and its time- and energy-saving effects almost before those ideas were fully articulated in other domains.

In aviation, technology was used from the earliest stages to automate flight subtasks (e.g., the Sperry autopilot) and to provide a clearer picture of an aircraft's attitude (e.g., the artificial horizon). In today's commercial or military aircraft, complex flight management systems can perform nearly every subtask in flight automatically (Ziegler & International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, 1999, p. 1271).

Yet within this system are inherent drawbacks and dangers. Despite technological advances and undoubted benefits, the relative safety level (hull losses per million departures) in commercial aviation remained at a constant level for the last twenty years (Ziegler & International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, 1999, p. 1271).

The marked flat rate of major incidents over the last two decades raises the concern that, while aviation may be much safer in absolute historical terms, relative expansion has kept incident numbers steady. "As the aviation system is still expanding (an estimated doubling of departures every twenty years), absolute accident rates will also increase. An accident rate of one major crash per week seems not far away" (Ziegler & International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, 1999, p. 1271).

Approximately 70% of all flight accidents are at least partially caused by pilots. A closer look, however, reveals that it is not the pilot's fault alone, but rather that the inappropriate design of automation exceeded pilots' cognitive limitations — resulting in deficits such as reduced situation awareness that inevitably led to fatal outcomes (Ziegler & International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, 1999, p. 1271).

The historical and current development of Crew Resource Management (CRM) — in development for more than 20 years — represents the most promising tool available to the industry to help manage the transition to highly successful automation and human collaboration. Without CRM's most current focus on cultural perspectives, a successful transition to reliance on automation would seem impossible (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001, p. 1).

The cultural perspectives embedded in CRM have largely developed in response to conflicts and concerns that arose during international implementation. Within the literature, there is evidence that professional culture plays a role similar to the other cultural dynamics, as pilots tend to share similar professional cultures across organizational and national lines. The greater challenges arise from organizational and national cultures, both of which can vary considerably and can have a substantial impact on the acceptance and use of automation (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001, p. 9).

It is within this international scope — of attempted implementation and within the recognition of professional, organizational, and national culture as driving factors behind human functioning in a highly stressed environment — that CRM has begun to develop ways to combat error in aviation internationally, fostering what may be called a culture of safety. Research has shown that national culture plays a powerful role in determining the effectiveness of CRM training programs (Maurino, 1994; Merritt & Helmreich, 1995b). Specifically, attitudes that define the core concepts of CRM differ dramatically across national borders — for example, individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and division of roles between the sexes (Hofstede, 1988). As a result, initial attempts to apply CRM globally were often unsuccessful because of a failure to recognize the power of national culture (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001).

Recognizing — through careful and professional industry research — the particular characteristics and possible errors arising from cultural dynamics in any given context is crucial to the successful use of automation in the aviation industry. CRM human resource management is the tool by which solutions will be reached.

CRM (Crew Resource Management) — The aviation human resource management tool that has developed globally to assist the aviation industry in reducing error and incidents through logical and collaborative solutions, both preemptively and as mistakes occur. CRM involves "optimizing not only the person-machine interface and the acquisition of timely, appropriate information, but also interpersonal activities including leadership, effective team formation and maintenance, problem-solving, decision making, and maintaining situation awareness" (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993, p. 3).

Cockpit Automation — The international implementation of automated systems in aviation that assist pilots in the performance of their duties.

Definition of Terms

Professional Culture — The cultural norms and values associated with one's profession. In this context, the profession of pilots, managers, and other crewmembers in the airline industry.

Organizational Culture — The cultural norms and values associated with the organization a professional is employed by, such as an airline or national aviation association.

National Culture — The cultural norms and values associated with an individual's country of origin.

External Threats — Threats to safety associated with external risks, such as weather and equipment failure. These threats can often be managed through preemptive planning on the part of the crew.

Internal Threats — Threats to safety associated with operational error. Internal threats must be managed as they occur, through leadership and teamwork, often in accordance with CRM principles.

Power Distance — "The degree to which members of a culture accept and expect inequality between superiors and subordinates" (Sherman & Helmreich, 1999, p. 1).

Review of Literature

CMAQ (Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire) — "The CMAQ was developed to assess pilots' attitudes regarding interpersonal components of job performance and link these attitudes to behavior."

FMAQ (Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire) — A research instrument developed from the CMAQ to further address cultural differences in crew responses to communication challenges and safety threats.

FMC (Flight Management Computer) — The onboard computer system that manages automated flight functions and has been likened to an "electronic crewmember."

One particularly dynamic facet of automation implementation concerns the international development of automation tools that are reliable and error-free within a cross-cultural context. Industry researchers have noted that design specialists in aviation automation hold significant responsibility in developing system-specific protocols that ensure the greatest functionality for users across cultures (Scerbo, 1999, p. 240). The designers of such technology must anticipate and account for error-reduction interventions in multiple cultural settings. Beyond language, programs must be able to anticipate — or at minimum adapt to — any possible crew reaction based on culture, experience, fatigue, or other factors, in order to maintain safe flight.

When flight crews follow procedures corresponding to specific system malfunction alerts provided by alerting systems (e.g., the Boeing EICAS), they are very likely to take the correct action. The number of accidents averted due to improved rule-based responses has not been fully documented, but the decrease in accident rates following implementation of improved alerts and associated procedures is unlikely to be coincidental. Airframe and avionics manufacturers have thus gone to great lengths to account for possible failure modes and to develop corresponding checklists (Scerbo, 1999, p. 240).

Automation implemented with system-specific protocols has historically been far less likely to fail due to human error or incorrect human interaction with automation technology. These design-based protocols are imperative for proper intervention in incidents involving automation, yet CRM is equally crucial to the development of a cross-cultural standard for crew and management action.

CRM itself has become both a highly regarded tool and one that demands considerable convincing to implement. Given the assumption that the tool is designed to address inevitable human mistakes, it has been a major point of contention for pilots and managers alike.

CRM is now mandated training in most parts of the world, yet many pilots and managers resist its introduction. What is needed is universal justification for training and operational practices that cannot be denigrated or dismissed. A model based on organizational recognition of the inevitability of error has been proposed (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996, p. 1).

Two of the most notable experts in the field state the most fundamental obstacle for CRM plainly: "If one can accept that human performance has limitations, and that errors are inevitable, then one can be logically persuaded that Crew Resource Management is a necessary and successful strategy for managing error" (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996, p. 1).

The challenge for CRM implementation has largely been one of persuading people and organizations that human error is inevitable and should be addressed through logical means. "The CRM strategies required to avoid, trap and mitigate the consequences of error must be operationally relevant, yet they can be culturally defined to fit the organizational and national cultures" (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996, p. 1). Clearly, an effective safety culture must involve crew, designer, and management collectively, and with CRM there is a reasonable chance that human–automation interaction errors will be kept to a minimum — and where one link in the chain falls short, another can compensate (O'Neil & Andrews, 2000).

Crew resource management training was originally developed to improve the performance of air transport crews in high-risk, high-stress conditions (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). It includes training in communication, decision making, and resource and task allocation. In principle, it applies to any environment in which coordinated action is required by teams of highly trained professionals functioning under dynamic, high-workload conditions — as in the military, nuclear power plants, space operations, and offshore oil operations. One important aspect of CRM training is learning to recognize stressful situations and team members' reactions, and to defuse them before they become debilitating (Orasanu & Backer, 1996, p. 111, in Driskell & Salas, 1996).

The major theorists in the aviation industry comprise a collective of academic and field specialists who research incidents and aviation management systems internationally, offering comprehensive answers to potential human–automation interaction errors based on the trends of particular cultures and organizations. They rank among industry leaders in automation technology and are guided by aviation specialist needs and safety standards rather than by development-industry demands.

The principal CRM theorists have tracked each of the five generational iterations of CRM through careful empirical research in the field of aviation. A particularly notable feature of the empirical literature is the linear progression from each successive inception of CRM to the present, culture-focused standards (Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001). Researchers involved in CRM's development and successive incarnations are associated with NASA, the FAA Aerospace Crew Research Project, and other industry organizations (Helmreich & Merritt, 1996, p. 1).

The comprehensive research on CRM conducted by these groups includes many self-report tools and questionnaires — such as the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire — that have been implemented internationally. These tools have yielded foundational statistical evidence of cultural differences in views and concepts that may reflect operational and communication error, as well as acceptance of and reliance on automation technology (Helmreich & Merritt, 1996, p. 1).

Overall, early results from implementing culture-sensitive CRM training programs internationally are encouraging (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1998). The keys to successful implementation appear to be careful analysis of cultural attitudes toward flight management operations and the development of programs sensitive to those differences (Johnston, 1993; Salas, Rhodenizer, & Bowers, 2000, p. 490).

Conclusion

It goes without saying that aviation has led the way for both research and implementation of automation, and for understanding its effects on communication and human error. The old challenges of simple human-to-human interaction seem almost archaic when one considers the impact technology has had on people's lives all over the world.