Crew Resource Management: Improving Flight Crew Communication

Introduction

According to Wilson (2001), aviation accidents and mishaps are attributed to human error in 60% to 80% of cases. A large number of these mishaps can be directly traced to failures in coordination among cockpit crews during a crisis. These situations are not caused by poor pilot or crew skills. Just the opposite is true: when highly professional staff and crew encounter a crisis situation, their training can actually hinder the communication and cross-checking of decisions that could often prevent the incident or accident. In the majority of controlled-flight accidents and incidents, poor pilot performance through improper or faulty crew resource management has been cited as a contributing factor in numerous accidents and incidents reported by major airlines during the period from 1983 to 1985 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997).

The U.S. General Accounting Office (1997) found that CRM deficiencies — such as a lack of coordination among cockpit crews, captains keeping tasks to themselves rather than delegating or checking decisions with other crew members, and a lack of effective crew supervision — were a contributing cause in approximately half of accidents that occurred between 1983 and 1985 involving one or more fatalities. Other reviews have found similar factors at work within cited accident reports (Chidester, Helmreich, Gregorich, & Geis, 1991; Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990).

Within the airline culture, outsiders can often clearly identify mistakes made by the pilot or captain in the event of a crisis. However, the pilot, because of the training he has received, is often unaware that his greatest resources surround him — and that by utilizing these resources, the accident could be avoided entirely. Within the aviation environment, these types of teamwork deficiencies are often embarrassing and highly publicized. They can also lead to tragic consequences. For example, Eastern Airlines Flight 401 crashed in the Florida Everglades in December 1972 "because the crew permitted their fully operational Lockheed L-1011 to fly into the ground. What the crew failed to realize was that the altitude hold feature of the autopilot had been accidentally disconnected" (Kayten, 1993). The FAA investigation revealed that the entire three-person crew was preoccupied with a landing gear light that had failed to illuminate, rather than maintaining a division of duties in which at least one officer preserved overall flight supervision.

While evidence has been provided suggesting that simulations can be used to practice and train CRM-related skills (Baker, Prince, Shrestha, Oser, & Salas, 1993), these studies do not address the issue of corporate culture, or how the inherent training embedded in the command structure of major commercial airline crews can itself become a source of hindrance to CRM during an in-flight incident. Additionally, national cultures can play a powerful role in determining the effectiveness of CRM training programs (Maurino, 1994). While American culture has a highly structured and individualized understanding of leadership, cross-cultural expectations between multinational crews can stand in the way of effective communication and thus further hinder CRM. Attitudes that define the core concepts of CRM differ dramatically across national borders. The following culturally defined issues further influence the communication styles of pilots and crew:

Due to these cultural factors, initial attempts to apply CRM globally were often unsuccessful because of a failure to recognize the power of national cultural influence over the decision-making process (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001).

Statement of the Problem

The problem that has continued to plague flight crews is that even with CRM training, ineffective communication and communication breakdowns continue to occur. As stated by Wilson (2001), "Although positive lessons have been learned, areas in need of improvement exist. To begin with, despite CRM's long history, there remains a lack of consistency within the aviation industry." The failure of CRM to fully address the communication needs in the cockpit has prompted the FAA to develop different sets of implementation guidelines. However, even with these differing approaches, CRM curriculum design, development, and implementation have become more ambiguous rather than more effective.

The reasons behind the continuing partial effectiveness of CRM methods lie in the fact that the methodology and formal aspects of CRM communication processes do not produce changes in culturally learned and personality-based communication styles. Formalizing training is only as effective as the training can standardize the way in which individuals communicate. While individuals can be taught extrinsic communication skills, they will still retain personality-based and culturally learned communication patterns that training will not replace. These patterns tend to be the fallback patterns individuals rely on in cases of increased stress or in-flight emergency. Like the difference between a learned conditioned response and ingrained programming, some of the communication culture a person brings to the flight deck will not be replaced by CRM training alone.

The following literature review contains references to studies evaluating the success and failure of CRM within the flight crews of major airlines. These studies document the partial success and continuing difficulties that flight crews face regarding communication failures during in-flight incidents or accidents. Following the literature review, suggestions are offered regarding how CRM training can be improved and modified to help flight crews adapt to varying communication styles while still using CRM communication methods.

Literature Review: Evaluating the Purposes of CRM

In evaluating the effectiveness of CRM training, a number of hypotheses have been constructed. Alliger, Tannenbaum, Bennett, and Traver (1997) argued that a trainee's stated response of "liking the training" is the most common reaction collected when training assessment is conducted.

Overall, most of the research reviewed concluded that the majority of participants liked CRM training that included role-playing, but did not feel as positively toward lecture-based training. For example, Schiewe (1995) found that training units based on case studies or role play were very well liked by participants, whereas those based mostly on lecture were not rated favorably (Baker, Bauman, & Zalesny, 1991). This suggests that methods promoting interaction among participants are preferred and therefore more effective than passive approaches.

Reactions to how participants "liked" training are not the only type of reactions worth collecting. In terms of utility, the reviewed CRM training programs were seen as worthwhile, useful, and applicable. Specifically, themes were viewed as relevant (Grau & Valot, 1997), and participants felt that the CRM class should be expanded to other fleets and populations (Incalcaterra & Holt, 1999).

Positive reactions to CRM were found in single-airline studies as well as in multifleet and multiairline studies (Butler, 1993). Furthermore, the teaching of teamwork behaviors such as communication, decision making, and leadership (Alkov, 1991); the use of role-playing exercises (Baker et al., 1991); and the inclusion of cabin crew members in training (Vandermark, 1991) have all contributed to a positive relationship between training and crew communications.

In many of the studies reviewed, common themes emerged regarding the factors used to identify and evaluate the effectiveness of CRM training. The following questions were used in many studies as a measuring framework for CRM's effectiveness.

In a multilevel evaluation effort, learning evidence is the second level of evaluation, referring to "the principles, facts, and skills which were understood and absorbed by participants" (Kirkpatrick, 1976, p. 11). Although evidence at this level includes learning that occurred during the program, it does not include the actual exhibition of learned behaviors (i.e., skills). Learning about CRM is the first step toward positively engaging CRM practices and applying them in the cockpit. Assessment of learning criteria provides evidence as to how successful the training program was in imparting targeted knowledge, skills, and attitudes, and also provides the basis for feedback and areas in need of further refinement.

For the most part, CRM programs seem to produce positive examples of participant learning, primarily as indexed by attitude change. However, there are a few reported instances of CRM programs creating a "boomerang effect" — that is, instances of negative attitude change (Helmreich, 1991). One study found that personality type influenced whether participants had a positive or negative attitude change as a result of CRM training (Chidester et al., 1991).

Behavioral evidence, identified by Kirkpatrick (1976) as the proof of positive CRM training, provides an assessment of whether the knowledge learned in CRM training transfers to actual behavior on the job. The extent to which trainees learned how and when to apply the knowledge, skills, and attitudes taught during training — as well as trainee readiness and overall program effectiveness — constitute the overall measure of CRM training effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1989).

Behavioral evidence has been argued to be valuable in determining the effectiveness of a training program because it provides the most direct means to assess whether training participants can actually translate what they learned into action. Overall, the behavioral evidence reviewed suggests that CRM training does have a measurable impact on behavior.

Organizational impact — such as increased safety and fewer errors — is the highest level of evaluation that can be applied to CRM. If the training does not result in fewer accidents and increased safety, then the CRM training, regardless of its theoretical underpinnings, represents a considerable waste of time and resources. Although this type of evidence is highly valued, very few current studies have been conducted at this level. Such studies are typically expensive, time-consuming, and must be longitudinal in order to accurately gauge overall effectiveness. Because of the difficulty of collecting this type of information — in terms of time, resources, identification of a clear criterion, and the low occurrence of accidents and mishaps — evidence of CRM training's impact on the organization as a whole is not often sought or obtained. The only available measure of overall CRM effectiveness is therefore on an expectation basis. The occurrence of in-flight problems in which CRM practices were not used points to the fact that additional CRM training methodologies need to be developed and implemented.

Although anecdotal reports indicate that CRM behaviors may contribute to reducing the impact of human and mechanical error within the aviation community, much stronger evidence and additional longitudinal studies are needed. Even with additional research, a number of difficulties exist in establishing a clear cause-and-effect relationship between CRM and safety. Various miscellaneous factors may influence airline operations between the point at which a CRM program is implemented and the assessment of its impact, making a direct causal relationship somewhat problematic. Evaluation efforts that can systematically track the impact of a CRM program on safety provide a stronger argument than any anecdotal reports. Although there is evidence of a positive trend regarding the impact of CRM on safety, more and better evaluations need to be conducted.