Cultural Relativism and Universal Moral Standards

Introduction: Culture, Morality, and Relativism

This paper deals with the relationship between culture and morality — specifically, the question: Is morality relative to culture? Proponents of so-called cultural relativism, sometimes also called "moral relativism" or "ethical relativism," argue that different cultures operate according to varying moral codes. "If there is no transcendent moral or ethical standard, then often culture arguably seems to become the ethical norm for determining whether an action is right or wrong" (Anderson 1). Culture and cultural dimensions are considered the collective horizon representing a specific social reality. American anthropologist and cultural relativist Ruth Benedict wrote in Patterns of Culture (1934): "Morality differs in every society and is a convenient term for socially approved habits" (as cited by Kehl 2). This paper will show that the doctrine of cultural relativism — though it has some strong arguments — is ultimately not convincing because of its many shortcomings. It will demonstrate that the theory cannot be lived out consistently. The strongest discrepancy between the concept and reality is that there are universal moral standards that can exist even if some practices and beliefs vary from one culture to another.

The word "culture" derives from the Latin cultura, meaning a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an entity such as an organization or a group. Some authors define culture as follows: "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditioning elements of future action" (as cited by Prawda 1). The term "culture" is used here in a very broad sense to represent the totality of the social environment into which a human being is born and in which he or she lives.

Cultural relativism is the theory that morality is relative to the norms of one's culture. That is, whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the society in which it is practiced. Cultural relativism holds that all ethical truth is relative to a specific culture: whatever a cultural group approves is considered right within that culture, and whatever a cultural group condemns is wrong (Relativism 2). The key to cultural relativism is that right and wrong can only be judged relative to a specified society (Anderson 1). There is no ultimate standard of right and wrong by which to judge culture. This view has some valid arguments but also many weaknesses.

Core Claims of Cultural Relativism

As Ruth Benedict illustrates in Patterns of Culture (1934), diversity is evident even on those matters of morality where we might expect universal agreement: "We might suppose that in the matter of taking life all peoples would agree on condemnation. On the contrary, in the matter of homicide, it may be held that one kills by custom his two children, or that a husband has a right of life and death over his wife, or that it is the duty of the child to kill his parents before they are old. It may be the case that those are killed who steal fowl, or who cut their upper teeth first, or who are born on Wednesday. Among some peoples, a person suffers torment at having caused an accidental death; among others, it is a matter of no consequence. Suicide may also be a light matter, the recourse of anyone who has suffered some slight rebuff, an act that constantly occurs in a tribe. It may be the highest and noblest act a wise man can perform. The very tale of it, on the other hand, may be a matter for incredulous mirth, and the act itself impossible to conceive as a human possibility. Or it may be a crime punishable by law, or regarded as a sin against the gods" (pp. 45–46, as cited by Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, and Meyer 1–2).

"Other anthropologists point to a range of practices considered morally acceptable in some societies but condemned in others, including infanticide, genocide, polygamy, racism, sexism, and torture. Such differences may lead to the question whether there are any universal moral principles, or whether morality is merely a matter of 'cultural taste'" (Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, and Meyer 2). Differences in moral practices across cultures raise an important issue in ethics — the concept of cultural relativism, sometimes also called "ethical relativism" or "moral relativism."

"The same action may be morally right in one society but morally wrong in another. For the ethical relativist, there are no universal moral standards — standards that can be universally applied to all peoples at all times. The only moral standards against which a society's practices can be judged are its own. If ethical relativism is correct, there can be no common framework for resolving moral disputes or for reaching agreement on ethical matters among members of different societies" (Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, and Meyer 2).

Arguments and Examples For Cultural Relativism

A very famous proponent of cultural relativism was John Dewey, often considered the father of American education. He taught that moral standards were like language and therefore the result of custom. Language evolved over time and eventually became organized by a set of principles known as grammar. But language also changes over time to adapt to the changing circumstances of its culture. Likewise, Dewey argued, ethics were also the product of an evolutionary process — there are no fixed ethical norms, only the result of particular cultures attempting to organize a set of moral principles. These principles can also change over time to adapt to the changing circumstances of the culture (Anderson 1). "This would also mean that different forms of morality evolved in different communities. Thus, there are no universal ethical principles. What may be right in one culture would be wrong in another culture, and vice versa" (Anderson 1).

Although it is hard for us in the modern world to imagine, a primitive culture might value genocide, treachery, deception, and even torture. While we may not like these traits, a true follower of cultural relativism could not say these are wrong, since they are merely the product of cultural adaptation (Anderson 1).

According to Charles Edwin Harris Jr., author of Applying Moral Theories, "Relativists do not deny moral truth exists, but they believe that moral truth is relative to a culture, class, individual, or set of principles." In other words, ethical relativists believe that some form of moral truths exists, but those truths are determined by the individual or by a group of people (as cited by Johnson 1).

An example that might support cultural relativism as a valid theory is the Yanomamo Indians, a culture from the South American Amazon basin, where aggression is advocated. "Nearly half of the male population has killed someone within a lifetime, and husbands brutally 'punish' their wives for the smallest 'infractions,' using such methods as jabbing them with sharp sticks or burning them with glowing coals. In short, hurting other human beings is rewarded and considered normal in this culture. Because this is all they have known and all they have been taught" (Knickerbocker 2), this behavior is understandable — but it certainly cannot be called morally right.

Another example: to make the "V for victory" sign in the United States is a compliment. In parts of Europe, however, this gesture carries the same meaning as the middle finger. If, while in Europe — knowing full well what it meant — one were to make this gesture, one would be violating a moral code. Even if the recipient deserved some rebuke, the act is still defamatory to that person. Whenever one knowingly does something harmful, selfish, or vindictive, the action is wrong regardless of the circumstances (Knickerbocker 2–3).

Or consider the case of a two-year-old boy who accidentally gets hold of a loaded gun and fatally shoots his sister. This boy has not been immoral. However, his innocence, as Knickerbocker (3) points out, "is quite a separate matter from the aspect of murder, which is clearly wrong. Just because we excuse him does not mean that murder is a subjective concept and that we will in turn excuse someone old enough to know better. In the same way, just because a savage group of natives do terrible things to each other and their actions are understandable — that is quite a separate matter altogether from the aspect of morality; it is their immorality that is relative to their culture."

Cultural philosophies change over time as societies evolve and grow. The social behavior that establishes what is moral in a society is unique to its moral codes. Some anthropologists point to a range of practices considered morally acceptable in some societies but condemned in others, including infanticide, genocide, polygamy, racism, sexism, and torture. Such differences may lead us to question whether there are any universal moral principles, or whether morality is merely a matter of "cultural taste" (Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, and Meyer 1).

A prominent figure who expanded on Dewey's ideas was William Graham Sumner of Yale University. He believed that what our conscience tells us depends solely upon our social group. The moral values we hold are not part of our innate moral nature — they are part of our training and upbringing (Anderson 2). Sumner argued in his book Folkways: "World philosophy, life policy, right, rights, and morality are all products of the folkways" (as cited by Anderson 2). In other words, what we perceive as conscience is merely the product of culture upon our minds through childhood training and cultural influence — there are no universal ethical principles, only different cultural conditioning (Anderson 2).

Sumner studied both primitive and advanced societies and documented numerous examples of cultural relativism. Although many cultures promoted the idea that a man could have many wives, Sumner discovered that in Tibet a woman was encouraged to have many husbands. He also described how some Eskimo tribes allowed deformed babies to die by exposure to the elements, and in the Fiji Islands, aged parents were killed (Anderson 2). Sumner believed that this diversity of moral values clearly demonstrated that culture is the sole determinant of our ethical standards — that different cultures reach different ethical conclusions (Anderson 2).

Some of the main arguments for ethical relativism are the following: actions or morals that are right for one person are not always right for another. This argument is a form of subjectivism. The arguments of Dewey and Sumner lend weight to this view. Yet even granting these points, Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, and Meyer rightly note that "the practice of slavery in pre-Civil War U.S. society or the practice of apartheid in South Africa was wrong despite the beliefs of those societies. The treatment of Jews in Nazi society was morally reprehensible regardless of the beliefs of Nazi society" (2). One author also offers this example: "She is gay, and I am straight, so morals are relative." In this example there is a difference in behavior and beliefs between two persons, but having a different view of what is right or wrong does not negate the existence of objective moral standards. Disagreement over moral principles does not provide a strong enough foundation for ethical or moral relativism (Johnson 1).

Conclusion

This paper has shown that cultural relativism — sometimes also called "moral relativism" or "ethical relativism" — is not an appropriate concept for demonstrating that cultural diversity proves culture alone is responsible for the morality of a society. There exist universal values shared by all enlightened societies that can acknowledge cultural differences in moral practices and beliefs while still affirming that some of those practices are morally wrong. As a theory for justifying morality, cultural relativism cannot overcome the sense of morality that is universally inherent to human beings.

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