Cyprus Problem: Greek-Turkish Conflict, EU Membership, and Peace

Introduction and Nature of the Problem

The Cyprus problem already spans three generations of Cypriots and, as it encroaches on the fourth, it appears as intractable as ever. Divided administratively in 1963 and geographically since 1974, the conflict has defied attempts at resolution through bicommunal means with the help of the United Nations and the international community. What makes it so difficult to solve?

Outsiders may find the question perplexing, but for the Cypriots themselves the issue is relatively straightforward. The Greek Cypriots would like to see their sovereign and civil rights — violated by the 1974 Turkish invasion and the continuing occupation of the northern part of the island — restored and safeguarded. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, under Turkey's direct control, wants to retain the territorial and political advantages gained as a result of that invasion.

To demonstrate this in historical perspective: the object of negotiations in the period 1964–1974 was a solution based on the self-government of the Turkish Cypriot community within a unitary state. Notwithstanding a series of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of refugees in the wake of the Turkish invasion, the search for a solution after 1974 began to shift toward a federal system of government in which each community would live in its own geographical area. This approach was formalized through high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in 1977 and 1979.

The prospect for a just and viable compromise began to take shape when the Republic of Cyprus submitted its application to join the European Communities in 1990. This development was rightly described as a "catalyst" for the solution of the Cyprus problem: the security of the European framework addressed the concerns of both communities. The Turkish Cypriot minority would have its safety considerations satisfied, while the Greek Cypriot majority could rely on the fundamental democratic principles on which the European Union is founded to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms for all legitimate inhabitants.

This effort was thwarted because the Turkish Cypriot community, in order to further its own geopolitical interests, did not allow the catalyst effect to come into play. On the contrary, its sole recognition of the illegal regime in the occupied part of the island further tilted the solution effort toward a compromise far removed from justice. This resulted in the UN Annan Plan for Cyprus being rejected by an overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot community in 2004.

The recent massive demonstrations in the occupied north show that Turkish Cypriots no longer want the continuing presence of the Turkish army and its settlers. The current generation of Cypriot citizens seems willing to reach a compromise based on universally accepted rules and principles of international law — which is precisely why the continuing impasse in Cyprus defies easy explanation.

Rationale

The problem in Cyprus has now lasted close to half a century, and there seems to be no real solution in sight. Cyprus occupies a strategic location between the Middle East and Europe owing to its proximity to the Suez Canal and its relationship to Greece and Turkey. Large deposits of oil have also recently been discovered off the Cypriot shore, making the resolution of longstanding divisions even more complicated.

The UN Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions aimed at reaching an amicable settlement, but resistance continues from both sides. Although the island historically contains more ethnic Greek than Turkish residents, that does not mean concessions would be one-sided. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey each regard the island as a personal sphere of influence to be individually manipulated for their own purposes, while the people who inhabit Cyprus increasingly want complete freedom to develop as an independent nation. The UN has repeatedly attempted to resolve all outstanding issues, largely without success, and new developments in energy exploration threaten to generate further complications.

A concerted examination of the issues facing the Republic of Cyprus is needed, with realistic solutions drawn from that examination. The reasoning behind the present study is an effort to look at the island in both historical and contemporary contexts to identify what realistic solutions present themselves. Determining real solutions may avert a crisis caused by the volatile nature of the invested parties on both sides of the Cyprus problem.

Purpose and Research Question

Since high-level international negotiations have worked to resolve the increasingly difficult issues facing the Cypriot people — both Greek and Turkish — it would be illogical and presumptuous to assume that one research paper could find a solution overlooked by the international community. The general purpose here is to add a new voice to the discussion by conducting a thorough search of the existing literature and critically examining its content, in order to determine the true nature of the conflict and present solutions that may not have been previously examined to their full extent.

Research Question: As Cyprus struggles for justice rather than debilitating compromise, where should the solution line between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots be drawn, and what role does EU membership play in that process?

Historical Background

Ancient History

Cyprus was first settled more than 12,000 years ago by hunter-gatherers who sailed to the island from the Eurasian coast. These ancient settlers are the first known people to have constructed wells for water and to have domesticated cats (Kyle, 2011). The island subsequently came under the possession of two waves of Greek settlers, followed by the Hittite Empire, the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, and Romans — disparate empires that ruled the island from approximately 8,000 BC until 1570 AD (Hitchens, 1997).

In 1570, Cyprus came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. This is significant because the island had previously been peopled with nobles from France, Italy, and England, with a majority Greek underclass. Following the Ottoman conquest, the island began a history of Turkish involvement that has continued, unabated, to the present (Hitchens, 1997).

Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

The British effectively leased the island in 1878 from the Ottoman Empire to protect the Turks against Russian aggression (UK in Cyprus, 2011). Cyprus remained under nominal Turkish control while the British occupied the island for military purposes. The British performed the duty of protectorate nation until 1914 when, at the advent of the First World War, the island was formally annexed (U.S. State Department, 2011) by the United Kingdom. The island officially became a Crown Colony in 1925. During this period, many ethnic Turkish inhabitants left Cyprus for Turkey.

After the Second World War, there was great turmoil regarding who was to gain possession of the island. A large number of Greek Cypriots — the earliest inhabitants — remained, along with a smaller number of Turkish Cypriots who had stayed during the British occupation, and the English governors and administrators of Cyprus. At the time, Great Britain was divesting itself of many colonial possessions. The English government granted freedom to many of its former colonies (Palestine, Egypt, India, and others), and Cyprus was among them.

The Greek Cypriots remained the largest population, and many among them wished for unification with Greece — a constant theme during the move toward independence from England. The Turkish Cypriots, who made up less than 10% of the island's population (Melakopides, 2006), refused union with Greece and instead called for the island to be partitioned (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Independence finally came to Cyprus on August 16, 1960, through the Zurich and London Agreement (UK in Cyprus, 2011). The accord was signed between the UK, Greece, and Turkey, and allocated permanent military bases to the United Kingdom at Akrotiri and Dhekelia (Brewin, 2007). The agreement also determined how the island was to be governed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot factions (Bryant, 2002).

Intercommunal Conflict

The conflict began as an incident involving a Greek Cypriot police officer stopping a Turkish Cypriot couple on the boundary between the Turkish and Greek quarters in Nicosia (Cyprus Conflict, 2011). Bystanders believed the Turks were being singled out and began to protest; shots were fired when the crowd became agitated, and three people — two Turkish Cypriots and one Greek Cypriot — were killed. From this point, tensions that had been building for several months erupted into the open.

The deeper reason for the violence was that Makarios, the leader of the Republic of Cyprus, wanted to add thirteen new provisions to the constitution. The constitution was flawed because the division of important government positions had been arbitrarily set at 30% for Turkish Cypriots and 70% for Greek Cypriots — a ratio that did not correspond to the actual population breakdown. Makarios sought to make the division of responsibility more equitable (Attalides, 1979). The ethnic Turkish community believed they were being relegated to a subservient position by the proposed constitutional changes, while the Greek Cypriots felt the Turks were demanding too much given their much smaller share of the population. This caused the Turkish contingent to vacate the seats they were guaranteed in the Congress of the Republic of Cyprus.

Intercommunal violence concentrated largely in central Nicosia. The most damaging fighting occurred in March and April of 1964, prompting the Turkish Cypriots to withdraw into enclaves so they could better protect themselves. The Turks maintained this was forced upon them by Greek Cypriot aggression; the Greeks contended the purpose was to garner sympathy from the international community (Ersoy, 2010).

Establishment of UNFICYP

After the intercommunal violence began and the Turkish Cypriots moved into enclaves, the UN dispatched a peacekeeping force designated UNFICYP to help curb the fighting in 1964 (Maloney, 1996). This multinational body was tasked not only with protecting the Turkish Cypriots, who feared being overrun by the predominant Greek Cypriot forces, but also with ending the uprising.

Turkey Bombs Cyprus

In August 1964, Greek Cypriot forces surrounded the final Turkish enclave because they believed Turkish Cypriots were establishing a beachhead from which Turkey could attack Cyprus. On the 8th and 9th of that month, the Turkish Air Force bombed the beach, resulting in over 200 casualties among Greek Cypriot troops. This action was the last major engagement of the intercommunal violence at that time, but it cemented the animosity between the two factions.

Turkey Rejects the UN Mediator

The UN continued its efforts, but was met by continuous resistance from the Turkish side. Turkish negotiators reportedly believed they were being short-changed by the UN (Denkats, 1982). The UN mediator's official position was that an equitable solution could be reached if the Turks agreed to compromise and accept some of the new constitutional conditions suggested by Makarios. Neither side, however, could find sufficient common ground.

The primary disagreement concerned responsibility for the violence of 1963 and 1964. Both sides believed their own actions were justified, and neither would compromise until some restitution had been made (Denkats, 1982). The Turks were especially firm that the Greeks accept blame for the conflict and compensate them for the resulting damages. The Turkish Cypriots also insisted on greater UN protection given Greek Cypriot hostility.

New Round of Intercommunal Talks

The UN worked to bring both sides to the table, which occurred in 1965. The Turkish position remained consistent. Meanwhile, renewed unrest blossomed in both Greece and Turkey. Talks cooled tensions on Cyprus, but it may have been because both ethnic groups were waiting to see what transpired in their ancestral countries.

Military Junta Takes Over in Greece

Since the end of the Second World War, Greece had been building toward civil conflict. The tensions concerned competing ideologies among the military, political, and civilian groups that tried to govern the country. The civilian faction wished to establish a communist-style system to counteract the centuries-old ruling autocracy.

"The civil war served as a fertile ground for the formation of a small group of staunch anti-Communists, right-wing officers who strongly favored the political autonomization of the military institution. Since neither the international nor the domestic environment supported the formation of a military regime, these officers chose to remain in the background and wait patiently for their turn. They would not have to wait long because the growth of the electoral strength of center-left parties and the constant interventions of the Palace in the country's political life in the 1960s created conditions of severe socio-political instability. On April 21, 1967, a group of middle and lower-ranking officers under the leadership of Colonel Papadopoulos staged a coup, abolished all parliamentary processes, and set themselves up to the task of governing the country" (Karabelias, 2003).

This junta was in power from 1967 until 1974 and had significant interest in Cypriot affairs. Although it did not attempt to actively influence Cypriot politics during most of that period, it would eventually foment one of the most violent episodes in Cypriot history — the Cyprus coup d'état of 1974. The junta officially ended that same year.

Kofinou Crisis

1967 was the year of greatest unrest in Cyprus since the beginning of the intercommunal disturbances in 1964. The Greeks remained wary of Turks congregating in particular locations, fearing the formation of additional enclaves. Although the original enclaves provided Turkish Cypriots with communal support and safety, it was widely believed that many of them were actually militaristic fronts organized by a Turkish Cypriot underground with the goal of splitting the country in two (Ker-Lindsay & Faustmann, 2008).

One of the worst instances of fighting during this period occurred when "a local Turkish Cypriot commander repeatedly refused to allow Greek Cypriot police patrols to enter the mixed village of Agios Theodoros, thereby threatening to create another Turkish Cypriot enclave in a strategically vital area" (Ker-Lindsay & Faustmann, 2008). The Greeks forced their way in and attacked the nearby Turkish village of Kofinou. Though the Greek forces prevailed, the victory proved very costly: the international community sided with Turkey in condemning the Greek action, and the Greek military was compelled to remove the commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, General Grivas, to prevent Turkey from sending military support to the Turkish Cypriots. This single battle set the Greek Cypriot cause back significantly.

Reinforced Talks with Constitutional Experts

After the Kofinou incident, both parties renewed their interest in returning to the mediation table. The Cyprus constitution had long been in dispute, and the UN Secretary General and Security Council believed it was time to bring the two sides to agreement on new constitutional reforms. Since the Turkish Cypriots had walked out of the House of Representatives, there could be no vote on the constitutional amendments proposed by Makarios. Talks broke down once more without an agreed-upon constitution.

Formation of EOKA B and Civil Strife

The EOKA (National Organization of Greek Fighters) was organized in 1955, dissolved in 1959, and was primarily dedicated to ending British rule in Cyprus. In 1971, a group of young nationalists formed the similarly named EOKA B, which was concerned with enosis (the unification of Cyprus and Greece) and employed terrorist tactics. Anyone who disagreed with the group — even remotely — was beaten or killed. Although the group principally targeted ethnic Turks, it also turned against Greeks who did not share its views (MFACY, 2011).

EOKA B was formed by the deposed General Grivas, who had secretly re-entered Cyprus in 1971 to begin organizing. Grivas was effectively a terrorist leader unconcerned with the broader consequences of his tactics (MFA Turkey, 2011). The organization was instrumental in staging the coup d'état that occurred in 1974.

Junta Coup d'État and Turkish Invasion

There had always been friction between the government in Cyprus and the government in Greece. Greece sought to make the Republic of Cyprus acquiesce to its control, but Makarios was independent and popular, so he paid little attention to advice from Athens. Many in the Greek Cypriot community wanted unification with Greece, and Makarios frequently ran afoul of them as well (Stavrinides, 2005).

The military junta in Greece changed leadership in 1973, becoming more right-wing than its predecessor and planning to remove Makarios from power. Because Makarios refused to relinquish the presidency, the new junta organized a coup d'état in July 1974 during which they deposed him — he fled to one of the British-controlled bases and was escorted out of the country — and installed Nicos Sampson, known as the "Hammer of the Turks," as president.

Turkey's leadership viewed this move as an attempt to absorb Cyprus into Greece and retaliated just five days after the coup began, mobilizing a force under the guise of restoring the treaty boundaries established in 1960.

"The coup d'état was of course ipso facto unconstitutional and was said by Makarios himself to be an attempt to extend Greek dictatorship to the island. The Turkish intervention was first welcomed by the world generally; it led to the overthrow of the military regime in Athens and of Sampson in Cyprus" (Dodd, 1993).

With initial international backing and believing they were defending the 1960 constitution, the Turks established a beachhead on Cyprus. They were not immediately successful in liberating Turkish Cypriot enclaves, as Greek Cypriot forces moved into many of them. However, they did succeed in ending the Sampson coup within ten days. Delegations from Britain, Greece, and Turkey convened in Geneva that same day and negotiated a halt to the initial invasion by the 30th of July.

The Aftermath

The whirlwind ten days encompassing both the coup d'état and the subsequent Turkish invasion were so swift that it was difficult to determine the total number of casualties. The Greek aim was to end Makarios's presidency and eliminate as many of his supporters as possible (Galster, 2008). Some reports place the number of Greek Cypriots killed by nationalist Greek forces and EOKA B during the coup at 2,000 (Galster, 2008) — a staggering figure given the brevity of the coup. The Greek government denied that the devastation was as widespread as these reports suggested.

The primary consequence of the Greek decision was Turkey's invasion five days later. The Turks succeeded only in taking a narrow piece of land from Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, but they did achieve their main goal of deposing Sampson's government, a result endorsed by the international community. However, subsequent events drew condemnation.

The Greek junta dissolved, and a less radical leader returned to the presidency of Greece. The Geneva accord allocated certain territories to each community: Turkish Cypriots were given the northern part of the island, and Greek Cypriots the south. While negotiations were still ongoing, Turkey's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister launched a second invasion, believing they had not received enough territory and requiring the northern region for strategic military purposes (Kyriakou, 2000). During this second invasion, from August 14th to the 16th, the Turkish Army annexed approximately 40% of northern Cyprus. That advance line became the final treaty boundary.

The international community condemned the violation of the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, calling for the return of refugees to their homes and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The UN Security Council renewed the Secretary General's good offices mission and urged the resumption of bicommunal talks. Without Turkey complying with Security Council resolutions, negotiations got underway in 1975 and continued into 1976 in Vienna — allowing compromise to take precedence over justice in Cyprus.

Restoration of Communal Order

The international community's first order of business, through the UN, was to establish a buffer zone between the two ethnic groups. This became known as the Green Line, marked in green on official maps, running along the line reached by Turkish forces during the second invasion. In a high-level meeting in 1977, Republic of Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash agreed to a federal solution involving two administrative areas. This was confirmed by another high-level agreement between Makarios's successor and Denktash in 1979.

Since the peace accord, the Republic of Cyprus repeatedly sought further talks with Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Greek Cypriots wished to see Cyprus self-governed as a contiguous entity rather than a split island. Notwithstanding earlier concessions regarding the demarcation line, in 1983 the Turkish Cypriot leadership made a unilateral declaration of independence, purporting to establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The UN Security Council and other international organizations expressly condemned the TRNC's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), considered it invalid, and called for its withdrawal. The only country in the international community to recognize the TRNC to this day is Turkey.

In January 1989, the Cyprus government submitted "Outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and the Solution of the Cyprus Problem" — a peace offering from the Greek Cypriots attempting to find common ground with the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish side did not respond. In July 1990, Cyprus submitted an application for full European Community membership, a step described as a catalyst for resolving the Cyprus problem. The European Council in Luxembourg in 1997 decided to include Cyprus in the next enlargement. That same year, the Cyprus government invited Turkish Cypriots to nominate representatives as full members of the Cyprus negotiating team. The Turkish Cypriots, at Turkey's instigation, did not respond.

In the face of Turkey's continuing refusal to comply with UN resolutions and the international community's failure to achieve compliance, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the seminal Loizidou v. Turkey case in July 1998 (Chrysostimides, 2000). The court ruled that all Greek Cypriots who had abandoned their homes following Turkey's invasion had the right to return to their property — a ruling the court could not itself enforce. It was the first in a series of judgments holding Turkey responsible for the continuing occupation of Northern Cyprus and for violations of human rights. A subsequent case — Meletios Apostolides against David Orams — involved another facet of the occupation. After the Apostolides family abandoned their land following the 1974 invasion, the Turkish Cypriot authorities treated it as forfeit and sold it to David Orams, a British national, as a vacation property. When Apostolides visited in 2003, following the relaxation of TRNC crossing regulations, he learned of the sale and brought action in the Nicosia district court, which ruled in his favor. Following a series of international court rulings, Orams was compelled to comply in 2010 and abandoned the property. The cases remain broadly unenforceable because the TRNC refuses to acknowledge the rulings.

Further UN efforts were made at the start of the 2000s. Secretary General Kofi Annan was tasked with working with both sides to develop a mutually agreeable plan (Diez, 2002). After several iterations — complicated by the Turkish Cypriot leader's absence for heart surgery and Denktash's subsequent refusal to allow a vote on Annan III — a fifth version of the plan was accepted by negotiators from both sides and put to a popular referendum. One of the central issues was that not all land taken during the 1974 invasion would be returned to its original owners — a condition unacceptable to most Greek Cypriots. Other provisions, such as a gradual complete reduction of military forces from the mother countries, were not agreed to by the Turkish Cypriots, who feared losing protection from the majority Greeks. In 2004, the UN Annan Plan was rejected by the majority of Greek Cypriots in a separate referendum while being strongly endorsed by the Turkish Cypriots. Shortly afterward, the Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the European Union.

Renewed talks started in September 2008, but despite the exclusion of formal UN arbitration deadlines, the emphasis remained on compromise at the expense of justice — leading, as might have been foreseen, to failure. The border is not considered open to disputation by the Turkish side, as the demarcation line has stood since 1974. The fact that much of the land the Turks occupy was taken from Greek Cypriots means little to Turkish negotiators, despite separate court rulings supporting restitution of property.

Turkey, with the initial support of certain third-party governments and a favorable UN posture, attempted to leverage the referendum outcome to further promote the occupation regime as a separate entity. Even though no member of the international community besides Turkey has ever recognized the TRNC as a sovereign state, Turkey continues to use this as a bargaining chip. The massive demonstrations by Turkish Cypriots in January, February, and March 2011 demonstrated, however, that they no longer share Ankara's views on this matter.

Literature Review: Stakeholder Perspectives

The history of conflict, while seemingly straightforward, contains many different perspectives that must be examined when looking at the Cyprus problem. The concerned parties are Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots. A final subsection is dedicated to the concept of Cypriot sovereignty.

Great Britain

Since the beginning of the conflict, Britain has been a necessary partner — first because the nation won its independence from the British Empire in 1960, and second because Britain has maintained a presence on the island through two dedicated military bases (EIC, 2011). Britain retained those bases for security reasons, particularly the security of the Suez Canal (EIC, 2011), but research also suggests Britain understood that there would be difficulties between the two factions on the island and wanted a presence that would allow it to act as an interested, non-resident mediator during conflicts (General Assembly of the UN, 2011).

In fact, the first expression of the Cyprus problem concerned Cypriots seeking sovereignty from Britain before the two factions began fighting each other (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1998). The quest for a free, self-governed Cyprus began under British rule and continued after the Zurich and London Agreement granted independence (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1998). Research has shown that the British Empire dissolved for two reasons: first, British citizens were disinterested in conquest and dissatisfied that British taxes were funding welfare in non-British territories; second, the Empire had become a liability for a country that espoused democratic ideals while having been one of the nations most responsible for the subjugation of indigenous peoples (UK in Cyprus, 2011; Karabelias, 2003). The decision to restore Cypriot sovereignty was therefore driven in part by a need to uphold democratic ideals.

Greece

The majority of people who inhabit Cyprus are ethnically Greek. This means they have always identified with the Greek nation (Ayers, 1996) and that the prevailing wish of many among this majority has historically been reunification with Greece — a process called enosis (James, 2002). According to research, Greece has maintained its strong interest in Cyprus because of the island's strategic position, the Greek ancestry of most of its inhabitants, and a determination not to cede influence to Turkey (Jansen, 1986).

The predominant reason why Greece is so engaged in the Cyprus problem may be precisely that determination not to lose to Turkey. There has long been animosity between the two nations based on historic grievances committed on both sides (Dana & Dana, 2000). Greece has contributed to the problem through this anger toward Turkey, especially during the junta period (Dana & Dana, 2000). Greek Cypriots are united in their desire to see Cyprus united under one banner — which now primarily means an independent Cypriot flag (Kypros, 2011) — though many Greeks still prefer to have Cyprus as a protectorate (Dana & Dana, 2000).

Turkey

It is often assumed that Turkey is the sole aggressor in this dispute (MFA Turkey, 2011), but that is a false assumption (Northern Cyprus Online, 2011). It is true that in the second Turkish invasion, Turkey was the sole aggressor, and during that invasion it appropriated approximately 40% of the island's territory (The Cyprus Conflict, 2011). However, the first invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in July 1974 can reasonably be interpreted as a move by the "mother" country to protect ethnic Turks living on Cyprus (Steven, 1997). That first invasion produced a dialogue among the parties concerned precisely because Turkey did not gain substantial ground. The desire to protect ethnic Turks from the stated aggression of the Greek junta can be seen as a justified action (Stavrinides, 1976), and many other countries might have taken similar steps to protect a community of their own nationals abroad (Spyrou, 2004).

However, since the second invasion of August 1974, Turkey has done everything it could to block either enosis or any form of island-wide unification (Peristianis, 1998). The government of Turkey, which operates the TRNC as a puppet state (Peristianis, 1998), will not allow any agreement to be signed — even when the fifth Annan resolution won passage among Turkish Cypriots. Neither Greece nor Turkey seems willing to allow the island to make peace on its own terms. The maneuvering of the past 25 years has been more about outmaneuvering each other than about the welfare of the people of Cyprus.

Greek Cypriots

The largest ethnic contingent on the island, by far, is Greek Cypriots (UNFICYP, 2011). Ethnic Greeks have lived on Cyprus for thousands of years and have seen many different ruling nations fight over their home. They were the driving force behind independence from Britain; at the time, approximately 90% (Ertekun, 1984) voted for unification with Greece, wanting to be governed by the country with which they were ethnically affiliated rather than remain as a separate nation.

In recent years, the prevailing attitude among Greek Cypriots has shifted: most now want Cyprus to be an independent nation with its own government (Mavratsas, 1997). Research has shown that most Greek Cypriot inhabitants want a unified nation, but not at the price the Turkish Cypriots are demanding (Oktay, 2007). Because nearly 80% of the island's inhabitants are of Greek heritage (Oktay, 2007), the Greek Cypriots believe they should have a proportionately large voice in the island's governance. The matter of what was taken from Greek families during the second Turkish invasion — and has remained in Turkish hands under the Geneva resolutions — remains a central grievance (Shaelou, 2009). The prevailing wish may be for freedom, but people may be expecting an impossible level of restitution. A mutually negotiated resolution drawn up by Kofi Annan and the UN has already been voted down overwhelmingly by the Greek majority (UN Security Council, 2004).

Turkish Cypriots

The population of Turkish Cypriots has consistently hovered around 220,000 — roughly one-quarter the number of people on the Greek side of the island (Baier-Allen, 1999). Because the ethnic Turkish population is small, it has always felt the need to remain under the protection of Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots believe that without Turkey's protection they would have no meaningful voice on the island. This has also led them to vote against any plan that would take land from them or lead to unification with Greece (Ersoy, 2010).

The Turks have also stated a wish for a sovereign state, though their conception of freedom differs from that of the Greeks. The Turkish Cypriots want a significant voice in Cyprus's governance (Ertekun, 1984), do not want to return lands won in earlier struggles, and do not want to relinquish the freedoms they already possess. It is true that the TRNC has been a puppet state of Turkey (Melakopides, 2006), but Turkish Cypriots wish to move away from that dependence, much as Greek Cypriots wish to move away from dependence on Greece. The underlying aspiration may be the same; the two factions are simply moving toward it by different means.

Sovereignty

Throughout recent world history, there has been a democratic movement away from autocratic governments — in which the state is supported by the people — toward governments that support the people (UN, 1945). This form of governance places importance on the individual rather than on a ruler or ruling body. Cyprus had always known the hand of a ruler until it was freed through independence from Britain.

The prevailing idea in the literature regarding the Cyprus problem is that the people of Cyprus want to exist as a sovereign nation completely independent of any other (UN Good Offices Mission, 2011). The Republic of Cyprus has achieved just such a freedom, but the Turkish Cypriots are not as eager to leave Turkey's protection. Because of the population discrepancies, the two sides find it difficult to determine an equitable solution. Sovereignty is a word that appears frequently in literature expressing the wishes of the Greek inhabitants (Richmond & Ker-Lindsay, 2001), while the key word among ethnic Turkish Cypriots is compromise. Because Turkey backs the TRNC, what the Turkish Cypriots say in negotiations carries as much weight as the statements of the majority Greeks (Northern Cyprus Online, 2011). Greek Cypriots have also brought a number of cases to court regarding the displacement of persons from their homes during and after the Turkish invasion (MFA Greece, 2011).