This paper examines two interconnected issues in international relations: the challenges of delivering humanitarian aid in conflict zones and the question of which body should lead the global fight against terrorism. The first section traces humanitarian intervention efforts from Tanzania's military action in Uganda in 1979, through the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs operations in Mozambique, to the catastrophic failure of UN peacekeeping forces during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The paper argues for the creation of a dedicated international humanitarian body empowered to establish protected civilian zones. The second section contends that NATO, rather than the United Nations, is the more effective and appropriate institution to deter, confront, and prevent global terrorism, supported by bilateral and multilateral agreements among member states.
One of the most purposeful and successful undertakings that has benefited developing nations is humanitarian intervention. It is an act arising out of the human collective spirit, as people come together through organized efforts and organizations to bring relief and aid to those areas of the world where humanity suffers. The suffering might be the result of mankind's own making, such as war, or of natural disasters like droughts, tsunamis, or other destructive forces of nature. Humanitarian intervention operates as a no-judgment zone. Where there is human suffering, others will respond with aid and will not use that suffering as a political platform from which to gain power over others or to assign blame. The first and immediate order of business is to deliver relief to persons in need.
Unfortunately, political, military, and self-interested actors often interfere with the efforts of humanitarian relief workers, because the delivery of relief draws attention to crimes against humanity, corruption, and greed, and to the players behind those forces of destruction. The attempts to delay or prevent humanitarian aid are often successful because the international community lacks the doctrine, rules, or laws that would place human life above and beyond the reach of corruption, greed, and war — or that would define when it is appropriate, and approved by the international community, to deliver humanitarian aid under armed protection and by force if necessary.
The first problem that arises in preventing the creation of international laws, policies, or rules describing how or when force should be used to deliver humanitarian aid is that the need to use force obscures the objective of delivering that aid. In early 1979, Tanzania intervened in Uganda by entering that country and deposing its dictator, Idi Amin (Wheeler, Nicholas J., 2002, p. 111). In doing so, Tanzania mobilized and utilized its military forces against Uganda (Wheeler, p. 111). Tanzania was responding to a dictatorial regime in its neighboring country, where Amin had waged an eight-year campaign of terror against his own citizens (Wheeler, p. 111). Amin's campaign used the country's military forces against its own people, committing acts of murder and torture and causing Ugandans to live in constant fear for their lives (Wheeler, p. 111). By 1979, Uganda had not only become an embarrassment to the African nations but also posed a direct threat to its neighbor Tanzania (Wheeler, p. 111).
The threat posed by Uganda, combined with the extreme and obvious human suffering, served — Tanzania claimed — as justification for entering a sovereign nation under military protection and deposing its government (Wheeler, p. 111). Tanzania was successful in both resolving the humanitarian crisis and removing a regime that had become a source of terror and abuse. The legal question of whether Tanzania had the right to enter Uganda was answered by President Julius Nyerere: in 1978, Uganda had invaded Tanzania, which constituted a declaration of war in international terms (Wheeler, p. 111). This, Nyerere argued, gave his government the right to respond to Uganda's aggression and to depose Idi Amin by military force (Wheeler, p. 111).
While there was perhaps room to challenge Nyerere's action under Article III of the OAU charter, no government felt strongly enough about Idi Amin's regime to press the argument. Humanitarian relief followed Tanzanian forces and provided large-scale aid to a Ugandan population in dire need of food, medical care, clothing, and shelter (Wheeler, p. 111). Nevertheless, Tanzania's action continues to be debated and criticized for its use of military force, and is cited as a problematic precedent for responding to human need (Wheeler, p. 111).
In 1989, human suffering in Mozambique was at the forefront of world attention as members of the United Nations Security Council debated how to address it (Barnes, Sam, 1998, p. 16). The UN worked toward a negotiated end to the war in Mozambique, because "it was increasingly clear that the war had become widespread with its victims increasingly the civil society in rural communities" (Barnes, p. 16). By 1992, discussions were still ongoing, and humanitarian suffering had become even more widespread, with little relief allowed into the country to address the survival needs of the civilian population (Barnes, p. 16).
In February 1992, the United Nations created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) under Resolution 46/182. The resolution allowed for relief coordination with any government and gave the UN authority to manage that effort and to create offices within conflict zones to manage those efforts if necessary. In 1992, the government of Mozambique agreed to work with DHA coordinators in support of relief efforts for citizens who not only suffered from the effects of war but were now also confronted with drought conditions (Barnes, p. 17). "The possibility of maintaining peace in Mozambique was seen to be closely linked to the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme" (Barnes, p. 18).
While the DHA and its mission achieved some success in Mozambique, world leaders within the UN recognized that it was necessary to create a platform of security, immunity, and neutrality around the DHA so that humanitarian efforts could proceed peacefully (Barnes, p. 18). The objective was sound, but the reality of conflict, politics, and power struggles in developing nations would prove a far greater challenge than the organization could manage.
The DHA and the United Nations peacekeeping forces that accompanied it in 1994 proved ineffective and unable to pursue their humanitarian mission when civil war broke out in Rwanda, ultimately resulting in the genocide of minority populations (Welsh, Jennifer, 2004, p. 5). Even though operational guidelines existed for the DHA and its peacekeeping forces, those forces were prohibited from acting to protect themselves or the civilians they were attempting to assist. As one analysis observed: "In April, 1994, with regard to Rwanda, the Security Council demonstrated that it is perfectly willing, under USA (Belgium) pressure, to abandon a population to a long-expected genocide in progress even when starting with a small but expandable UN peacekeeping force already in place (with a willing and capable commander)" (Welsh, 2004, p. 19).
"New empowered body to create civilian safe zones"
The body responsible for this mission will receive the full support of the international community and will have authorization to defend its mission against internal or external warring forces. It will operate under a distinct and identifiable set of conditions, and will be responsible for collecting, maintaining, and presenting evidence in defense of its own use of force to protect its mission.
Once the international community identifies the need for such a body to enter a conflict zone, the area of land occupied by that body and by the people seeking or deemed in need of humanitarian aid would constitute a no-conflict zone. Violation of the no-conflict zone parameters would be deemed an act of aggression against the international community as a whole and would be met with an expanded international response on behalf of the non-violent and otherwise unarmed civilian population to whom the organization is administering aid.
Only with the creation of such a body, empowered with such capabilities, can humanitarian aid and peace prevail.
The increased use of terrorism to attack foreign nations has grown during the last decade at an alarming rate and on an even more alarming scale of destruction. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States by organized terrorists, and because the United States' response to those attacks has since come under worldwide scrutiny and criticism, the time has arrived for the world community to take decisive action and come to agreement on how, and by whom, action should be taken to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. The United Nations is not the entity that should be charged with preventing and confronting terrorist activity. Rather, that responsibility should be placed upon a different organization — one that does not come under the management or control of the United Nations.
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter states that all nations must settle disputes through peaceful negotiation (Cohn, Marjorie, 2002, p. 25). While this is admirable and represents the highest human aspirations, it does not reflect the reality of today's world. Furthermore, the concept of a fixed geographic boundary defining a country on whose behalf terrorist activity is being conducted does not exist in the realm of modern terrorism. Most terrorist activities conducted around the world today arise out of disputes and religious beliefs held by people within a strand of fundamentalist Islamic tradition. However, terrorism is not limited to advocates of Islamic religious fundamentalism, as was evidenced by the events in Rwanda in 1994 (Welsh, Jennifer, 2004, p. 5) and by the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) decision to use terrorism as a tool against the United Kingdom in seeking change and control over Northern Ireland until the early 1990s (Smith, M.L.R., 1997, pp. 15–51).
Because the United Nations has proven itself an ineffective peacekeeping force and has exercised no meaningful ability to confront terrorism, the mantle should be passed to NATO and other alliance forces to prevent and combat global terrorism. This has been demonstrated repeatedly, including in the ongoing situation in Darfur, where genocide is being waged against minorities. Following the 2001 attacks in the United States, equally violent acts were perpetrated against civilian populations in the United Kingdom and Spain. Those attacks occurred after the United Nations passed Resolution 1373, which placed legal obligations on its 191 member states to help stop the perpetrators of terrorism by cutting off funding, travel, and information networks that enabled their destructive and deadly missions (Cortright, David, 2005, p. 62). Foreign financial aid alone does not prevent terrorism (Graham, Carol, 2002, p. 28).
Many political and military experts, along with a broad cross-section of the international community, conclude that the best way to counter terrorism is to prevent it from occurring in the first place (Reisman, Michael, 1999, p. 3). This can be accomplished by establishing bilateral agreements on the response to terrorism, so that the certainty of response itself serves as a deterrent to the terrorist act (Reisman, p. 3). Those bilateral agreements can be upheld by multilateral conventions, and the international community can utilize NATO forces under a strict set of guidelines describing how, when, and where they will react to international terrorism.
Using NATO as a mechanism to deter, combat, and pursue terrorism is more complicated than it may appear. However, while some politicians may have questioned the continued need for NATO before 2001, the events of September 11 solidified in the minds of most world leaders that NATO remained essential (Moens, Alexander, Cohen, Leonard J., and Sens, Allen G., 2003, p. 20). NATO has increasingly attracted attention as world leaders seek ways to prevent and deter terrorism. The Alliance was useful and successful during the Cold War, and many believe it should be utilized in the war against terrorism in a comparable manner.
NATO has also undergone internal changes that make it appropriate to consider in the context of the war on terror (Moens et al., p. 20). "Transatlantic friction has developed over a greater European Union role in foreign policy, especially in areas of concern to the United States, such as Russia, North Asia, and the Middle East" (p. 22). China and Korea are also significant players on the international stage and can affect NATO's viability as a modern organization used by the free world to maintain peace and counter terrorism (p. 22).
The war on terror is not cited in NATO's mission statement, but the mission statement could, like the organization itself, be updated to respond to the threat of terrorism (p. 24). "Despite the activation of Article 5, an important political sign of unity and solidarity, the war on terrorism may accelerate some of the corrosive trends" (p. 30) previously identified. There is a role for NATO in fighting the war on terror — one that cannot be filled by the United Nations.
Former SACEUR Wesley Clark put the question of NATO's future into clear perspective with respect to its role in confronting global terrorism (Moens et al., p. 80):
"The fundamental questions on which the Alliance's future depends are these: Will the European Union truly make NATO an institution of first choice for meeting European security needs? Will the United States pledge, and follow through, always to participate where there is a security challenge to Allied interests? If the answer to either of these questions is No, then further problems for the Alliance are inevitable."
If the answer to either question is no, the Alliance will not serve as a useful deterrent or tool in the war on terror. Only if Europe and the United States are prepared to seriously address and take steps to deter, confront, and prevent global terrorism by using NATO as the force with which to do so will NATO take on a meaningful role in the modern world — and will the global community be able to collectively confront, deter, and prevent global terrorism.
Barnes, Sam. Humanitarian Aid Coordination during War and Peace in Mozambique, 1985–1995. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute, 1998.
Cohn, Marjorie. "Understanding, Responding to and Preventing Terrorism." Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ) (2002): 25+.
Cortright, David. "Can the UN Battle Terrorism Effectively? Security Council Resolutions Have Mobilized States for a Campaign of Nonmilitary Cooperative Law Enforcement Measures to Combat Global Terrorism." USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education) Jan. 2005: 62+.
Graham, Carol. "Can Foreign Aid Help Stop Terrorism? Not with Magic Bullets." Brookings Review Summer 2002: 28+.
Moens, Alexander, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens, eds. NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
Reisman, Michael. [Source on bilateral agreements and terrorism deterrence], 1999.
Smith, M.L.R. Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. London: Routledge, 1997.
Welsh, Jennifer M., ed. Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
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