This paper argues that the ends do not justify the means by critiquing teleological ethics and consequentialist reasoning. Using the trolley problem as a central case study, the author demonstrates how consequentialist logic fails because it assumes only one means to an end, violates individual rights, and treats fundamentally different outcomes as equivalent. The paper contends that inalienable human rights and the existence of alternative solutions undermine teleological arguments that outcomes alone determine moral validity.
We all face ethical dilemmas at some point in our lives. Sometimes we are called upon to choose between several courses of action. However, in some instances, these alternative courses of action can be equally undesirable. This effectively puts us in a moral dilemma as selecting either course of action comes with a cost. One of many ethical dilemmas advanced over time involves a scenario in which, as a result of a medical condition, the life of an unborn baby must be terminated because allowing the pregnancy to proceed to full term could cause the mother's death. What would be the best course of action in such a case? Some could argue that saving the mother's life would be most appropriate. Others could be of the opinion that saving the life of the baby would be the best course of action.
It is in response to such scenarios that ethical theorists have developed a number of ethical principles to guide decision making. One such viewpoint is teleological ethics, which in its most pure form according to Bradburn focuses on the results of the decision rather than the method of getting to that result (3). In such a case, the end, according to the author, essentially justifies the means. However, do the ends ever justify the means? This paper argues that they do not.
In my view, the ends do not at any time justify the means. In its most bare form, this ethical system seeks to promote acts that would ordinarily be bad, unjust, immoral, or unethical if such acts in the end lead to good consequences. Such a line of reasoning has a number of fatal flaws. To further explore this topic, I will use an ethical dilemma that Trevino and Nelson offer in their book. In the dilemma, five people will inevitably be killed if a runaway train headed in their direction is not diverted. However, according to Trevino and Nelson, diverting the runaway train to an alternative track will result in the death of one person who is standing unawares on the alternative track (95).
What would be the best course of action in such a case? From a teleological perspective, diverting the train to the alternative track would seem most reasonable as it would save the life of five people. The end in this case—saving the lives of five people—effectively justifies the means: pulling the lever to divert the train to an alternative route where it will kill only one person. Yet this reasoning contains significant logical flaws.
To begin with, this kind of reasoning erroneously assumes that there can only be a single means to a definite end. However, this is not always the case. For instance, in the example offered above, the person standing by the lever could try to warn the five bystanders of the oncoming runaway train. This alternative action might allow them to escape harm without anyone being killed.
Further, it is important to note that every individual has some basic rights that are largely inalienable. If we permit the killing of one individual so as to save several other lives, we would inevitably be trampling on the rights of the said individual. A rights-based approach to ethics recognizes that persons possess inherent dignity that cannot be violated merely to produce better aggregate outcomes. Consequentialist logic fails to account for this fundamental ethical principle.
Next, teleological arguments view the ends as being equal. This is however not the case. For instance, in the example given above, all courses of action would result in death. Although one course of action in this case results in fewer deaths, the consequences are almost identical when one looks at the end result. The moral weight of deliberately causing one death is not erased simply because an alternative action would have caused five deaths.
"Arguing that outcomes are not truly equivalent"
Thus in the final analysis, the ends do not ever justify the means. The teleological framework fails because it assumes a single path to an outcome, ignores inalienable human rights, and treats fundamentally different moral actions as equivalent if they produce similar numerical results. A defensible ethical system must consider not only what we achieve but how we achieve it.
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