This paper examines the causes of famine and underdevelopment in Africa through the works of Alex de Waal and Dennis C. Galvan. Drawing on de Waal's concept of the "anti-famine political contract," the paper argues that authoritarian regimes undermine famine prevention by removing accountability mechanisms that democracies provide. It further explores Galvan's account of the Serer people of Senegal, whose indigenous land-use systems were disrupted by French colonial economic models. Together, these perspectives suggest that both colonial powers and contemporary NGOs have at times worsened African economic conditions by imposing external frameworks that ignore local realities and governance structures.
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Famines and famine situations have been, and continue to be, cruel realities in Africa. Scholars such as Alex de Waal and Dennis C. Galvan have attempted both to identify the causes of famines and poor economic development in Africa and to suggest constructive paths forward — in terms of both prevention and response. In the process, difficult realities have emerged, many with political consequences. Among the most striking is the finding that many NGOs that claim to help people in Africa during times of need are, in practice, directing money and dedication elsewhere.
In his book Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Alex de Waal argues that international humanitarian assistance has often amplified African problems rather than resolved them. This is not a blanket condemnation — de Waal himself never denies the genuine help some NGOs provide — but he contends that a persistent misunderstanding of African realities frequently creates the conditions for counterproductive action.
A central contribution of de Waal's analysis is his concept of the "political contract," or "anti-famine contract," that may be concluded between a people and their rulers. He connects famine directly to the nature of the political regime in place at a given time. The famines in Ethiopia and Somalia, for example, are not isolated catastrophes but reflections of the political regimes those countries had implemented.
The central problem with such a contract is that it is far more likely to be concluded — and honored — under democratic regimes than under authoritarian ones (de Waal, 2000). The logic is straightforward: authoritarian regimes act and react on the basis of unchecked power. They therefore have no meaningful obligation, beyond a purely moral one, to enter into or to respect contracts with the people they govern.
In a democracy, by contrast, the powers of rulers are constrained by a constitution and by legislative and judicial institutions. This means that democratic leaders are subject to removal, and that removal can be driven by the population itself. An "anti-famine" contract that is violated therefore becomes a political scandal, and, as de Waal argues, "famine is deterred" (de Waal, 1997, p. 5).
In this sense, the most capable agents of economic and political change — more capable than states or international agencies — are African citizens themselves. According to de Waal, African citizens are positioned to produce the political changes that would in turn trigger the right economic adjustments, and to implement at the local level the economic development initiatives necessary to reduce the risk of famine. It is also worth noting that authoritarian political regimes tend to generate corruption, for reasons closely tied to the very limitlessness of the power they exercise — power that goes unquestioned by those who benefit from the regime.
Dennis C. Galvan's book The State Must Be Our Master of Fire offers a detailed account of economic development at the village and local level, including a comparison between local governance structures and state authorities — both Senegalese and French. His work complements de Waal's framework by illustrating what locally adapted, historically grounded economic systems actually look like in practice.
The Serer people of the Sine region in Senegal developed over centuries a distinctive pattern of land use and colonization, built on a well-developed system of private property as the fundamental form of individual ownership. The Serer also used land pawning as a form of cash loan secured by land collateral. Over time, this system matured into something fully comparable to any modern economic framework, with a functional set of economic rules. Most importantly, it worked — providing consistent and reasonable economic development at the local level and successfully avoiding food shortages throughout its history.
"French economic imposition disrupted Senegalese systems"
"NGO failures compared to colonial economic harm"
Local and village-level economic developments may often appear primitive and irrelevant to those belonging to Western civilization. On the other hand, it must be recognized that they are frequently responses to local particularities and may represent the best-adapted solutions under many conditions. Implementing new and inappropriate measures is rarely the right approach.
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