India-Israel Relations and India's National Interests

Introduction and Background

Today, India stands at an important juncture in its historical development. Following its independence from Britain in 1947, the years that followed were turbulent ones, with a relentless series of political, military, and economic challenges confronting the country time and again. Despite these challenges, India has emerged in the 21st century as an increasingly important actor within the international community and has enjoyed steady economic growth for the past two decades. Notwithstanding its enormous geographic size and population, India continues to perceive a number of external threats — most especially with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue — and its relations with much of the Arab world have often been ambivalent or even hostile. In this environment, forging a foreign policy that ensures India's national interests are protected while continuing the path toward greater integration in the international community represents a difficult but important enterprise. To determine the historical basis for the current issues facing India in this regard, this paper reviews the relevant literature concerning Indian foreign policy in general and its foreign policy positions with Israel in particular.

With a population of more than 1.1 billion people and an economy that experienced steady and impressive growth for the past twenty years (CIA World Factbook, 2010), India is the world's largest democracy and is well positioned to become an increasingly important actor in the international community. Berlin emphasizes that "one of the key milestones in world history has been the rise to prominence of new and influential states in world affairs. The recent trajectory of India suggests strongly that this state will play a more powerful role in the world in the coming decades" (2006, p. 58). This point is echoed by Ghoshal, who notes that "the theme of India's power and influence in world affairs is not new. India's enormous size, especially in terms of its population, rich natural resources, and its strategic location, together with a civilizational past, has long convinced Indian leaders of an imperative for playing an international role" (2003, p. 521).

The evolving international role that India will occupy in coming years appears to be inextricably interwoven with how it deals with Israel. Menon and Pandey emphasize that "the transformation in the relationship between India and Israel, from one that was at best cool and correct to one that is now hailed as a strategic alignment, is among the striking changes in the post-Cold War landscape" (2005, p. 29). This transformation in foreign policy has received the full support and encouragement of the international community in general and Israeli, Indian, and American observers in particular (Menon & Pandey, 2005). According to these authorities, "they believe that its potential significance extends well beyond the dense network of transactions that has developed between the two sides, and out across the entire region of South Asia and the Greater Middle East" (Menon & Pandey, 2005, p. 30).

Although India and Israel have experienced a fundamental shift in their respective foreign policy stances toward each other over the years, there are important issues involved in this complicated relationship that may create difficulties in the future (Menon & Pandey, 2005). Menon and Pandey note that "both friends and foes of the alignment between India and Israel see it as an important development. Only once this much-ballyhooed entente faces trials that require tough tradeoffs will we know whether it will be limited to mutual gains provided by arms sales and the flow of commerce" (2005, p. 30). Suggesting that it is still too early to gauge the long-term implications of this sea change in foreign policy, Menon and Pandey conclude that "such exchanges would still put India and Israel on a new road, but they will not amount to a strategic partnership that could change the balance of power in pivotal regions. For now, the safe bet is that the collaboration between India and Israel will meet the expectations of neither its foremost proponents nor its most fervent critics" (2005, p. 30).

India, like Israel, is geographically located in a strategic region of the world, and neighboring countries as well as other major actors with interests in the area have all played a formative role in India's foreign policy decision-making over the years (Berlin, 2006). According to Berlin, "over the past few years, India has placed itself on a path to achieve, potentially, the regional influence in the Indian Ocean to which it has aspired. India's links with the most important external actors in the Indian Ocean — the United States, Japan, Israel, and France — have also been strengthened" (2006, p. 58). These improved relationships are due in large part to the burgeoning Indian economy, but there have also been notable refinements in India's foreign policy. Berlin adds that "these are significant achievements, and they derive from India's growing economic clout and from a surer hand visible today in Indian diplomacy" (2006, p. 58).

The concept of Indian national interest is expressed in part in the manner in which India pursues its foreign policy goals. Modern Indian foreign policy can be traced to the country's independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 and the installation of Jawaharlal Nehru as its first prime minister (Wadlow, 2003). According to Wadlow, "Nehru was able to play a high-profile role in world politics, especially at the start of the Cold War and as a mediator in the 1950–1953 Korean War, which some feared was the forerunner of a broader armed conflict. Indian diplomats were also able to work on compromise formulas during the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China" (2003, p. 90). Although afforded a great deal of latitude in establishing foreign policy goals and developing a unique Indian diplomatic style, Nehru faced a number of significant foreign policy challenges early on, including the partitioning of Pakistan, which erupted into country-wide inter-religious violence, and the Kashmir issue (Wadlow, 2003).

According to U.S. analysts, "communal violence led to the subcontinent's bloody partition, which resulted in the creation of two separate states, India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought three wars since independence, the last of which in 1971 resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of Bangladesh. India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 caused Pakistan to conduct its own tests that same year" (CIA World Factbook, 2010, p. 3). Although the two countries have not used their nuclear weapons against each other, the potential for this eventuality hangs heavily over the region as well as the rest of the world. From India's perspective, nuclear weapons are just part of the arsenal it needs to ensure its survival in a hostile world. Karp emphasizes that "for India, a nuclear weapons capability is an issue that defines national uniqueness. The end of the Cold War provoked a crisis of credibility for Indian foreign policy, which found itself unable to adjust to a world without the Soviet Union, dominated by economic globalization and American political leadership" (1998, p. 14).

Despite its nuclear capability, India's foreign policy was mired in stagnant economic development. As Karp puts it, "India's attempt at economic liberalization began in 1991 but quickly stalled, keeping foreign investment low and suppressing growth" (1998, p. 14). Moreover, India's foreign policy during the closing decade of the 20th century was largely based on reacting negatively to the United States and its allies. According to Karp, "Indian commentators have been highly critical of the country's indecisive foreign policy that is seemingly based only on opposition to the United States. This policy manifests itself in areas as diverse as opposition to pressure on Iraq, criticism of NATO expansion, and particularly with regard to arms control and disarmament issues" (1998, p. 14). There has been one issue on which virtually all Indian policymakers agree, however, and that is India's right to possess nuclear weapons without restrictions of any type from the international community. As Karp points out, "one clear cornerstone of New Delhi's foreign policy — something on which Indians of every political stripe can agree — is opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)" (1998, p. 14).

Although most of the international community has supported the NPT, India and Israel remain two of the last three holdouts for much the same reasons (Karp, 1998). Both India and Israel have good reason to be wary about the promises made by the international community, and both countries have experienced attempts by their neighbors to eradicate them from the world map. Although other countries have expressed reservations about the NPT, India is unique in its outspoken criticisms of the pact. According to Karp, "where India stands apart is in its long-standing moral opposition to what it considers to be the discriminatory basis of the NPT — dividing the world into 'haves' and 'have-nots.' Indians across the political spectrum, especially the country's powerful nuclear weapons establishment, are critical of the NPT, arguing that it unfairly warps international hierarchies to the disadvantage of the non-nuclear-weapon states" (1998, p. 15). In its efforts to balance pressures from the international community with its own self-interests, the position adopted by India has been starkly different from that of other countries. Karp concludes that "most states party to the NPT accept the unfairness of the treaty as a tradeoff that serves their own and global interests. India's leaders insist that fair and genuine nuclear disarmament must start with the nuclear-weapon states themselves, a demand formalized by former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his 1990 global nuclear disarmament initiative" (1998, p. 14).

As a result of these events, the 20th century witnessed the formation of various positions in Indian foreign policy that would endure throughout the Cold War era and beyond (Wadlow, 2003). These foreign policy positions were primarily based on India's official policy of nonalignment, an approach adopted early on in an effort to maintain independence and navigate a bipolar world (Ghoshal, 2003). According to Ghoshal, India's foreign policy of nonalignment "was aimed at drawing economic and technological aid for development from both powers as well as providing an alternative model of international relations in a world which was then intensely bipolar" (2003, p. 521). The objectives of this policy were to establish a buffer zone between the polarized blocs of the international community, minimize the potential for conflict, and ultimately create a new world order in which there were more than two primary spheres of influence (Ghoshal, 2003). Ghoshal notes that nonalignment "made it possible for India to maintain normal relations with all the major world powers, with varying degrees of warmth and intimacy, while facilitating the flow of technical and financial assistance from the two ideological blocs. In short, nonalignment gave India the maximum possible dividends in a bipolar world" (2003, p. 521).

Clearly, nonalignment during the 20th century was in India's best interests, but nonaligned does not mean disinterested, and India's foreign policy shifted as events required. Heo and Horowitz note that "India's approach to alignment, both during and after the Cold War, is a defining characteristic of Indian foreign policy, but one which was subject to shifts and reinterpretation. Similarly, India's strong stance on disarmament and arms control was based on moral assumptions apparently at odds with its decision to test and deploy nuclear weapons" (2003, p. 139).

India's propensity to employ military force as a means of achieving political goals also differed dramatically over time since independence (Heo & Horowitz, 2003). For example, in 1962, India fought a frontier conflict with China. According to Wadlow, "the conflict was widely considered a defeat for India and India was seen as an unsuccessful state in the international system" (2003, p. 90). Ghoshal reports that "India's profile and influence, however, were not always balanced during this period; both external and internal factors combined, in the later years of the Nehru era and after, to deprive nonalignment of some of its élan and effectiveness" (2003, p. 521). Even the addition of nuclear capabilities did little to reverse these trends at the time. Ghoshal adds that "externally, India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 proved to be a major setback, and the relationship of near-permanent hostility with Pakistan exercised a disabling effect on India's foreign policy. Internally it was seen as a crisis-ridden country with poor economic performance. Militarily, it could not elevate itself to the status of a major power as China did by exercising its nuclear option in 1964 despite its poor economic base" (2003, p. 521).

Based on the widespread perception that India had been weakened by the conflict with China, India's foreign policy was further constrained concerning the direction it should turn in its efforts to maintain a nonaligned status while receiving the assistance it so desperately needed. As Ghoshal points out:

Since nothing blights more the image of a nation than failure, the defeat at the hands of the Chinese conjured up an international perception of India whose attributes were that of a country which had become weak, incoherent, unable to defend its own interests, and which had to turn to the outside for help and protection. Nothing is forgiven in international relations, least of all the defeat of a country that has the normative pretensions of building a self-reliant and self-sustaining nation. (Ghoshal, 2003, p. 521)

In response to these failures, the prime minister was accused by Indian policymakers of having been negligent with respect to the Chinese threat, but Nehru died before he could take steps to reverse these perceptions of India as a weak and ineffective state (Wadlow, 2003). His daughter, Indira Gandhi, served as prime minister during the periods 1965 to 1977 and 1980 through 1984, when she was assassinated (Wadlow, 2003). Prime Minister Gandhi also experienced distinct challenges during her tenure, and while she made an effort to reformulate India's foreign policy to rebuild India's image abroad, the situation had changed in fundamental ways by the time these efforts were made and they were largely ineffective. Wadlow notes that "although there were still crises, the Cold War had become stable, and neither Russians nor Americans felt the need for intermediaries" (2003, p. 90). Consequently, India shifted its foreign policy focus from the international community to a more regional level, especially concerning the independence of Bangladesh (Wadlow, 2003). As Wadlow points out, "after Nehru, things began to change. The balance slowly tilted in favor of regionalism. While the global policy began to gradually lose its luster, its coherence, its framework, and, what is more, its importance, the broad contours of a regional policy began to emerge — a policy that was more coherent, more pragmatic, more national-oriented and more forceful" (2003, p. 90).

Thereafter, India's foreign policy became more militaristic in nature. According to Heo and Horowitz, "under Indira and her son Rajiv Gandhi, Indian foreign policy became more militarized, including a series of provocative military exercises in 1986–87 and a disastrous intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987–90" (2003, p. 141). The 1980s witnessed a brief rise in the influence wielded by the Indian military in formulating foreign policy. Heo and Horowitz note that "the combination of an inexperienced prime minister (Rajiv Gandhi), a charismatic and intellectual chief of army staff (General K. Sundarji), and a quiet but brilliant civilian administrator and planner (Arun Singh) led to a far more aggressive use of military coercion and much higher defense budgets" (2003, p. 143). In response to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, India conducted a large military exercise along the Pakistani border, an exercise that resulted in yet another political crisis (Heo & Horowitz, 2003). From Pakistan's perspective, such an exercise on its border was an alarming escalation in tensions that could easily have become a full-blown war. Heo and Horowitz note that "this demonstration of Indian military capability, larger than any previous military exercise and including virtually all of India's mechanized units, could easily have been expanded into an actual invasion. Virtually simultaneous maneuvers and exercises were held on the Chinese border, with similar results" (2003, p. 143). In addition, during the 1980s, the Indian military establishment was included as part of the foreign policy planning process for the use of nuclear capabilities (Heo & Horowitz, 2003). Taken together, it is apparent that Indian foreign policy managed to keep the country independent and reasonably secure, but the world stage has changed in the meantime, creating the need for additional refinements in Indian foreign policy with regard to states such as Israel.

Historical Aspects of Israeli-Indian Relations

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Palestinians and many countries in the Arab world placed the blame for continuing violence in the Middle East squarely on the United States for failing to restrain Israel; conversely, Israel cited the tendency of the United States to ignore Palestinian violence (Elahi, 2002). The Madrid peace process in October 1991 served to improve Israel's international stature (Karsh, 2003). A willingness to compromise where compromise was never previously an option was the driving force behind this shift in international perception. According to Karsh, "the willingness of the Arabs and the Palestinians to seek a negotiated settlement altered the basic rules of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By its very nature, a negotiated settlement implied the willingness of both parties to abandon their maximalist demands and to seek a compromise solution" (2003, p. 266). The peace process initiated in 1991 also served as the basis for a change in Indian foreign policy with respect to Israel. Karsh notes that "once the Arab states and the Palestinians embarked on this course, there was no compelling reason for India to maintain the status quo. The absence of fundamental conflicts between India and Israel eroded any need to continue the situation of non-relations" (2003, p. 266).

The peace process initiated in 1991 also served to demarcate the end of Israel's extended isolation from the international community in both political and diplomatic terms (Karsh, 2003). In a dramatic shift from previous policy positions concerning Israel, many countries took this opportunity to normalize relations, including China in January 1992 (Kumaraswamy, 1998). According to Karsh, "India's ability to play any meaningful role in the Middle East peace process depended on its willingness to establish normal relations with all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel. Not to be left out of the process, India announced its decision within days after the Chinese move" (2003, p. 266). The decision to normalize relations with Israel signaled a new direction in Indian foreign policy characterized by a recognition of the need for improved relations with the international community to facilitate trade, arrange mutual security agreements, and achieve other outcomes that would favor India's self-interests. Karsh emphasizes that India's decision to normalize relations with Israel "appears to have been a considered move aimed at seeking a balance and pragmatism in Indian foreign policy. By becoming a prisoner of its idealism and rhetoric, India had divorced itself from political realism, with consistency ironically becoming the guiding principle of its policy towards the ever-turbulent Middle East" (2003, p. 266).

More importantly, perhaps, this new pragmatic direction in Indian foreign policy was not easily derailed, and Indian policymakers adhered to this approach even when it became unilateral. According to Karsh, "while extending political support for the Arab and Islamic countries of the region, it was unable and unwilling to seek reciprocity. Even the political and military support of some of these countries for Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars did not modify this trend" (2003, p. 266). By normalizing relations with Israel, Indian policymakers sought to level the playing field in ways that would benefit India while avoiding regional entanglements that could derail the process. J.N. Dixit, the Foreign Secretary of India at the time relations with Israel were normalized, stated: "What have the Arabs given us, if I may ask? Did they vote for us on the Kashmir issue? Were they supportive of us when we had the East Pakistan crisis in 1971?" (quoted in Karsh, 2003, p. 267). It is reasonable to suggest that Indian policymakers were relieved that the normalization of relations with Israel did not provoke any significant negative reaction from the region, although some countries in the Arab world expressed their displeasure with the initiative (Karsh, 2003). Indeed, the normalized relations with Israel did not negatively affect India's ability to forge improved relationships with several countries in the Middle East that were in India's self-interest (Karsh, 2003). Karsh emphasizes that "the improved ties with Iran and the highly publicized visit of President Hashemi Rafsanjani in April 1995 offered a vivid demonstration that normalization did not inhibit India from improving its relations with other countries of the region" (2003, p. 267). The relations between India and Israel were formally normalized in 1992 by the establishment of an Indian embassy in Israel's capital, a move that was reciprocated by Israel shortly thereafter (Karsh, 2003).

The brief but bloody 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon drew criticisms from a number of Indian policymakers who were in power at the time. The facts, however, did not support such a condemnation from the perspective of many international observers. What is known is that in July 2006, militants from the Shia group Hezbollah staged a border intrusion from Lebanon into Israel, in which eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two were abducted back into Lebanon (Rill & Davis, 2008). In response, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared the actions by Hezbollah an act of war, notified the Lebanese government — which included members of Hezbollah — that Israel held them responsible for the incursion, and called for the return of the two abducted Israeli soldiers (Rill & Davis, 2008). The U.S. government also assigned responsibility for the border incursion to Hezbollah and added that both Iran and Syria, as active supporters of Hezbollah, should also be held accountable for the deaths and abductions (Rill & Davis, 2008). In response to these demands by Israel, Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged that Lebanon was holding the two Israeli soldiers hostage and stated that Hezbollah members held prisoner in Israel would have to be released before Lebanon would consider releasing them (Rill & Davis, 2008).

Not satisfied by this response, Israel's reply was unequivocal, swift, and forceful. According to Rill and Davis, "within hours of the incursion, Israel had launched a counter-strike into Lebanon, bombing the airport in the capital city of Beirut and a range of targets in southern Lebanon which it said were connected with Hezbollah" (2008, p. 609). Over the next several weeks, Hezbollah responded with numerous rocket attacks targeting northern Israel (Rill & Davis, 2008). Although the military exchanges lasted slightly more than a month, they caused more than one thousand deaths and thousands of injuries on both sides (Rill & Davis, 2008). After the UN brokered a ceasefire between the warring belligerents, Israel began to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon in mid-August 2006, and assisted by UN peacekeepers, Lebanese military forces attempted to reestablish order and stability in their country (Rill & Davis, 2008). This bloody exchange was viewed in starkly different ways in different parts of the world. As Rill and Davis advise, "this event was of substantial significance, widely covered by news media outlets throughout the world. However, various international media covered this story in very different ways, or with very different frames" (2008, p. 609).

India chose to interpret Israel's retaliation negatively, due in large part to pressures from religious fundamentalists in the country to abandon its secular government. According to Kapila, "India's condemnation of Israel over its military operations in Lebanon through a resolution in Parliament was avoidable. It has arisen from the Leftists' pressure in the coalition government and the other disparate political groupings that masquerade as 'secularists' but in reality pander to Indian Muslim vote banks" (2006, p. 2). In addition, India also condemned the more recent bloodshed over the Gaza Strip by Israel in 2008. Although the Indian government criticized Israel for its military actions, it did acknowledge the provocation Israel was responding to in the region. A report from the India Times notes that "while India is aware of the cross-border provocations resulting from rocket attacks, particularly against targets in southern Israel, it urges an immediate end to the use of force against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip that has resulted in large numbers of casualties" (India says end conflict, but takes note of Hamas missiles too, 2008, pp. 2–3). These criticisms followed the pattern of the Indian government viewing Israel's actions as employing "disproportionate retaliation" (India says end conflict, 2008, p. 3).

Notwithstanding these setbacks in bilateral relations between India and Israel, the two countries have apparently recognized that improved relations are in their mutual best interests, including their economic interests, which are discussed further below.

Conclusion

The research showed that the current juncture in India's historical development is an important one, and a host of factors have served to shape the country's foreign policy directions to date. Although thousands of years old, modern India has had just a few decades in which to forge a new identity for itself in a changing and frequently hostile world, and the changes that have taken place in the geopolitical sphere in recent years have forced India to constantly reevaluate its foreign policy initiatives to ensure they are in the country's best interests. One of the major challenges in formulating foreign policies that are truly in India's best interests has been the need to balance its self-interests with a dynamic global environment in which the actors have changed in profound ways over the past thirty years. Gone forever are the relative certainties of the Cold War, where everyone knew each other's position on the vitally important issues of the day. In their place has come a scenario in which terrorist threats at home and abroad are threatening India's interests in the same fashion that has caused the United States and Israel so much grief in the past.

The juncture India now faces means that it can continue to pursue normalized relations with the United States and its ally Israel, pursue a more rigid path of nonalignment, or fall victim to the fundamentalist religious forces that are calling for an end to secular rule. Although a policy of nonalignment helped India remain independent and survive during the last half of the turbulent 20th century, it is reasonable to conclude that mutual security arrangements with countries such as Israel are clearly in India's best interests. Only time will tell, however, whether the current approach will be sufficient to prevent future hostilities between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, or whether India can withstand the forces arrayed against it by religious fundamentalists.