India-Israel Relations and India's National Interests

Introduction and Background

Today, India stands at an important juncture in its historical development. Following its independence from Britain in 1947, the years that followed were turbulent ones, with a relentless series of political, military, and economic challenges confronting the country time and again. Despite these challenges, India has emerged in the 21st century as an increasingly important actor within the international community and has enjoyed steady economic growth for the past two decades. Notwithstanding its enormous geographic size and population, India continues to perceive a number of external threats — most especially with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue — and its relations with much of the Arab world have often been ambivalent or even hostile. In this environment, forging a foreign policy that ensures India's national interests are protected while continuing the path toward greater integration in the international community represents a difficult but important enterprise. To determine the historical basis for the current issues facing India in this regard, this paper reviews the relevant literature concerning Indian foreign policy in general and its foreign policy positions with Israel in particular.

With a population of more than 1.1 billion people and an economy that experienced steady and impressive growth for the past twenty years (CIA World Factbook, 2010), India is the world's largest democracy and is well positioned to become an increasingly important actor in the international community. Berlin emphasizes that "one of the key milestones in world history has been the rise to prominence of new and influential states in world affairs. The recent trajectory of India suggests strongly that this state will play a more powerful role in the world in the coming decades" (2006, p. 58). This point is echoed by Ghoshal, who notes that "the theme of India's power and influence in world affairs is not new. India's enormous size, especially in terms of its population, rich natural resources, and its strategic location, together with a civilizational past, has long convinced Indian leaders of an imperative for playing an international role" (2003, p. 521).

The evolving international role that India will occupy in coming years appears to be inextricably interwoven with how it deals with Israel. Menon and Pandey emphasize that "the transformation in the relationship between India and Israel, from one that was at best cool and correct to one that is now hailed as a strategic alignment, is among the striking changes in the post-Cold War landscape" (2005, p. 29). This transformation in foreign policy has received the full support and encouragement of the international community in general and Israeli, Indian, and American observers in particular (Menon & Pandey, 2005). According to these authorities, "they believe that its potential significance extends well beyond the dense network of transactions that has developed between the two sides, and out across the entire region of South Asia and the Greater Middle East" (Menon & Pandey, 2005, p. 30).

Although India and Israel have experienced a fundamental shift in their respective foreign policy stances toward each other over the years, there are important issues involved in this complicated relationship that may create difficulties in the future (Menon & Pandey, 2005). Menon and Pandey note that "both friends and foes of the alignment between India and Israel see it as an important development. Only once this much-ballyhooed entente faces trials that require tough tradeoffs will we know whether it will be limited to mutual gains provided by arms sales and the flow of commerce" (2005, p. 30). Suggesting that it is still too early to gauge the long-term implications of this sea change in foreign policy, Menon and Pandey conclude that "such exchanges would still put India and Israel on a new road, but they will not amount to a strategic partnership that could change the balance of power in pivotal regions. For now, the safe bet is that the collaboration between India and Israel will meet the expectations of neither its foremost proponents nor its most fervent critics" (2005, p. 30).

India, like Israel, is geographically located in a strategic region of the world, and neighboring countries as well as other major actors with interests in the area have all played a formative role in India's foreign policy decision-making over the years (Berlin, 2006). According to Berlin, "over the past few years, India has placed itself on a path to achieve, potentially, the regional influence in the Indian Ocean to which it has aspired. India's links with the most important external actors in the Indian Ocean — the United States, Japan, Israel, and France — have also been strengthened" (2006, p. 58). These improved relationships are due in large part to the burgeoning Indian economy, but there have also been notable refinements in India's foreign policy. Berlin adds that "these are significant achievements, and they derive from India's growing economic clout and from a surer hand visible today in Indian diplomacy" (2006, p. 58).

The concept of Indian national interest is expressed in part in the manner in which India pursues its foreign policy goals. Modern Indian foreign policy can be traced to the country's independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 and the installation of Jawaharlal Nehru as its first prime minister (Wadlow, 2003). According to Wadlow, "Nehru was able to play a high-profile role in world politics, especially at the start of the Cold War and as a mediator in the 1950–1953 Korean War, which some feared was the forerunner of a broader armed conflict. Indian diplomats were also able to work on compromise formulas during the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China" (2003, p. 90). Although afforded a great deal of latitude in establishing foreign policy goals and developing a unique Indian diplomatic style, Nehru faced a number of significant foreign policy challenges early on, including the partitioning of Pakistan, which erupted into country-wide inter-religious violence, and the Kashmir issue (Wadlow, 2003).

According to U.S. analysts, "communal violence led to the subcontinent's bloody partition, which resulted in the creation of two separate states, India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought three wars since independence, the last of which in 1971 resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of Bangladesh. India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 caused Pakistan to conduct its own tests that same year" (CIA World Factbook, 2010, p. 3). Although the two countries have not used their nuclear weapons against each other, the potential for this eventuality hangs heavily over the region as well as the rest of the world. From India's perspective, nuclear weapons are just part of the arsenal it needs to ensure its survival in a hostile world. Karp emphasizes that "for India, a nuclear weapons capability is an issue that defines national uniqueness. The end of the Cold War provoked a crisis of credibility for Indian foreign policy, which found itself unable to adjust to a world without the Soviet Union, dominated by economic globalization and American political leadership" (1998, p. 14).

Despite its nuclear capability, India's foreign policy was mired in stagnant economic development. As Karp puts it, "India's attempt at economic liberalization began in 1991 but quickly stalled, keeping foreign investment low and suppressing growth" (1998, p. 14). Moreover, India's foreign policy during the closing decade of the 20th century was largely based on reacting negatively to the United States and its allies. According to Karp, "Indian commentators have been highly critical of the country's indecisive foreign policy that is seemingly based only on opposition to the United States. This policy manifests itself in areas as diverse as opposition to pressure on Iraq, criticism of NATO expansion, and particularly with regard to arms control and disarmament issues" (1998, p. 14). There has been one issue on which virtually all Indian policymakers agree, however, and that is India's right to possess nuclear weapons without restrictions of any type from the international community. As Karp points out, "one clear cornerstone of New Delhi's foreign policy — something on which Indians of every political stripe can agree — is opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)" (1998, p. 14).

Although most of the international community has supported the NPT, India and Israel remain two of the last three holdouts for much the same reasons (Karp, 1998). Both India and Israel have good reason to be wary about the promises made by the international community, and both countries have experienced attempts by their neighbors to eradicate them from the world map. Although other countries have expressed reservations about the NPT, India is unique in its outspoken criticisms of the pact. According to Karp, "where India stands apart is in its long-standing moral opposition to what it considers to be the discriminatory basis of the NPT — dividing the world into 'haves' and 'have-nots.' Indians across the political spectrum, especially the country's powerful nuclear weapons establishment, are critical of the NPT, arguing that it unfairly warps international hierarchies to the disadvantage of the non-nuclear-weapon states" (1998, p. 15). In its efforts to balance pressures from the international community with its own self-interests, the position adopted by India has been starkly different from that of other countries. Karp concludes that "most states party to the NPT accept the unfairness of the treaty as a tradeoff that serves their own and global interests. India's leaders insist that fair and genuine nuclear disarmament must start with the nuclear-weapon states themselves, a demand formalized by former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his 1990 global nuclear disarmament initiative" (1998, p. 14).

As a result of these events, the 20th century witnessed the formation of various positions in Indian foreign policy that would endure throughout the Cold War era and beyond (Wadlow, 2003). These foreign policy positions were primarily based on India's official policy of nonalignment, an approach adopted early on in an effort to maintain independence and navigate a bipolar world (Ghoshal, 2003). According to Ghoshal, India's foreign policy of nonalignment "was aimed at drawing economic and technological aid for development from both powers as well as providing an alternative model of international relations in a world which was then intensely bipolar" (2003, p. 521). The objectives of this policy were to establish a buffer zone between the polarized blocs of the international community, minimize the potential for conflict, and ultimately create a new world order in which there were more than two primary spheres of influence (Ghoshal, 2003). Ghoshal notes that nonalignment "made it possible for India to maintain normal relations with all the major world powers, with varying degrees of warmth and intimacy, while facilitating the flow of technical and financial assistance from the two ideological blocs. In short, nonalignment gave India the maximum possible dividends in a bipolar world" (2003, p. 521).

Clearly, nonalignment during the 20th century was in India's best interests, but nonaligned does not mean disinterested, and India's foreign policy shifted as events required. Heo and Horowitz note that "India's approach to alignment, both during and after the Cold War, is a defining characteristic of Indian foreign policy, but one which was subject to shifts and reinterpretation. Similarly, India's strong stance on disarmament and arms control was based on moral assumptions apparently at odds with its decision to test and deploy nuclear weapons" (2003, p. 139).

India's propensity to employ military force as a means of achieving political goals also differed dramatically over time since independence (Heo & Horowitz, 2003). For example, in 1962, India fought a frontier conflict with China. According to Wadlow, "the conflict was widely considered a defeat for India and India was seen as an unsuccessful state in the international system" (2003, p. 90). Ghoshal reports that "India's profile and influence, however, were not always balanced during this period; both external and internal factors combined, in the later years of the Nehru era and after, to deprive nonalignment of some of its élan and effectiveness" (2003, p. 521). Even the addition of nuclear capabilities did little to reverse these trends at the time. Ghoshal adds that "externally, India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 proved to be a major setback, and the relationship of near-permanent hostility with Pakistan exercised a disabling effect on India's foreign policy. Internally it was seen as a crisis-ridden country with poor economic performance. Militarily, it could not elevate itself to the status of a major power as China did by exercising its nuclear option in 1964 despite its poor economic base" (2003, p. 521).

Based on the widespread perception that India had been weakened by the conflict with China, India's foreign policy was further constrained concerning the direction it should turn in its efforts to maintain a nonaligned status while receiving the assistance it so desperately needed. As Ghoshal points out:

Since nothing blights more the image of a nation than failure, the defeat at the hands of the Chinese conjured up an international perception of India whose attributes were that of a country which had become weak, incoherent, unable to defend its own interests, and which had to turn to the outside for help and protection. Nothing is forgiven in international relations, least of all the defeat of a country that has the normative pretensions of building a self-reliant and self-sustaining nation. (Ghoshal, 2003, p. 521)

In response to these failures, the prime minister was accused by Indian policymakers of having been negligent with respect to the Chinese threat, but Nehru died before he could take steps to reverse these perceptions of India as a weak and ineffective state (Wadlow, 2003). His daughter, Indira Gandhi, served as prime minister during the periods 1965 to 1977 and 1980 through 1984, when she was assassinated (Wadlow, 2003). Prime Minister Gandhi also experienced distinct challenges during her tenure, and while she made an effort to reformulate India's foreign policy to rebuild India's image abroad, the situation had changed in fundamental ways by the time these efforts were made and they were largely ineffective. Wadlow notes that "although there were still crises, the Cold War had become stable, and neither Russians nor Americans felt the need for intermediaries" (2003, p. 90). Consequently, India shifted its foreign policy focus from the international community to a more regional level, especially concerning the independence of Bangladesh (Wadlow, 2003). As Wadlow points out, "after Nehru, things began to change. The balance slowly tilted in favor of regionalism. While the global policy began to gradually lose its luster, its coherence, its framework, and, what is more, its importance, the broad contours of a regional policy began to emerge — a policy that was more coherent, more pragmatic, more national-oriented and more forceful" (2003, p. 90).

Thereafter, India's foreign policy became more militaristic in nature. According to Heo and Horowitz, "under Indira and her son Rajiv Gandhi, Indian foreign policy became more militarized, including a series of provocative military exercises in 1986–87 and a disastrous intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987–90" (2003, p. 141). The 1980s witnessed a brief rise in the influence wielded by the Indian military in formulating foreign policy. Heo and Horowitz note that "the combination of an inexperienced prime minister (Rajiv Gandhi), a charismatic and intellectual chief of army staff (General K. Sundarji), and a quiet but brilliant civilian administrator and planner (Arun Singh) led to a far more aggressive use of military coercion and much higher defense budgets" (2003, p. 143). In response to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, India conducted a large military exercise along the Pakistani border, an exercise that resulted in yet another political crisis (Heo & Horowitz, 2003). From Pakistan's perspective, such an exercise on its border was an alarming escalation in tensions that could easily have become a full-blown war. Heo and Horowitz note that "this demonstration of Indian military capability, larger than any previous military exercise and including virtually all of India's mechanized units, could easily have been expanded into an actual invasion. Virtually simultaneous maneuvers and exercises were held on the Chinese border, with similar results" (2003, p. 143). In addition, during the 1980s, the Indian military establishment was included as part of the foreign policy planning process for the use of nuclear capabilities (Heo & Horowitz, 2003). Taken together, it is apparent that Indian foreign policy managed to keep the country independent and reasonably secure, but the world stage has changed in the meantime, creating the need for additional refinements in Indian foreign policy with regard to states such as Israel.