Standard Operating Procedures for High-Rise Building Fires

Introduction

The main aim of this research paper is to review the current standards for fighting fires in high-rise buildings and to recommend various ways to improve those standards. The paper also examines how these standards may affect current firefighting methods. The needs of local Chief Fire Officers, the current fire department hierarchy, and contemporary international practices have all been considered when suggesting recommendations for change and improvement.

According to fire department personnel, high-rise buildings are at greater risk of fire because their large size means more occupants who may be less vigilant about fire hazards (Russell, 2004). Additionally, these buildings contain large quantities of combustible material and multiple pathways through which fire can spread rapidly (Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire, 1992).

Buildings over 25 meters (approximately 75 ft) in height are generally classified as high-rise buildings, and it is in these structures that appropriate fire suppression adjustments are critically important. However, experts also recommend that high-rise fire procedures be considered for buildings with four or more floors. Officers responsible for building safety are encouraged to have high-rise systems installed even in buildings shorter than 75 feet, as this precautionary measure is believed to significantly improve the chances of extinguishing a fire quickly (AOC, 1996).

A great deal can be learned from historical high-rise fires — from the reasons they occurred to the methods used to bring them under control. Studying these incidents provides a clear picture of what should and should not be done to prevent such fires or, when they do occur, how to suppress them effectively. An efficient Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) can therefore be developed with the help of these historical incidents.

Historical High-Rise Fire Incidents

The three most significant high-rise fires examined in this paper are:

1. First Interstate Bank fire, Los Angeles (1988)
2. One Meridian Plaza fire, Philadelphia (1991)
3. New York City bank building fire (1993)

Studying these incidents underscores the importance of precautionary measures. Key lessons include the need for proper ventilation systems to minimize fire spread, the necessity of clear protocols that all building occupants understand, and the importance of designing infrastructure — including elevators and stairwells — so that firefighters can reach and suppress a fire as quickly as possible.

It should be noted that the World Trade Centre fire has not been used as a case study here. That incident cannot be categorized as a typical high-rise fire and therefore is not suitable as a basis for developing SOPs applicable to fires in normal high-rise circumstances.

According to Routley (Report 082), fires in high-rise buildings are extremely difficult to suppress, and the evacuation process presents enormous challenges. Because these buildings contain numerous floors, reaching all affected levels and rescuing occupants quickly is a significant operational difficulty.

Incident Command Systems

According to Smith (1995), an effective incident command system for high-rise buildings must allow room for changes and adjustments so that appropriate alterations can be made when circumstances demand it. In Chapman's (1995) view, even a small fire in a high-rise building is very difficult to control and requires the fire department to deploy far greater resources than a fire in a smaller building.

The Los Angeles Fire Department developed an Incident Management System specifically designed around high-rise fire scenarios. The system emphasized organizational efficiency by assigning specific duties to designated individuals and establishing clear protocols for transferring those duties to other personnel if the situation became prolonged. This made the system notably flexible (Gerard, 1981).

This Incident Management System proved effective during the First Interstate Bank fire (Routley, Report 022; Building Official and Code Administrator Magazine, 1989).

In the case of the One Meridian Plaza fire, however, the incident management system was not effective. In response to this failure, Routley, Jennings, and Chubb (Report 049) argued that when multiple building system failures occur simultaneously, safety-oriented strategies must always take priority over command decisions. In such unanticipated situations, the effectiveness of fire-ground decision-making cannot be reliably judged. Three firefighters lost their lives in the One Meridian Plaza fire, after which the Philadelphia Fire Department reevaluated its incident management system and revised it in 1989 (Dyer, 1996).

Ventilation, Smoke Control, and Elevator Use

Smoke and fire together present serious hazards to firefighters attempting to reach trapped occupants and control the blaze. In the One Meridian Plaza fire, the fire spread both vertically and horizontally because the ventilators lacked fire dampers and the building had unprotected penetrations through its fire-resistant construction. These conditions made the fire extremely difficult to contain (Routley et al., Report 049). Auto-exposure was also a contributing factor in the fire's expansion.

In the First Interstate Bank fire, the absence of compartmentalization combined with an open floor plan allowed the fire to spread vertically. According to Bennett (2000), the primary purpose of an SOP is not only to minimize fire spread as quickly as possible but also to remove smoke from as many areas as possible.

Iklim (2003) emphasizes the critical importance of proper ventilation systems for smoke removal. A tragic example is a hotel fire in Las Vegas in which 85 people died from smoke inhalation. All of the victims were on the hotel's upper floors; because the building lacked an adequate ventilation system, smoke traveled through the central air conditioning system and proved fatal.

According to the Los Angeles Fire Department (1995), effective ventilation systems are essential in high-rise buildings. However, Routley (Report 082) notes that vertical ventilation can only be achieved using elevators and stairwells — and if those are dedicated to ventilation, they cannot simultaneously be used by firefighters for evacuation or fire suppression. This position was also endorsed by the Pittsburgh Fire Department (1992).

The use of elevators by firefighters during high-rise fires has resulted in numerous fatalities, often because the elevators malfunction under fire conditions (Leihbacher, 2003). This is why elevator use in fire scenarios remains a debated issue. During the One Meridian Plaza fire, a security guard had to be rescued after inhaling smoke when his elevator opened onto a floor that was already on fire (Routley et al., Report 049).

Despite these dangers, elevators remain the fastest means of reaching upper floors during a high-rise fire. For this reason, neither the Pittsburgh nor the Los Angeles Fire Department has prohibited elevator use outright; both departments have instead issued strict guidance that elevators should only be used once it has been confirmed that they are safe to operate (LAFD, 1995; Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire, 1992).

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