This paper examines Thomas Barnett's "Pentagon's New Map" framework, which divides the world into the Core, the Gap, and the Seam based on integration into globalization. It critiques Barnett's reliance on unilateral military action as the primary means of "shrinking the gap," arguing that diplomacy and multilateral coalitions are essential yet overlooked tools. The paper also assesses the threats, challenges, and opportunities facing U.S. defense strategy in a complex and rapidly changing international environment, and analyzes the future operational environment by applying mission and operational variables to identify likely regions of future U.S. military engagement, including the growing challenge posed by transnational non-state actors operating in virtual spaces.
The paper demonstrates critical engagement with a primary theoretical source. Rather than simply summarizing Barnett's framework, the author identifies specific weaknesses — the absence of diplomacy, the lack of coalition-building, and the one-dimensional reliance on military force — and supports each critique with evidence. This technique of "agree with the diagnosis, challenge the prescription" is a strong model for analytical writing in political science and strategic studies.
The paper opens with an exposition of Barnett's Core-Gap-Seam model and the logic of "shrinking the gap." The second section critiques the theory's overreliance on military unilateralism and its neglect of soft power. The third section shifts to an assessment of the real strategic environment facing U.S. forces, cataloguing threats, challenges, and opportunities. The final section applies operational and mission variables to forecast where future U.S. deployments may occur and describes the evolving nature of transnational threats in the digital age.
The overriding aim of globalization is to eliminate physical boundaries, uniting all the countries of the world into one massive village. So far, globalization has had both positive and negative influences, and has literally split the world into three: the portion that is already reaping the benefits of globalization and is characterized by high standards of living and stable governments (the Core); that which is yet to reap any benefits and is still grappling with political repression and widespread disease (the Gap); and that which exhibits features of both the Core and the Gap (the Seam).1 Most Americans tend to think that the problems the Core faces are a result of its association with the Gap, and hence believe that cutting links would be the solution to the issues of drugs and terrorism. This, however, is not a valid argument, because as long as the Gap is not enjoying the gains of globalization, it will continue to incubate terrorists and drug lords, exporting its pain to the Core in the form of instability.
Getting the Gap to be part of globalization is only possible if the Core first recognizes the Gap's significance, identifies the factors hindering its success, and then engages with it in a bid to find long-term solutions. Looking back in time, the Saddam Hussein regime used the threat of terrorism to instill fear and cause years of instability in the Middle East. This fear was a threat to development, and Saddam Hussein a stumbling block to the diffusion of globalization. Military engagement was seen as the only way to bring about peace and get Iraq, and the greater Middle East region, to share in globalization. Most countries within the Gap face similar problems, and the Core — particularly the U.S. — will keep going to war until all stumbling blocks are addressed. This is referred to as "shrinking the gap," and is one of the three strategies of the war on terror. Using the Seam to suppress harmful influences from entering the Core, and strengthening the Core's own resilience, are the other two strategies.
The theorist puts forth a reasonable analysis of the international order; however, the simplistic, one-dimensional solution he offers for decreasing disconnectedness is not entirely convincing — in fact, it is potentially dangerous. To begin with, he completely disregards the role played by diplomacy in the containment of threats and the coercion of outcomes. He dismisses the value of soft power as a persuasion tool and relies solely on military action, arguing that the only way to free the Core from its security issues is to export security to the Gap and preserve peace within the Core. Diplomacy has, however, provided solutions to some of the worst conflicts in history. The decades-long conflict between England and Northern Ireland is a perfect example: military action failed, and a solution was only reached when the conflicting parties came together in diplomatic talks. The power of diplomacy cannot, therefore, be underestimated.
Only recently, America witnessed other countries openly refuse to participate in U.S.-led efforts to reconstruct Iraq, owing to President Bush's refusal to establish a coalition and gain international consensus for the 2003 invasion.2 This virtually ensured that the U.S. bore almost all the costs of the Iraqi mission — simply because President Bush was unwilling to exhaust diplomatic efforts.
A second fundamental concern arises from the "go-it-alone" attitude the theorist's proposals suggest. The theorist mentions nothing about coalitions or multilateral cooperation in situations that require the waging of war. This is a fundamental weakness given the high degree of uncertainty that often mars military operations. With this level of uncertainty, and with the emergence of violent non-state actors, the U.S. will need to make use of a responsible engagement strategy and foreign policy capable of defending against potential threats while simultaneously spreading and expanding the nation's values as a bulwark against those threats.
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