This paper examines the concept of global civil society as a potential model of world governance, tracing the evolution of political organization from feudalism and Westphalian sovereignty to contemporary international structures. Drawing on scholars including Keane, Finnemore, Meyer, Lipshutz, and others, the paper argues that a global civil society is achievable but depends heavily on the spread of shared cultural norms, the gradual displacement of state-centered political structures, and the expanding influence of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The paper also considers how global civil society relates to democratization, human rights, and social justice, while acknowledging the significant challenges posed by political elites resistant to ceding power and cultural groups that reject Western norms.
The paper demonstrates effective comparative synthesis, placing competing theoretical positions — such as world-system theory versus world society/culture theory — in dialogue to show why a culturally grounded model of global civil society is more persuasive than a politically driven one. This technique allows the student to build an original argument from secondary scholarship rather than merely summarizing individual sources.
The paper opens with historical context and a thesis statement, then devotes separate analytical sections to cultural norms, political obstacles, and NGO growth before addressing democracy and justice. Each section introduces a key variable in the global civil society debate and evaluates its contribution or resistance to the model. The conclusion synthesizes all three variables and reasserts the central claim that global civil society is achievable through cultural diffusion and the erosion of entrenched political structures.
Over the course of history, the organization of the world and its governance has taken many forms. One of the earliest forms, the feudal model, involved kingdoms and provinces ruled by a single ruler. Power would often change hands when these kingdoms went to war with one another. The Catholic Church was one of the first overarching systems of governance applied to these kingdoms in Europe, recognized as a political authority in its own right. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia created the system of governance now used throughout the world — that of the nation-state. As of late, however, the sovereignty of nation-states has been questioned, as world organizations — both intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) — such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Greenpeace have begun to emerge. Further, unions such as the European Union and the African Union have arisen as regionally based sources of governance, claiming jurisdiction in areas that have traditionally been considered sovereign.
Their existence and actions are often at the heart of controversies regarding global governance today, but their implementation is a direct result of issues that are no longer regional but global in scope. These include global warming, terrorism, the nuclear threat, economics, and others. Keane (2003) describes this situation when he writes, "A new world-view radically different from any that has existed before has been born and is currently enjoying a growth spurt: it is called global civil society" (p. 1).
Indeed, global civil society is an idea that, if implemented, could see the end of many of the world's problems. It is a construct that proposes a global village — a new political order involving complex interaction among actors in the international realm — an idea that can be described as a normative, moral, or political structure (Keane, 2003). Although Lipshutz (1992) defines global civil society as "a parallel arrangement of political interaction, one that does not take anarchy or self-help as central organizing principles, but is focused on the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by decentered, local actors that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there" (p. 390), Keane (2003) specifically points out that global civil society is difficult to define. It is precisely in its abstractness, and as a result of its many forms, that a global civil society is difficult to pinpoint exactly.
Meyer et al. (1997), however, note that the existence of world models is nothing new, and that world models are now beginning to explain the organization of the world at an unprecedented rate. Perhaps the clearest reason for this goes back to the fact that decisions made at the sovereign, national level impact the world as a whole (Held, 1995). Scholars also state that world society theories explain how cultures with seemingly extreme differences manage to function in similar manners, and how these cultures are able to interact at all — even if that interaction may be strained (Meyer et al., 1997). Through an examination of the spread of cultural norms, politics, and democracy, this paper argues that a global civil society or world society may soon become the prevailing form of international governance, but that it cannot be implemented without a significant degree of change and strife.
According to Keane (2003), shared beliefs about the cosmos have been what has kept humankind united to the degree that it is united today. It follows, then, that a global civil society or world society will require a spread of cultural norms. To a degree, this has already happened through globalization. Shared economic interests, travel, and entertainment have brought the world closer together in ways never before experienced. Still, some of the most potent conflicts in the world are fueled by cultural differences. Terrorist organizations with ties to extremist or fundamentalist religious groups have certainly not accepted the spread of cultural norms. In areas of the Middle East where the Taliban continue to portray the United States as associated with religious evil, Western norms are by no means accepted.
According to Keane (2003), the definition of global civil society has many manifestations, one of which is a normative ideal. Keane suggests that many view a global civil society as the ideal form of global governance, and the term is often used to signal the "undesirable or unworkable consequences of practical efforts to weaken or abolish the institutions of global civil society, for instance through unilateral military intervention" (p. 4). What Keane implies here is that some see global civil society not as a theory currently in practice, but as a normative ideal — perhaps one that can never quite be achieved. While global civil society can, in principle, be achieved, Keane's comments regarding cultural norms underscore the degree of change and strife that would be needed in order to implement this new world order. The fact that advocates must continually invoke the idea of global civil society as an appropriate cultural norm itself suggests how far the world still is from truly shared cultural values.
Still, many agree that cultural norms are the pathway to global civil society. Finnemore (1996) writes that sociologists have long understood that "social realities influence behavior," but more importantly for the international community, sociologists have begun to suggest that these social realities and behaviors are in direct opposition to both liberal and realist theories (p. 325). Finnemore (1996) argues that it is social norms — not political theories — that explain much of societal behavior. Thus, if culture rather than politics ultimately defines how societies are constructed, then the global civil society model of governance is possible, but is almost entirely dependent on the spread of cultural norms.
The rise of international NGOs testifies to the importance of culture in the emerging global civil society. Boli and Thomas (1997) make this clear when they state that "culture is increasingly global," and also note that "a transnational legal world order operates with considerable independence from states" (p. 172). That new world order is achieved through governance that relies heavily on international NGOs to establish cultural norms. Finnemore (1996) further argues that bureaucracy, which "transcends culture" (p. 30), is in fact supported by cultural values, suggesting that even the political norm is reliant on culture. Through the spread of cultural norms, it may not be necessary to maintain such bureaucratic governance. Instead, shared cultural norms may allow states to have enough in common to operate under a different model — perhaps the model of a global civil society.
The idea of global civil society is not a new one, but it is a complex idea, bringing together the concepts of culture, politics, democracy, and justice, along with many other characteristics. Global civil society is dependent upon culture and the spread of cultural norms in order to function as the architect of an ideal world. At the same time, it must remain largely independent of politics. Politics will, in fact, become a major stumbling block to the implementation of this new society, as political actors prove reluctant to surrender their power. Finally, global civil society is needed in order to create a world in which justice and democracy are genuinely effective.
Achieving the ideal version of global civil society is by no means easy, but it is certainly possible through a combination of the spread of cultural norms and the gradual erosion of entrenched political structures. Through a natural progression, aided by committed IGOs and NGOs, the global civil society in its fullest manifestation could be within reach in the years ahead.
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.