Islam's Role in the Iran-Iraq War: Religion, Politics, and Economics

Introduction

Throughout history, mankind has engaged in wars of various sorts, ranging from truly noble causes to the downright bizarre. It is in the latter category that the Iran-Iraq War must be grouped, given its enormous impact on these two countries for reasons that remain better described than understood in the West. As with all wars, there are certainly two sides to the reasons why this war was fought in the first place, with both the Iranians and Iraqis claiming the high moral ground for their respective parts. Based on the predominantly Islamic nature of both countries—fundamentalist Iran more so than secular Iraq—it would be reasonable to suggest that religious grounds were part of this rationale. However, the research shows that in spite of this shared religion, there were more salient reasons for these nations going to war in 1980, reasons that transcended the religious tenets of Islam and were more closely related to the economic and political environment in which the war occurred. Although Islam played a role in how the war was prosecuted and managed on both sides, particularly in Iran, it was the economic and political forces at work that ultimately fueled it. In support of this position, this paper provides a review of the relevant scholarly and peer-reviewed literature concerning the Iran-Iraq War, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

The Cost of the Iran-Iraq War

Although the twentieth century was a particularly turbulent period for Iran characterized by numerous momentous events, Rajaee (1997) suggests that "none has been more devastating in terms of material and human losses than the Iran-Iraq War, which was initiated by Iraq on 22 September 1980 and absorbed Iranian energy, wealth, and valuable opportunity for eight years" (2). Likewise, Workman (1994) emphasizes that "the first Gulf War—better known as the Iran-Iraq War—was tragic by any account. When one considers its economic costs, physical destruction, and human toll, there is merit in the claim that the Iran-Iraq War was the Third World's first 'Great War'" (1). Although the belligerents of World War II would likely disagree, the Iran-Iraq War has been termed by various scholars as one of the costliest conflicts of the twentieth century (Abdulla 1994:2), while others have described it as the longest war (Hiro 1990).

The Iranian government estimated that the 1980–1988 war resulted in $440 billion in direct losses to its economy, with another $490 billion exacted in indirect costs (Rajaee 2). A number of observers suggest that Iraq experienced comparable losses, with accepted estimates placing "the aggregate direct and indirect cost of the war to Tehran at $627 billion, and to Baghdad at $561 billion" (Rajaee 2). These enormous sums do not take into account the costs associated with rebuilding the two countries' economies following the cessation of hostilities—an amount Rajaee suggests was approximately another trillion dollars, roughly divided equally between the two combatants, with $644.4 billion required to reconstruct Iran's economy and $452.6 billion required for Iraq's (Rajaee 2). Both countries enjoy enormous oil reserves and were actively marketing this resource throughout the twentieth century. Yet the revenues derived from oil were dwarfed by the costs of the "longest war": "The total cost of the war exceeds the oil revenue of the two states throughout the twentieth century" (Rajaee 2).

While the economic consequences of the war were truly immense, they pale in comparison to the human toll the conflict caused. Rajaee emphasizes that "more than one million people died or were injured in the war. Conservative Western estimates put the number of total war dead at 367,000—with Iran accounting for 262,000 and Iraq 105,000. With over 700,000 injured, the total casualties were put at over one million" (Rajaee 2). Given these staggering statistics, it would be difficult to call either side a "winner," but Cordesman (1999) suggests that Iraq did in fact win the war, and did so decisively. According to Cordesman, "Iraq had decisively defeated Iran during the spring and summer of 1988, in battles that cost Iran some 45–55 percent of its inventory of major land-force weapons. Iraq had the only modern, combat-effective, armored and mechanized forces in the Gulf and an air force that was emerging as combat effective for the first time" (82).