Islam's Role in the Iran-Iraq War: Religion, Politics, and Economics

Introduction

Throughout history, mankind has engaged in wars of various sorts, ranging from truly noble causes to the downright bizarre. It is in the latter category that the Iran-Iraq War must be grouped, given its enormous impact on these two countries for reasons that remain better described than understood in the West. As with all wars, there are certainly two sides to the reasons why this war was fought in the first place, with both the Iranians and Iraqis claiming the high moral ground for their respective parts. Based on the predominantly Islamic nature of both countries—fundamentalist Iran more so than secular Iraq—it would be reasonable to suggest that religious grounds were part of this rationale. However, the research shows that in spite of this shared religion, there were more salient reasons for these nations going to war in 1980, reasons that transcended the religious tenets of Islam and were more closely related to the economic and political environment in which the war occurred. Although Islam played a role in how the war was prosecuted and managed on both sides, particularly in Iran, it was the economic and political forces at work that ultimately fueled it. In support of this position, this paper provides a review of the relevant scholarly and peer-reviewed literature concerning the Iran-Iraq War, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

The Cost of the Iran-Iraq War

Although the twentieth century was a particularly turbulent period for Iran characterized by numerous momentous events, Rajaee (1997) suggests that "none has been more devastating in terms of material and human losses than the Iran-Iraq War, which was initiated by Iraq on 22 September 1980 and absorbed Iranian energy, wealth, and valuable opportunity for eight years" (2). Likewise, Workman (1994) emphasizes that "the first Gulf War—better known as the Iran-Iraq War—was tragic by any account. When one considers its economic costs, physical destruction, and human toll, there is merit in the claim that the Iran-Iraq War was the Third World's first 'Great War'" (1). Although the belligerents of World War II would likely disagree, the Iran-Iraq War has been termed by various scholars as one of the costliest conflicts of the twentieth century (Abdulla 1994:2), while others have described it as the longest war (Hiro 1990).

The Iranian government estimated that the 1980–1988 war resulted in $440 billion in direct losses to its economy, with another $490 billion exacted in indirect costs (Rajaee 2). A number of observers suggest that Iraq experienced comparable losses, with accepted estimates placing "the aggregate direct and indirect cost of the war to Tehran at $627 billion, and to Baghdad at $561 billion" (Rajaee 2). These enormous sums do not take into account the costs associated with rebuilding the two countries' economies following the cessation of hostilities—an amount Rajaee suggests was approximately another trillion dollars, roughly divided equally between the two combatants, with $644.4 billion required to reconstruct Iran's economy and $452.6 billion required for Iraq's (Rajaee 2). Both countries enjoy enormous oil reserves and were actively marketing this resource throughout the twentieth century. Yet the revenues derived from oil were dwarfed by the costs of the "longest war": "The total cost of the war exceeds the oil revenue of the two states throughout the twentieth century" (Rajaee 2).

While the economic consequences of the war were truly immense, they pale in comparison to the human toll the conflict caused. Rajaee emphasizes that "more than one million people died or were injured in the war. Conservative Western estimates put the number of total war dead at 367,000—with Iran accounting for 262,000 and Iraq 105,000. With over 700,000 injured, the total casualties were put at over one million" (Rajaee 2). Given these staggering statistics, it would be difficult to call either side a "winner," but Cordesman (1999) suggests that Iraq did in fact win the war, and did so decisively. According to Cordesman, "Iraq had decisively defeated Iran during the spring and summer of 1988, in battles that cost Iran some 45–55 percent of its inventory of major land-force weapons. Iraq had the only modern, combat-effective, armored and mechanized forces in the Gulf and an air force that was emerging as combat effective for the first time" (82).

Economic and Political Forces Behind the War

What could cause these two countries to go marching off to war in such a fashion, bringing such devastation and destruction upon their peoples and economies? There are no simple answers, but there are viable explanations that help illuminate the war's origins and its sustained nature. According to Chubin and Tripp (1988), "it is important in seeking to understand the origins of the war between Iraq and Iran that an effort should be made to examine the factors which led to the perception of the Iraqi Government in the autumn of 1980 that war was the most advantageous, and perhaps the only possible, way of reordering Iraq's relations with Iran" (13). There were, in fact, profound economic and political forces at work that appear to have contributed to the prolonged nature of the conflict.

In their analysis of Turkey's role in the conflict, Aydin and Aras (2005) emphasize that "Turkey's neutrality in the war between Iran and Iraq helped to increase its commercial links with both countries. Bilateral trade with Iran, for example, grew to $2.3 billion in 1983–1984 and continued to rise, reflecting an interdependence that was not easily reversed" (21). Just as individuals tend to live up to—and beyond—their income level, countries that have grown accustomed to a vital revenue source will make significant tradeoffs to maintain it. This was certainly the case with Turkey and Iran during the lengthy Iran-Iraq War. Aydin and Aras add that "this interdependence caused occasional strains in the foreign ministry's attempts to balance Turkey's security concerns with its economic gains. In return for increasing export markets, Turkey had to tolerate the growth of a large Iranian exile community (upwards of half a million) and the occasional lapses of Iranian officials who sought to promote Islamic perceptions in their host's secular system" (21).

This uneasy but profitable relationship was not restricted to Iran. Turkey played both ends against the middle for as long as it was possible to do so. Aydin and Aras note that "during the war, both Iran and Iraq depended heavily on Turkey as the only secure transit route, which allowed Turkey to capture a major share of the rapidly expanding transit market of the region. Moreover, the war, which also created an important market for Turkish manufactured goods in the two belligerent countries, became the predominant source of expansion for exports to the Middle East" (22). Iran and Iraq's combined share of total Turkish exports increased from 5.5% in 1980 to 26% in 1985, before declining to 15% in 1986 as a result of falling oil prices (Aydin and Aras 22). It has been estimated that $1.9 billion—or 42%—of total Turkish exports between 1979 and 1984 were attributable to the Iran-Iraq War and related political changes after 1981. As Aydin and Aras conclude, "one of the main aims of Turkish foreign policy during that period was to preserve those markets. Turkey's 'active neutrality' during the Iran-Iraq War derived as much from security concerns as from the fact that both countries counted among Turkey's largest trade partners" (22, emphasis in original).

Conclusion

In many ways, the Iran-Iraq War that lasted from 1980 to 1988 resembles a massive chessboard, with the pieces on both sides being manipulated by foreign interests that were less concerned with the enormous human toll of the conflict than with the profits to be made from its continuation. The research showed that France, Turkey, the United States, and others had a vital interest in the war's continuation for both political and economic reasons. The trillion-dollar-plus costs and more than one million casualties that resulted from the Iran-Iraq War did not make the Middle East a safer place by any measure. The Iranians would likely suggest, however, that it provided them with an opportunity to send many of their citizens—including children—directly to heaven. In the final analysis, it is from this religious perspective that Iran's prosecution of the war must be understood. Yet it remains more probable that Iraq's motivation for initiating the conflict in the first place was primarily political and economic in nature.