This paper examines and compares the philosophical views of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill on the nature of happiness and its relationship to morality. It explores Kant's argument that happiness is too indefinite and empirical to serve as a foundation for moral obligation, tracing his distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives and his insistence that the good will — not happiness — is the only unconditionally good thing. The paper then turns to Mill's utilitarian framework, analyzing the greatest happiness principle, the equal consideration of interests, and the idea that pleasure and the absence of pain define what is morally right. The analysis concludes by weighing the strengths and limitations of both approaches.
For the philosopher Kant, happiness is something rather ambiguous — not black or white, but many different shades of grey, depending on the person. In very simple terms, he believed that happiness is basically getting what one wants. His ethical system was presented in Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 2009), where seeking a universal and supreme principle of morality was his central focus. It should be noted that Kant does not discuss actual "happiness" to a great extent, because happiness was not the foundation of his ethical system. This is in contrast to many ethical systems, including Mill's, where happiness is the aim of morality.
Happiness is still an important part of Kant's ethics; yet, because of his belief that happiness is about getting what one wants, it is easy to see happiness as being too weak to serve as a foundation for morality. Getting what one wants could prevent other individuals from getting what they want, so it seems highly improbable that everyone could be happy simultaneously. If morality is defined in terms of happiness, not every person can be moral — and thus morality cannot possibly be defined in terms of happiness. Kant also thought that people do not truly know what will make them happy. The concept of happiness is therefore indeterminate: everyone desires it, yet no one can say with certainty what it is they really want.
Kant illustrated this with two telling examples. First, someone who seeks wealth believing it will bring happiness may discover that the pursuit produces only unhappiness, through greed, envy, and similar consequences. Second, a person who seeks knowledge may find that learning reveals how much was previously hidden, generating distress rather than satisfaction. As human beings, it is impossible for us to know with certainty which actions will bring happiness and which will bring unhappiness — to know this would require something like omniscience. The best we can do, as will be discussed below, is to learn from our own experiences.
The universal moral law, which Kant named the categorical imperative, was conceived as a basic law applicable to multifaceted and shifting circumstances. An imperative is a command that compels certain actions, and there are various types. Kant contrasted the hypothetical imperative with the moral, or categorical, imperative. A hypothetical imperative is formed in conditional terms and focuses on a final outcome. In the case of happiness, this means that a person knows certain actions will bring a desirable result and acts accordingly — for example: "If I clean my room, change my sheets, and put away my clean clothes, my mother will give me a reward."
This means that the desire to be happy carries no great moral weight and cannot serve as the measure of morality. Hypothetical imperatives cannot contain universal truths because they are based on subjective inclinations. Therefore, according to Kant's reasoning, there can be no general happiness — an antithesis to Mill's theories — because people desire different things and comprehend happiness in different ways. Hypothetical imperatives are defined by personal taste and choice and cannot be elevated to the status of a universal moral principle (Kant 2009). Happiness cannot be considered a basis for morality because the means to happiness cannot be truly known.
For Kant, there is no determining whether an action is good or right simply on the basis of one's happiness. Good or bad actions can be performed to achieve better or worse results, placing a person in a position of moral dilemma where choosing good for oneself can harm other people, and vice versa. The actions we undertake after these considerations are what Kant calls moral actions — actions where reason is responsible for the choice itself, and where the happiness of others is taken into consideration. Kant believed that humans must follow universal moral law and "act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 2009).
According to Kant, human beings are incapable of reasoning happiness to its ultimate principle. While every individual wishes for happiness, no one can ever truly know his or her genuine wishes and will. Rather than actively seeking happiness, Kant held that the moral law constructed by reason — the categorical imperative — is what a person should actively pursue. These principles constitute morality and give a person pure reason, which in turn leads to choices that bring good to others or help people improve themselves.
Kant defines happiness as a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life, which without disruption accompanies his or her whole existence. A conscious being with needs necessarily desires happiness, understood as the satisfaction of those needs. Yet happiness is not inherently good: even being worthy of happiness requires that one possess a good will. More simply stated, happiness can be attained when one lives a life guided by reason. Happiness is both too indefinite and too empirical to serve as grounds for moral obligation, and for Kant the only thing that is good without qualification is the good will itself.
Kant also stated that the only non-moral end we must will by "natural necessity" is our own happiness. Any imperative that applies to us because we will our own happiness is an assertoric imperative. However, rationality can issue no genuine imperative when the end is indeterminate — and happiness is precisely such an indeterminate end. One could suggest that to be happy, one should work hard to secure financial stability, eat well, exercise, and nurture relationships; but these are not genuine commands, since some individuals can be happy without them. Whether one could be happy without them is, at the very least, an open question.
"Pleasure and absence of pain define moral rightness"
"Maximizing happiness for all equally affected parties"
"Weighing rationalism against utilitarian accessibility"
You’re 54% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 3 sections.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.