Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform: Arguments and Effects

Introduction: Origins of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing

Mandatory minimum sentencing requirements that removed a judge's power to impose a sentence emerged in the 1960s and 1970s due to sentencing disparities stemming from unrestrained judicial power, excessive leniency, negative bias, and little guidance on appropriate punishment. These requirements were established primarily to maintain consistency within the criminal justice system, but have instead removed power from judges and placed it in the hands of prosecutors. This shift of power has not proven to be a deterrent to sentencing disparities; rather, it has caused a negative impact on the American criminal justice system and should be amended to restore some sentencing discretion to judges.

There are currently two bills with bipartisan support under consideration that attempt to support the reform of current sentencing policy: the Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, which would apply to all federal mandatory minimums, and the Smarter Sentencing Act, which would apply to federal mandatory minimums for drug offenses only (Bernick & Larkin, 2014). The Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013 would place some sentencing leniency at the judge's discretion when it is deemed that public safety would not be placed in jeopardy (Wing, 2013). The Smarter Sentencing Act addresses the issue of relatively minor drug offenses that receive decidedly harsh sentences under current regulation. While these bills are a step in the right direction, it is difficult to predict their impact and effects on the criminal justice system without also considering other factors that could contribute to or mitigate criminal behaviors.

Effects of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing

Many feel that harsh sentencing policies provide a deterrent to potential offenders by creating a sort of scare factor. The rationale is relatively simple and is based on the notion that the threat of lengthy sentences would effectively prevent certain crimes from taking place. While this logic might prove effective in some instances, it is not a uniform factor that can be relied upon solely to reduce crime or arrests, for a variety of reasons. As regulations and policies evolve, criminals and their activities do as well. Many offenders are driven by greed, necessity, or thrill — motivations that are rarely curtailed by the risk of incarceration. The prevailing mindset among many criminals is that they simply will not get caught, and they adapt their routines accordingly to ensure their activities can continue.

In other instances, criminals are ignorant of the punishment for their offenses. They may be aware that they are breaking the law, yet not know the specific sentencing measures attached to their particular crimes. As the stories and circumstances surrounding those who are caught become known, other criminals adjust their behavior so as to avoid a similar fate. This adaptive dynamic significantly limits the deterrent value of mandatory minimums.

Prison Overcrowding and Taxpayer Burdens

Another consequence of mandatory minimum sentences is seen in the dramatic growth of the U.S. federal prison population. "We now spend about $6.4 billion a year on federal prisons, about a quarter of the Justice Department's entire budget" (Leahy & Garza, 2014). The case of Weldon Angelos — a 23-year-old with no prior arrest history who was sentenced to 55 years after three occasions on which he sold approximately $350 worth of marijuana to an informant while in possession of a handgun — illustrates the taxpayer burden and prison overcrowding that mandatory minimum sentencing exacerbates. The 55-year term resulted from the compounding of the marijuana sale and illegal possession of a firearm, and will cost American taxpayers an estimated $1.5 million.

It is also important to note that prison overcrowding has effectively given rise to what is termed "prison business" — the transfer of ownership of prisons from the traditional public sector to the private sector. Private, corporate ownership of prisons is becoming far more common than it once was. Additionally, prison labor — which is essentially a form of compelled work in which inmates earn pennies — is being used to facilitate production in an increasing number of industries. These developments raise serious questions about the incentives that shape incarceration policy.

Conclusion and Future Study

Removing the power of discretion from judicial hands and handing it to the executive branch essentially converts federal prosecutors into de facto sentencers (Cassell & Luna, 2011). Many times society sees sentencing disparities between violent and nonviolent offenses due to the current minimum sentencing policy. When communities observe these disparities repeating themselves, they become suspicious of the fairness of the law and less likely to support or cooperate with law enforcement officials. Incorporating more sentencing options for judges to utilize will allow for greater discretion, which in turn can reduce the dissatisfaction felt when unduly harsh sentences are rendered.