This paper surveys four interconnected questions about collective conflict and warfare. It begins by comparing theoretical explanations for mass mobilization—including mass society theory, relative deprivation, collective behavior theory, and resource mobilization theory—arguing that recent Middle Eastern uprisings are best understood through regime structure and opportunity frameworks. The paper then outlines key analytical elements for understanding crises, draws on the UN/World Bank needs assessment approach to identify conflict factors, actors, and peace capacities. It examines how misperceptions at decision-making levels can produce both catastrophic and unexpectedly favorable outcomes, using historical examples from the Korean War and Pearl Harbor. Finally, it addresses whether a general theory of war is achievable, synthesizing Clausewitz's foundational work with contemporary scholarship to conclude that while systematic frameworks are possible, context-dependent factors inevitably constrain their universal application.
According to Jenkins (1983), social movement theory generally seeks to better understand why people become actively involved in social movements. To this end, a wide range of theoretical perspectives have been offered, including mass society theory, relative deprivation, and collective behavior theory. These were developed, Jenkins suggests, to help explain mobilization that is "generated by the structural strains of rapid social change" (1983, p. 528). Likewise, resource mobilization theory as articulated by McCarthy and Zald (1977) has been used as an alternative explanation for mass mobilization.
The recent and, in some cases, ongoing series of uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East and successful revolution in Egypt, though, suggest that mass mobilization can best be understood as a response to a crisis that presents an opportunity. In this regard, Muller and Weede suggest that regime structures offer both constraints and opportunities that tend to influence the respective potential benefits and costs that are associated with collective political action, as well as the probability that such actions will succeed. According to Jacoby (2008), these influences operate in three distinct ways as follows:
First, since mobilization depends on the coercive, normative, remunerative, and informational resources that incipient movements can extract from their settings and employ in their protests, variables such as the availability of data, the accessibility of media outlets, and the efficiency and extent of communications infrastructures can all have an important impact on collective conflict.
Second, the institutional relationship between civil groups and political elites may, through the formulation and implementation of rules and conventions, shape collective demands. As agents of social change are rendered, according to rational choice assumptions, as an exogenous variable captured by the cost function, mobilization is likely to be encouraged by conciliatory responses and impeded by reactions that are more forceful.
Third, mobilization may be affected by the presence or absence of other mobilizing groups. The perceived success of one group may exert a demonstrable influence over others, while the concurrent appearance of many such groups can help to determine the type of response preferred by the polity (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 127-128).
These three influences on mass mobilization can be seen in many civil uprisings, with an initial grassroots effort being amplified by increasing participation by others who view the event as an opportunity to improve their condition and address inequitable distributions of resources and power. For example, according to Lichbach, "Nations with an unequal distribution of income and wealth are more subject to phenomena like revolution, rebellion, civil war, terrorism, demonstrations, and coups than those with a more equal distribution. All major theorists of conflict believe that economic inequality is, at least, a potentially important cause of dissent" (1989, p. 431).
Conflicts are typically enormously complicated affairs, but there are some key elements involved in all conflicts that can be used to help understand their source and objectives. In this regard, according to the United Nations Development Group and World Bank Needs Assessment Handbook, two foundational principles guide crisis analysis: each transition situation is unique and requires context-specific analysis, and conflicts are not mono-causal phenomena but arise from a set of interconnected conflict factors and dynamics.
Therefore, three key elements are required for a timely and informed analysis of a crisis.
Understanding proximate conflict factors is critical to ensure that transition programming mitigates against the impact of violent conflict over the short term. At the same time, transition programming should be informed by an analysis of structural conflict factors in order to ensure that its inputs become assets for long-term peace building and development. This is particularly relevant as countries emerging from crisis are prone to relapse.
Conflicts are multidimensional phenomena and cannot be understood in terms of one single factor, as they result from a complex interaction and overlap of various conflict issues. It is therefore important to map out the causes and consequences of violent conflict from the perspective of various thematic dimensions: security (from state, community, and personal perspectives); political and governance issues; economic factors; and social dimensions broadly defined to include ethnographic, cultural, and religious factors.
The mapping of structural and proximate conflict factors may also be further divided into international, regional, national, sub-national, and local levels. The focus on the different levels at which conflict factors operate is essential, as it often brings out the external dimensions of what may originally be purely internal problems. Moreover, transitions usually reflect "no war, no peace" situations, where a disaggregated analysis of conflict intensity and impact is critical. Experience suggests that the sub-national level is an important level that is often neglected in conflict analysis.
The term "actors" refers to individuals, groups, and institutions engaged in and affected by conflict. People are central to understanding how groups become polarized around key conflict issues, as well as what drives the interests of those promoting violent conflict. By providing an understanding of the potential risks associated with engaging with internal and external actors, this approach may also help address the issue of "interlocutors" and "partners," with whom support agencies interact in both humanitarian and development terms during transition situations.
Actor mapping is centered on an analysis of their stated interests, hidden agendas, relationships with other actors at various levels and their perceptions of such interrelationships, the resources they currently possess to realize their agenda, and the resources they still require to realize their agenda.
The term "capacities for peace" traditionally refers to structures, mechanisms, processes, and institutions that exist in society to peacefully and constructively manage conflict. Typical examples include informal approaches to conflict resolution, the role of traditional authorities, strong civil society, a culture of tolerance, the role of the judiciary, inter-village meetings, traditional courts, and truth commissions.
Although every conflict will be unique in some fashion, applying these analytical steps to its examination will help illuminate the proximate causes, major actors, and opportunities for resolution that are involved.
On the one hand, history has shown time and again that misperceptions at the decision-making level can result in less than optimal outcomes for a variety of reasons, paramount of which is taking a course of action based on an erroneous understanding—or a complete lack of understanding—of all the factors that are involved. A good example of such a misperception leading to crisis was General Douglas A. MacArthur's prosecution of the early part of the Korean Conflict in 1953, wherein he did not believe the Chinese would intervene and assumed he would be free to occupy the entire Korean peninsula. The well-known result was hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops pouring across the North Korean border to repulse the United Nations coalition and a protracted war that still has not ended.
Similarly, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was intended to disable the United States' Pacific fleet, especially its aircraft carriers, but it only served as a catalyst for America to declare war on Japan and steel American resolve for vengeance at any cost. This is not to say that decision-makers always enjoy complete and reliable information about a given set of circumstances upon which to formulate their courses of action; however, when top-level decision-makers fail to perceive the "big picture," they run the risk of taking actions that will inevitably have unexpected and frequently adverse consequences.
On the other hand, misperceptions at top decision-making levels may have unexpected consequences that turn out favorable. In this regard, Jacoby (2008) points out that, "Misapprehensions regarding the potential costs of becoming involved might inspire zealotry and increase risk-taking, while a misleading impression of the group's internal structure can convince individuals that their participation could make a material difference to the outcome of mobilisation" (p. 130). In fact, some historians maintain that President Roosevelt knew well in advance about the Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese but chose to allow the attack to proceed because he knew it would mobilize the American public behind the war effort. However, it is doubtful that he could have foreseen the enormous consequences of United States involvement in World War II.
"Assessing Clausewitz and the limits of universal war theory"
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