Montaigne and Kant on Toleration, Identity, and Anti-Colonialism
This paper examines two philosophical traditions relevant to anti-colonialism and political toleration. Drawing on Ingrid Creppell's analysis, it explores Michel de Montaigne's argument that embodied selfhood and moral psychology provide the foundation for tolerating diverse identity groups. The paper then turns to Immanuel Kant's political philosophy, analyzing his concepts of free will, republican government, and perpetual peace as conditions for global justice. It also considers Howard Williams's critique that Enlightenment philosophers, including Kant, exhibited a condescending attitude toward non-European societies—one of the fundamental weaknesses of Enlightenment thought and its entanglement with colonial power structures.
- Introduction: Toleration and Identity Conflict: Defines toleration and its historical political context
- Montaigne's Framework for Political Toleration: Montaigne's pragmatism and skepticism as grounds for tolerance
- Embodied Identity and the Limits of Individualism: Individual selfhood balanced against social and cultural forces
- Kant's Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Politics: Kant on free will as the foundation of moral duty
- Kant on Republican Government and Perpetual Peace: Republican alliances and conditions for lasting global peace
- Enlightenment Philosophy and the Problem of Colonialism: Enlightenment's condescension toward non-European societies
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What makes this paper effective
- Connects two major philosophical traditions — Montaigne's Renaissance humanism and Kant's Enlightenment rationalism — under a unified theme of toleration and anti-colonialism.
- Uses primary and secondary sources together, citing both the original philosophers and scholarly interpreters such as Creppell, Bobbio, and Williams.
- Acknowledges the internal contradictions within each thinker's framework, such as Kant's otherwise progressive philosophy being undermined by his colonial attitudes.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative philosophical analysis: it presents each thinker's position on toleration and political order, then uses secondary scholarship (Creppell on Montaigne, Williams on Kant) to critically evaluate those positions rather than simply summarizing them. This layering of primary argument and scholarly critique is a hallmark of undergraduate-level philosophical writing.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by defining toleration and situating the problem historically. It then devotes its first major section to Montaigne — covering his pragmatism, skepticism, individualism, and embodied identity — before transitioning to Kant's moral and political philosophy: free will, republican government, and perpetual peace. The paper closes by invoking Williams's critique of Enlightenment condescension toward colonized peoples, framing that failure as a direct counterpoint to the toleration ideals discussed throughout.
Introduction: Toleration and Identity Conflict
A crucial issue among many identity groups is conflict. Toleration, by definition, is essentially the rejection of a belief or practice followed by restraint from suppressing that belief. Those seeking to address the social and political dimensions of toleration among people from different backgrounds must engage more deeply with the idea of toleration itself — what it means and what it is based on. In the sixteenth century, the primary aim was to establish conditions of harmonious living for people who held different beliefs. Thus, the most pressing issue for politicians and other thinkers was the conflict between identity groups.
The idea of toleration provides a basis for thinking differently about how to respond to such conflict. The rejection of a belief or practice, followed by restraint from suppression, is important in resolving conflicts. When communities are rallied into conflict with one another on the basis of social injustice, heresy, or ideology, merely disapproving of a practice and then allowing it is not a sufficient basis for thinking through how we should interact with others — especially if we are trying to establish social and political conditions of toleration (Creppell, 247).
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after the Reformation, when thinkers first conceptualized toleration as a political norm, its goal was to establish conditions of harmonious living for people who held different beliefs. Those who advocated for toleration did so for two reasons: first, to allow for differences, and second, to establish the right conditions for political cohesion. Many different changes helped this new political norm to survive in the long term. Would societies composed of communities with different religious backgrounds accept tolerance policies imposed by their political leaders simply for the good of the state? Yes — and one of the reasons they were able to accept toleration was a rethinking of values, that is, a change in what societies held dear. In this paper, I examine the change in moral values as the basis of political toleration, using the concepts and arguments proposed by Michel de Montaigne. One of the best ways to explore this subject is through an awareness of the value of our spiritual selves. Montaigne investigated the issue of endless political and religious conflicts in a wholly different dimension (Creppell, 248).
Montaigne's Framework for Political Toleration
Montaigne is widely recognized as one of the most impactful early advocates of tolerance and religious freedom. Four arguments have been put forward to support this claim: practicality, skepticism, self-interest, and privacy. Montaigne was principally known for his arguments for skepticism, yet, as Richard Tuck notes, skepticism is not in itself a basis for toleration. Montaigne also practiced pragmatic politics; he advocated for moderate politics rather than the extremist position of the Catholic League. He did call for tolerance of other denominations, such as Protestants in pre-civil war France (Creppell, 249). Thus, Montaigne is more accurately recognized as a father of toleration on the basis of his pragmatic mentality.
One of the main distinguishing characteristics of Western thought is the dichotomy between the person and society. Liberalism has been described, in part, as the preservation of individual thought against societal demands. In this context, Montaigne is seen as the father of individual liberty. Montaigne argued that we should make time and create a space that we can keep entirely free, and establish there our true freedom in solitude. Even though this argument appears to demonstrate Montaigne's support for individual freedom, one should approach it with some skepticism. Although an individual represents the unlimited possibilities of the self, he or she is always bound by the magnetic force of society. Society, laws, and culture are the things that make an individual unique.
Embodied Identity and the Limits of Individualism
The concept of the individual as simultaneously attached to and withdrawing from society shows that we should not define the individual's toleration by supporting only one side of the equation. Since an individual cannot entirely escape society, he or she should not attempt to use moral psychology to prevail over it (Creppell, 255). Based on this, Montaigne also argued against blind adherence to customs and laws, since he believed doing so would result in less conflict in the world. However, it is important to note that for those who observe customs almost as second nature, that observance often restrains them from attacking other communities (Creppell, 257).
The deep tolerance that Montaigne supported is anchored in the manner in which the mind travels the world, attuned to the self in the here and now. Montaigne's work did not directly and explicitly articulate a defense of toleration itself; yet all his writing is grounded in the idea of creating tolerance that would enable people of diverse backgrounds to coexist harmoniously in the same society.
Norberto Bobbio speaks of tolerance from a different perspective. He introduces a virtue he calls mitezza — meaning being actively meek and, by extension, refusing to visit violence upon anyone, letting the opposing party be themselves, not out of inaction but out of positive choice. However, Bobbio also argues that mitezza is not a political virtue, that it is in fact the direct opposite of politics (Bobbio, 17).
Some modern thinkers, such as Bodin, emphasize the use of institutions to counteract or manage divisive issues. Montaigne also suggests an ethical respect for human life and, by extension, provides a reason why we should protect it. Recognizing the embodiment of the self, and being aware and attentive to it, could give political ethics the impetus to work actively toward preserving diversity (Creppell, 271).
Works Cited
Bobbio, Norberto. "In Praise of La Mitezza." In P. Ricoeur, ed., Tolerance between Intolerance and the Intolerable. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996. Print.
Creppell, Ingrid. "Montaigne: The Embodiment of Identity as Grounds for Toleration." Res Publica 7.3 (2001): 247–271.
Kant, Immanuel. "Toward Perpetual Peace." Practical Philosophy 8 (1996): 836.
Williams, Howard. "Colonialism in Kant's Political Philosophy." Diametros 39 (2014): 154–181.
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