This article review examines a Wall Street Journal report on three Brooklyn men arrested for attempting to provide material support to ISIS, using group behavior theory to analyze online radicalization dynamics. The paper applies interpersonal and collective behavior concepts to terrorist networks operating primarily through digital platforms, exploring how anonymity and online group contexts may amplify extreme rhetoric compared to face-to-face interactions. It also considers potential tensions between law enforcement objectives and civil liberties, including free speech concerns and the role of confidential informants in shaping suspect behavior. The analysis reveals the complexity of distinguishing genuine terrorist intent from performative group rhetoric in online spaces.
On February 26, 2015, the Wall Street Journal published an article by Pervaiz Shallwani, Rebecca Davis O'Brien, and Andrew Grossman titled "Three Brooklyn Men Arrested and Accused of Plot to Join Islamic State." The article reports that the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL, has successfully leveraged the internet to spread propaganda and recruit supporters from across the world. In response, U.S. law enforcement agencies have intensified efforts to prevent Americans from joining extremist groups in the Middle East or providing support to such organizations domestically. Top law-enforcement officials have publicly identified ISIS as one of the most significant threats to U.S. national security.
The article specifically covers three individuals arrested for attempting and conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. If convicted, each faces a potential prison sentence of fifteen years. While global efforts continue to combat material support to terrorist organizations, the article notes that more than three thousand European citizens have traveled to Syria since 2012 to join extremist groups, with many of those who returned subsequently arrested and charged with terrorism. The three men arrested in the United States had made public statements of support for ISIS and expressed intentions to carry out terrorist activities. One individual offered on a website to assassinate the President and become a martyr, while another announced plans online to carry out a bombing attack at Coney Island amusement park in Brooklyn.
This article was selected for review because it provides an opportunity to apply interpersonal and group behavior theory to terrorist networks. Much of the activity described appears to be conducted primarily online, with ISIS recruiting supporters through webpages, social media platforms, and chat rooms. Despite the digital nature of these interactions, online communities engaged in extremist recruitment can still be understood as groups subject to observable group behavioral patterns.
A central question emerges: would these individuals actually carry out the violent acts they discuss online? Group psychology research suggests that people often express statements in collective contexts that they would not voice in isolation. The individual arrested for announcing plans to kill the President may not have genuinely intended to do so, yet a federal law explicitly prohibits plotting against the sitting president. Conversely, announcing a plan to bomb a public venue raises distinct free speech considerations that complicate legal interpretation.
The sports fan analogy illuminates this tension. Members of fan clubs frequently make hyperbolic statements such as "go kill the other team" or "I'm going to kill that referee"—rhetoric that reflects the escalatory dynamics of group enthusiasm rather than literal intent. When a sports fan makes such comments, they are typically understood as exaggeration within a normative group context and rarely treated as genuine death threats. Yet when identical linguistic and rhetorical patterns appear in groups associated with terrorism, even peripherally, participants face severe criminal penalties—regardless of whether they possessed authentic plans to support terrorist organizations or were primarily engaging in performative group discourse.
The disparity in legal response to identical rhetoric depending on context raises important civil liberties questions. One complicating factor is the role of law enforcement's use of confidential informants in counterterrorism investigations. Critics have argued that informant-led operations can be problematic because confidential sources may actively shape suspect behavior rather than merely observe it. An informant functioning as a facilitator can enable group productivity and planning in ways that would not occur organically, thereby potentially inducing the very conduct that law enforcement seeks to prevent.
This dynamic mirrors the group behavior observed among the suspects themselves. Just as members of terrorist networks may escalate rhetoric and intentions through peer reinforcement, law enforcement teams pursuing terrorism cases operate as institutional groups with their own dynamics, hierarchies, and incentive structures. Members of law enforcement agencies may be motivated to make arrests and achieve measurable results—metrics that demonstrate productivity and advancement within their organizations—potentially creating pressure to prosecute borderline cases or to use investigative techniques that blur the line between surveillance and entrapment.
The tension between national security imperatives and constitutional protections thus operates on two levels: among suspected extremists online and within the law enforcement apparatus itself. Both groups can exhibit dynamics that amplify rhetoric, increase commitment to stated objectives, and potentially distort the actual intentions and capabilities of individual members.
The article's relevance extends to understanding how groups organize and communicate in digital spaces. Online groups likely exhibit different behavioral dynamics than face-to-face collectives. The anonymity and physical distance afforded by digital platforms appear to reduce self-censorship, enabling individuals to express more extreme positions than they would articulate in person, where direct eye contact and social accountability operate as behavioral moderators.
This disinhibition effect—the tendency for online users to express themselves with less restraint than in physical settings—may explain why the rhetoric in these terrorist-adjacent networks escalates so rapidly. Yet the legal system has not yet fully integrated this understanding into prosecutorial frameworks or sentencing guidelines, creating a mismatch between the actual psychological and social dynamics of online group behavior and the assumptions embedded in criminal law.
A reciprocal application of group behavior theory illuminates law enforcement operations. The FBI and other investigative agencies can be understood as groups with institutional incentives, hierarchies, and social dynamics. Within these organizations, individual agents may be motivated by career advancement, arrest statistics, and the desire to be recognized as productive team members. These institutional pressures can influence investigative decisions and prosecutorial strategies in ways that parallel how group dynamics shape extremist rhetoric online.
The analogy extends further: both the suspected terrorists and the investigators can be conceptualized as opposing groups in a high-stakes competitive dynamic. Where sports fans might exaggerate claims about rival teams, both extremists and law enforcement personnel may develop distorted perceptions of the other side's capabilities, intentions, and commitment. The stakes are dramatically higher in a counterterrorism context, but the underlying group psychological mechanisms—in-group loyalty, out-group perception, escalatory rhetoric—operate similarly.
"Assessing article's factual approach and analytical gaps"
You’re 82% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 1 section.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.