Organized Crime in America: History, Structure, and Ethnicity

Introduction: Organized Crime and American Society

Organized crime underwrites much of the political, social, and economic history of America. What has often been mentioned in passing as legitimate business activity can — and often should — be reframed as organized crime, including the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the colonial mercantilism that it supported (Woodiwiss, 2003). When organized crime is taken out of its Hollywood context, which portrays it as an immigrant problem, certain patterns emerge that clarify its function and structure in America. As scholars have observed, organized crime tends to flourish in "societies that experience rapid and intense social change" (Albini et al., 1995, p. 213). This is why the United States has been a hotbed of organized crime in various manifestations throughout its history. In only a few hundred years, the United States went from colonial outpost to global superpower — and rapid change and cultural transformation foment organized crime, as does the influx of immigrants who transform the political, social, and economic landscape of the nation.

Although organized crime deserves to be examined through the lens of criminal justice, a structural-functionalist sociological framework provides a more meaningful and helpful analysis that can shed light on the future of public policy. Past policies attempting to address the problems associated with organized crime — such as threats to public safety, violence, extortion, fraud, and theft — may miss some of the bigger picture. The history of organized crime in the United States is as rich, varied, and nuanced as the nation itself.

According to Lyman and Potter (2000), the problems associated with organized crime include damage to the taxpayer system, increased costs of law enforcement, violence, and the exploitation of the underclass. However, the function of organized crime is often to mitigate perceived social ills. Organized crime in the United States has assumed several forms and functions. One of those functions has been to provide a proxy social, political, and economic system for disenfranchised communities. Another has been to participate in a liminal capitalist market system. Not all manifestations of organized crime were entirely lawless, either. As Woodiwiss (2003) points out, organized crime facilitated corporate power and fostered the growth of market capitalism in the United States. What might be called gray or black market activity through the benefit of hindsight would have been considered legitimate, or at least condoned, business dealings in the past.

Corporate Power, the Robber Barons, and the Origins of Organized Crime

The Vanderbilts, Rockefellers, Carnegies, Stanfords, and other major names in American corporate history — families that built some of the nation's proudest and most enduring institutions and enterprises — were "ruthless" and used "violent and corrupt means" to achieve their goals of acquiring wealth and power (Mallory, 2012, p. 18). The Robber Barons of American history are in many ways no different from corporate America in the twenty-first century and its collusion with government (Mallory, 2012).

One of the methods by which nineteenth-century capitalist enterprise operated was to infiltrate multiple domains of economic, political, and social power. "Although decisions and responsibilities were still concentrated at the top of corporate hierarchies, the complicated and fragmented new bureaucratic arrangements had the effect of making accountability for illegal or harmful activities more complicated" (p. 107). A hallmark of organized crime, therefore, is the confluence of different types of power — not only official posts held in government, but actual methods of wielding power, including the dominance of the economy. With the profit motive, the ideal of individualism, and the American Dream firmly entrenched in the public consciousness, organized crime could flourish relatively untouched.

A mistrust of big government and anti-federalist policies further entrenched organized crime models into the American economy and political system throughout much of the nation's history. Organized crime initially flourished because of two seemingly contradictory elements: too little government intervention and too much government collusion with big business. What was needed was a radical shift in public values.

Legislation, Immigration, and the Shifting Definition of Organized Crime

It was not until the end of the First World War that American social norms shifted toward an appreciation for government and good governance, largely due to the need for a more concentrated and pointed means of dealing with some of the ill effects of organized crime (Woodiwiss, 2003). The term "organized crime" was a new one, reflective of a new civic ethic in which government would champion the rights of the people. Lyman and Potter (2000) trace the origin of the term to the Chicago Commission of Inquiry in 1915. The term had appeared in the late nineteenth century, but "serious efforts to define and discuss it as a distinct problem" began only in the 1920s and 1930s (Woodiwiss, 2003, p. 227). It would not be until the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act that the federal government defined and operationalized specific elements falling within the rubric of organized crime, such as racketeering.

Organized crime became a symbol of illegitimate power and authority. Subsequent to the first wave of laws denouncing organized crime, corporations in America shifted their methodologies, pushing organized crime in its more formal sense to the fringes of the marketplace and political arenas. The segregation of legitimate and illegitimate business activities is a relatively new development in American history. Prior to the First World War, the lines between legitimate and illegitimate business — between that which harmed people and that which benefited the dominant culture — were blurred. African Americans, Native Americans, and all other disenfranchised groups had always been victims of violence, coercion, intimidation, and subordination that fall squarely under the rubric of organized crime. Unemployment, lack of housing, disenfranchisement, and anomie allowed organized crime to flourish especially well in disadvantaged communities (Mallory, 2012).

Following the First World War, a few important shifts in public consciousness emerged, coinciding with serious changes in American demographic and cultural history. The most important of these was a change in immigration patterns, which enabled the scapegoating of immigrant groups. Organized crime had been indigenously American, rooted in the American Dream and the expansion of white capitalist culture. Starting in the early to mid-twentieth century, however, organized crime became framed as an immigrant issue — "an outside threat to otherwise sound U.S. laws and institutions" (p. 227). The fear-mongering that enabled xenophobia and prejudice thus became part and parcel of anti-organized crime discourse. As Albanese (2011) points out, organized crime is "interethnic," and "ethnicity is not a very powerful explanation for the existence of organized crime" (p. 12). Rather, organized crime is better understood as a reaction to market forces and opportunities. Structural-functionalism provides a valid framework for understanding organized crime, even as conflict and strain theories likewise explain some of the ways organized crime has functioned and flourished.

Large and rapid influxes of new immigrants led to the types of social change that fertilize the seeds of organized crime. The Irish immigrant influx following the potato famine in the nineteenth century led to millions of Irish people coalescing in small geographic zones. As a result, the Irish "established their own neighborhoods and, with their large ethnic vote, established the corrupt political machine, which allowed them to control both the legal and illegal enterprises of the cities where they settled" (Mallory, 2012, p. 19). Similar patterns emerged in other ethnic communities.

Unfortunately, the oversimplification of organized crime and the racist discourse surrounding it has also led to a "dumbing down" of the rhetoric and legislation used to address the very real problems that organized crime creates (Woodiwiss, 2003). The most significant modern manifestation of this dynamic is the war on drugs, which should have dismantled itself peacefully, as did alcohol prohibition. Instead, the war on drugs has bolstered organized crime syndicates. The war on drugs has technically been waged since the passing of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, which gave rise to "nationally organized crime groups" and massive police complicity in them (Mallory, 2012). From 1920 to 1933, alcohol prohibition provided "another market opportunity for expansion of organized crime in the United States" (Mallory, 2012, p. 22). The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution enabled a thirteen-year flourishing of the black-market alcohol trade. The Wickersham Commission in 1931 studied the impact of prohibition on criminal activity, and the Twenty-First Amendment ultimately repealed the Eighteenth. Yet drug prohibition remains in place.

Italian Mafia: Cosa Nostra, 'Ndrangheta, and Camorra

Already engaged in the drug trade, organized crime syndicates had by this time developed the hierarchical organizational structure for which they are renowned and which has been frequently depicted in film and television. Interestingly, Mallory (2012) credits Arnold Rothstein and Jewish organized crime syndicates with developing the "modern bureaucratic structure" of the organized crime group (p. 22). A significant development in organized crime business models was their straddling of the legitimate-illegitimate line. While generating significant income from illicit trades like drugs and alcohol, organized crime businesses also engaged in legitimate activities — not only as a means of money laundering. The infiltration of labor unions by organized crime syndicates became a core feature of early twentieth-century business models, enabling near-total control of the capitalist enterprise. In other words, the entire system could be on the syndicate's payroll: workers, police, politicians, judges, and traffickers.

According to Lyman and Potter (2000), the primary attributes of organized crime groups include a non-ideological mission, distinguishing them from some terrorist groups that have explicit political goals. Other qualities include hierarchical structures and limited or exclusive membership, the specifics of which depend on the group. Division of labor and other features are not necessarily inherent to organized crime but may be present due to their business models and adherence to the basic tenets of capitalism. Like all capitalist enterprise, organized crime provides services and goods for profit and may engage in practices like extortion or corruption as a means of achieving profit and maintaining market dominance. Like legitimate businesses, organized crime enterprises work with contractors who provide ancillary services — legal counsel, protection, and the support of community and business leaders.

Mafia is deeply rooted in the culture and history of Italy. Woodiwiss (2003) traces organized crime there to Roman times. Competitive survival in hostile environments, a view of masculinity that depends on "noncooperation with authorities," and of course the concept of the vendetta are all inextricably entwined with Italian identities (Abadinsky, 2013, p. 106). Likewise, the concept of the famiglia — an extended family that goes well beyond the American notion of the nuclear family and includes a community kinship bond — has underwritten the evolution of Italian organized crime.

Italian organized crime centers largely on what is known as the Mezzogiorno, literally meaning "midday" but a colloquialism for Southern Italy. Highlighting the sociological underpinnings of organized crime, Southern Italy had been oppressed politically, socially, and economically for centuries. A feudal system remained entrenched in Southern Italy long after it had been dismantled in the north, and even after the unification of Italy, economic development has lagged and continues to lag there (Abadinsky, 2013). Moreover, the regions of Southern Italy were also the most resistant to the nationalist spirit and did not want to be part of the Italian nation-state (Abadinsky, 2013). Given the pernicious efficacy of the age-old concepts of famiglia and indifference to authority, it is unsurprising that the Italian Mafia was born and bred in the south.

Ironically — or perhaps predictably — attempts to economically rejuvenate the south have led only to further Mafia infiltration of legitimate business and government enterprises. Mafia groups have controlled public contracts either through "dummy companies" or subcontracting schemes, and the phenomenon has become so widespread as to have spread into areas that had never before been under Mafia control (Abadinsky, 2013). The three most significant Italian organized crime groups are the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, and the Neapolitan Camorra. Each operates transnationally and each has a bearing on the United States. Of these three, the Cosa Nostra has had the longest and most serious legacy in American organized crime. The Camorra's jurisdiction has remained more solidly tied to the Old World and has expanded deeply into the Balkans, while the 'Ndrangheta has operated internationally with impunity and has extended into the United States. All three groups trace their history to roughly the same period: Italian unification. Other Italian Mafia groups include the Apulian Sacra Corona Unita and a newer Sicilian group, La Stidda (Snow, 2013).

The Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta share a common sociological history and grounding. Both represent the "outgrowth of a section of the middle class which had been licensed to use violence by the ruling classes of the day and were founded on codes of honor, secrecy, and silence" (Abadinsky, 2013, p. 107). The Camorra, by contrast, was "an association of the poorest classes for whom crime was a means of survival and was neither secretive nor elitist" (Abadinsky, 2013, p. 107). The latter is best framed in terms of conflict theory, showing how economically and politically disenfranchised groups use crime as a means of gaining power. All Italian Mafia groups have served as liaisons between various stakeholders in the public and private sectors. The Cosa Nostra's reputation for ruthless violence was not surpassed until the 1980s, with the rise of the Colombian drug cartels (Varese, 2011).

The primary distinguishing feature between the Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta is the role of bloodlines and kinship structure. Within the Mafia (Cosa Nostra), the famiglia is not only permitted to be a loosely defined structure independent of bloodline — it is strongly suggested that not too many members of the same family join the crime group, ostensibly to prevent conflicts of interest and consolidations of power and to offer tacit protection against the obliteration of entire bloodlines (Varese, 2011). With the 'Ndrangheta, by contrast, bloodlines are crucial and membership is bestowed only upon those within the actual family tree. There have been "significantly fewer defections" versus the Cosa Nostra because of the importance of keeping operations within the family (Varese, 2011). In other words, a person is less likely to confess or become an informant if doing so means bringing down brothers, sisters, wives, mothers, and grandchildren. According to Varese (2011), the Camorra has a similar structure to the 'Ndrangheta. Family ties have allowed 'Ndrangheta operations to be relatively successful across disparate regions including the United States, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France, and Australia (Varese, 2011).

For an immigrant Mafia group to be successful, it must fully understand its target market and all situational variables. The Mafia accomplished this in the United States by building generations of contacts in the new world while maintaining connections with the old. Varese (2011) credits information gathering, the development of strong social ties, and robust social networks as cornerstones of business success in organized crime. As in the old country, Mafia groups provided valuable services and products to their clientele. In addition to providing in-demand goods not available on the white market — such as drugs or prostitution — Mafia organizations provided intangible but invaluable services like "extralegal governance" in the form of "protection" (Varese, 2011, p. 6). Protection might be from police harassment, theft, or unions. The target market for such services tacitly supports the existence of organized crime in their communities because the relationship becomes symbiotic.

When politically, economically, and socially disenfranchised groups do not receive legal protection or economic resources, organized crime can step in as a proxy for legitimate power. Because the Mafia arose in Sicily directly as a result of "weak central government" and mistrust of the new centralized government in Rome in the nineteenth century, new manifestations of Cosa Nostra in the United States arose in communities with similarly loose infrastructures (Albanese, 2011, p. 96). One of the core functions of all three main Italian Mafia groups was to broker deals that could not otherwise be made due to weak enforcement of contract and other law (Albanese, 2011; Varese, 2011). So powerful and influential had the Cosa Nostra become in Italy and the United States that "it may be described as a private government of organized crime" (Albanese, 2011, p. 108). When Cosa Nostra launched subsidiary groups in the United States, preexisting social ties and networks were easily established and entrenched.

Conclusion: Sociological Frameworks and Policy Implications

Russian organized crime in a way signals a backslide toward the robber baron days of American history. The Russian model is all-encompassing and morally ambiguous. While there may be signs that some Russian companies seek distance from the Mafia in order to gain full acceptance in the legitimate global marketplace, the illegitimate marketplace continues to provide ample opportunities for business growth. Because many Russian organized crime syndicates maintain links to Russia, it may be difficult for American law enforcement to dismantle their American counterparts, such as those that operate in areas with large Russian communities like Brighton Beach.

Like Asian, Italian, and any other type of organized crime — such as motorcycle gangs or Colombian drug cartels — organized crime can be understood well within a structural-functionalist framework. Organized crime is often a result of either too much or too little state intervention. Too much state intervention, as seen with the war on drugs, can lead to problematic organized crime by generating lucrative black markets. Too little state intervention can equally enable organized crime to flourish. Organized crime syndicates are often "outlets for political frustration" (Nicaso & Lamothe, 2006, p. 82), allowing disenfranchised groups to create and maintain power while undermining legitimate authority.

Organized crime often blossoms where even non-members benefit indirectly. In both Italy and Russia, the organized crime syndicate delivers goods and services that would have otherwise been unavailable, and the same is true for their clientele in the new world. Any attempt to subvert organized crime in the United States depends on a thorough understanding of its mechanisms, forms, and functions in the community.