Pacific Rim Relations: Asia, America, and Shifting Power

Introduction: The Rising Importance of the Pacific Rim

In recent years, the importance of Southeast Asia has been increasing steadily. Thanks in large part to the rapid economic advancement of the region — which began with Japan, moved to Korea and Taiwan, and is currently being seen in China — this is an area in which Western countries are showing increasing interest. As a result, it is worth examining the relationships between countries in the region, the changing way in which America views those nations, and the evolution of American ties with the Pacific Rim as a whole.

Traditionally, the major power in the region has been Japan. Due to its economic might, Japan has been the major contributor to regional development and a significant voice in both local and global politics. In recent years, China has also taken a more active role in both economic and political arenas, meaning that the power structure of the area has been subject to considerable change. Furthermore, many of the smaller nations — such as Taiwan and Korea — also make major contributions to the sociopolitical structure of the area, due to their historic interactions with the major nations and with each other.

Sino-Japanese Relations: Economic Interdependence and Historical Tensions

The recent economic rise of China has had a growing impact on Japanese perceptions and expectations for the future. A 1995 poll found that 16 percent of the Japanese people already regarded China as the strongest economic power in the world, while a further 66 percent predicted that China would be the strongest economic power by 2015. At the same time, many Japanese people have doubts about China's prospective political stability, and about how this might affect Japan (Shuja, 2000). When these perceptions are combined with the historic relationship between the two nations and their current interaction, they suggest that the coming years will be very consequential for the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations.

Recent Sino-Japanese cooperation on regional affairs seems aimed at promoting Japan's bid for a role as regional leader. Tokyo has expressed its interest in becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council in order to upgrade its international standing to a level commensurate with its economic status (Shuja, 2000). This is a privilege China already enjoys, and China could therefore be a valuable ally to Japan in lobbying for a similar position.

To aid this ambition, Japan has been using its economic might to help China in its development as an economic power. This began with Japan resuming official development assistance (ODA) to China in 1990 (Shuja, 2000). Other reasons for providing such assistance include a desire to help prevent China from suffering long-term isolation and resulting instability, as well as the desire to encourage a healthy interdependence between the two countries. Such a relationship would be very lucrative for Japan, since close ties with China would allow it to benefit from that nation's economic growth.

The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has also reinforced the importance of Sino-Japanese economic relations as the specter of trading blocs looms in the wake of the strengthening European Union and the development of similar blocs in the Americas. Increasingly, the economy of southern China has become more integrated with those of Hong Kong and Taiwan as overseas Chinese capital returns to China with the gradual opening of Chinese markets. Given the large investments by Japanese corporations in companies operating in these regions, this has led to rapidly growing economic interdependence between Japan and China. China is now Japan's second most important export market after the United States, and Japan has surpassed Hong Kong as the most important market for Chinese exports. Japan is also the fourth-largest investor in China — after Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States respectively — and the most important provider of official economic assistance to China in the form of ODA grants (Shuja, 2000).

Beijing can take advantage of Japan's strong presence in international financial institutions and use Tokyo as a mediator in supporting Chinese interests in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This suggests Beijing's efforts to receive every possible kind of help from Japan and the West in its modernization goals. It is reasonable to conclude that economic gain, rather than political influence, has become the main motive behind China's recent friendlier attitudes toward Japan (Shuja, 2000).

Fortunately, the interests of China and Japan appear complementary in many areas. While China is a permanent United Nations Security Council member, it remains a developing country economically. Although Japan is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it is a major player in WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a member of the G-7 group of industrialized nations. As a result, the two nations could use each other to realize their respective individual ambitions (Shuja, 2000).

However, the legacy of World War II continues to have repercussions on the bilateral relationship. The resentment felt against Japan among ordinary Chinese citizens remains very strong, even though relations between the two countries are currently amicable. Many Japanese tourists to China realize that Japan and the Japanese are not very well liked there, despite the extensive technical and financial assistance Japan provides. In addition, some Japanese find doing business in China more difficult because of their nationality. While often outside the realm of government control, these misgivings could still be a source of diplomatic tension. Historical legacies may therefore put a damper on the Sino-Japanese partnership (Shuja, 2000).

Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: Regional Dynamics

Having examined the relationship between the two major powers in the area, it is also useful to consider the relationships between these nations and their neighbors. Japan has always regarded Korea as critical to its own security; it fought two wars — with China and Russia — to secure control over the Korean Peninsula in the early years of the twentieth century. The Koreans, however, have not appreciated Japanese interest in the Peninsula.

The era of Japanese colonial domination has left deep-seated bitterness toward the former colonial oppressor, and that feeling is reciprocated in Japan. Public opinion polls in both nations consistently indicate mutual dislike between their peoples. South Koreans rank Japan as one of the countries they like least, second only to North Korea, while the Japanese rank South Korea third on their list of most-disliked nations, behind only North Korea and Russia. Koreans believe that the Japanese look down upon the Korean people and their culture, citing Japanese treatment of their own ethnic Korean population as indicative of that contempt (Shuja, 1999).

The security interests of Korea and Japan are also not identical. South Korea is primarily concerned with the threat posed by the North. South Koreans do not see Russia as a direct threat, but only as a secondary adversary due to its association with North Korea. Indeed, in the absence of a threat from Russia, South Korean security concerns would more likely focus on Japan. Japan, on the other hand, perceived the U.S.S.R. as a primary direct threat and, in the post-Cold War era, continues to regard Russia with suspicion as a potential future adversary. North Korea is not seen as a real independent threat to Japan.

Today, South Korea and Japan are bound together by geography, economics, and mutual ties to the United States, while Japanese trade, investment, and technology are vital to the South Korean economy. In turn, U.S. forces based in Japan are critical to South Korean security. For all of this, Japan and Korea remain uneasy associates rather than true allies.

The same cannot be said, however, of the relationship between China and Taiwan. The government in Taiwan was initially made up of Chinese nationalists who fled there following the Communist revolution. The initial mandate of that administration was to return to mainland China and regain control of the nation from the Communists. This ambition was gradually replaced by a focus on the island itself, particularly on its economic development. Taiwan's government became democratically elected, and foremost on recent political platforms has been the issue of greater autonomy — or even complete independence — from the mainland. In recent years, native Taiwanese elements have taken control of the island's politics, and descendants of immigrants from mainland China also consider themselves Taiwanese (Yu, 2001). China, on the other hand, continues its rhetoric of threatening reunification by force.

Conclusion: A Region in Transition

Recent years have brought some major changes to the Pacific Rim. The region has endured considerable adversity, including prolonged recessions and political upheavals, while also experiencing rapid economic development that once made it the global model for growth. At the same time, America has gone through significant domestic trauma that has prompted a reassessment of its relationships with nations around the world.

As a result of this reassessment, there have been many changes in the way America perceives the nations of the Pacific Rim. Some of these changes have been more obvious and far-reaching than others, but all of them will contribute to a significant realignment of relationships within the region. Over the coming years, the relationships among nations in this area — and between those nations and America — will be tested and placed under considerable pressure. It is only when subjected to that pressure that the new face of the region will truly come to light.

Sources

Shuja, Sharif M. "Tokyo-Beijing Relations in the New Millennium." Contemporary Review, November 2000.

Shuja, Sharif M. "Japan's Asia Policy." Contemporary Review, May 1999.

Yu, Peter Kien-hong. "Taiwan and Mainland China." Contemporary Review, June 2001.

Weidenbaum, Murray N. "United States-China-Taiwan: A Precarious Triangle." Challenge, September 2000.

Eberstadt, Nicholas. "Our Other Korea Problem." The National Interest, Fall 2002.