Power-Conflict Theory: A Critical Analysis of Coleman

Introduction: Coleman's Framework

Coleman (2006) has done a great service to the community of scholarship by bringing together a number of views of power. He provides summaries of these views in an attempt to formulate a helpful rubric for understanding power-conflict dynamics. Almost two thirds of his important article is taken up with a presentation of power, while the last third tackles conflict dynamics and resolution. The emphasis is clear: Coleman wants to insert power into the conflict equation. He is driven by the following concern: "Because of its ubiquity, it is paramount that when we address conflict, we consider power" (2006, p. 121). He addresses this issue by reviewing existing notions of power, first at the level of definition, and next at the level of components (personal and environmental). He then elaborates six principles for power-conflict dynamics before moving into some implications for training in conflict resolution.

While appreciating the many valid arguments in Coleman's article, this essay will take issue with it on a number of points. It will attempt fairly to assess the definition of power he uses. It will work toward a critical assessment of the dynamic principles Coleman's discussion engenders. Finally, by proposing a hypothetical situation at the end, it will attempt to show the limitations of the current interactionist perspective when it fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of language or silence in conflict dynamics, and of non-power-based situations on the part of one of the participants.

Power in Coleman's Position

The significance of power for grasping conflict is not a new perspective. Coleman is not claiming that it is, although at the end he suggests that perhaps "the time is ripe for a new approach to power" (p. 140). He views power as important enough to warrant renewed emphasis, and his article aims to fill that gap. Yet he recognizes that the construct of power is abstract and ambiguous (p. 121). Therefore, he tries to find a working definition that will be analytically comprehensive and practically useful. His initial definition follows Follett's work: "I begin by defining power generally as the ability to make things happen or to bring about desired outcomes" (p. 121). This definition gives him a clear and functional concept, while not escaping the generality that is essential to any comprehensive definition of a force.

A couple of things are crucial about this definition. First, it gives power a causal ability. One cannot have passive power by this definition (which is not the same as the potential or resources for power). If one cannot "make things happen," one has no power. Second, this initial definition is goal-oriented: Coleman sees power in terms of outcomes, making it inescapably teleological.

The advantages of this definition are several. In Coleman's view, it "avoids the common misconception that power is fundamentally competitive and coercive" (p. 121). Part of his article's point is to combat this limited view with a more expansive understanding. This definition views power not as a scarce resource, he argues, but as an inextinguishable one (p. 122) — not a finite quantity, like land or oil. Power cannot be captured and owned to the exclusion of others; it is vast, changing, and infinite. This means there is no monopoly on power, and that power can be held and wielded by everyone. Another advantage is that this definition is not pinned to a specific location, nor is it conceived of as a one-way flow (p. 122). Coleman conceives of power as decentralized and interchangeable within mutual interaction. As one will see, his definition undergoes refinement as he wades through other approaches to power and incorporates them into his final concept.

Not content simply to rest on his own definition, Coleman introduces several other approaches. One can assume that the research summaries he presents fall within the bounds of his own acceptance. One key strand of argument is: "Power, therefore, is determined not only by the characteristics of the person or persons involved in any given situation, nor solely by the characteristics of the situation, but by the interaction of these two sets of factors" (p. 122). Clearly, then, Coleman supports an interactionist view (following Deutsch). Power is not strictly an individual quality but is also a situational quality, dependent on how interaction unfolds between participants in conflict.

Two other strands of argument are discernible. First, power shifts occur within three interrelated realms: the personal, the relational, and the environmental (p. 123). A gain in one area may mean a gain or a loss in another. Second, Coleman clearly adopts the distinction between primary and secondary power developed by Deutsch. Primary power refers to "the ability to affect those activities (the law, the media, policies, and so on) that define the domain" (p. 123). Primary power sets up the field rules by which the game — secondary power — is played. It defines the ideology and supporting myths of a culture or situation and constrains the possible moves available to secondary power. Coleman writes, "Only once the domain has been defined does it become possible for power as conceived of in a conventional sense to be exercised" (p. 124). Yet primary power is not immutable; secondary power can overtake it through revolutions. This points to something important in Coleman's view: primary power is not concrete but is socially constructed, resting on consensus rather than objectivity.

As he begins reflecting on the components of power, he adjusts his definition toward greater specificity: "It [power] can be usefully conceptualized as the ability (or the perception of the ability) to leverage relevant resources in a specific situation in order to effectively achieve personal, relational, or environmental goals, often through using various strategies and channels of influence of both a primary and secondary nature" (p. 125). The teleological focus remains, but he has now assimilated the notion of situation (context), expanded on the notion of goals, refined the levels of power, and included the practical methods by which power comes into actual being.

Coleman then attempts to clarify the factors that orient a person to power in situations of conflict. These are personal and environmental, and their influence is great since they determine a person's behavioral patterns in social situations. Using McClelland's framework, for example, a person can approach power through support, autonomy, assertion, or togetherness (p. 126). A person could maintain an authoritarian framework, or one in which they need power (p. 127). They could approach power relations through various ideological frames — unitary, radical, or pluralistic (p. 128). Coleman's conclusion is that these different factors, as well as environmental factors such as culture, social roles, and hierarchical structures, must be considered when thinking about conflict dynamics and resolution.

Dynamic Conflict in Coleman's Position

In Coleman's account, conflict seems like the vessel within which the liquids of power swirl. He states, "Power is commonly used in conflict as leverage for achieving one's goals" (p. 120). He says that power influences the types of conflicts available to wage (p. 120), and that "conflict is often a means of seeking or maintaining the balance or imbalance of power in relationships" (p. 120). In other words, the motion of power is what makes conflict dynamic. One power can move against or away from another. One power can merge with another. While the total amount of power in conflict stays constant, its density and weight can sway one way or another. This interaction or exchange leads either to equilibrium between the wielders of power, or to disequilibrium and imbalance.

How do the dynamics actually play out? From the beginning, Coleman speaks of "strategies and tactics employed" (p. 121). Power is no static element — it is a force that can be manipulated and wielded as if in contest. Those in conflict maneuver their power, whatever it may be, into positions of leverage. These maneuverings can be defensive or offensive, cooperative or coercive. Much depends on the availability of power given the social situation.

Coleman's description of potential power, or the availability of power, is useful here. He places the dynamics of power use in the context of resources, writing frequently of "potential power," "resources for power," "tools available to influence one's environment," and "sources of influence." Power can only be used if there are available resources for its exertion. It is the situation, as Coleman sees it, that determines to a large extent what kind of resources are available and in what quantity. For example, wealth is a resource; in a given situation, one party may have wealth while the other does not, giving the wealthier party more resources with which to influence power dynamics.

Coleman's presentation ultimately aims at aiding those who wish for a "constructive resolution" to conflict (p. 121). To this end, he designates a series of "principles of power-conflict dynamics" that are "grounded in the assumption that power differences affect conflict processes, which in turn can affect power differences" (p. 133). His attempt is to synthesize all this information into effective principles. The following section presents a critical interpretation of their validity.

Conclusion

This essay has explored Coleman's insightful theory of power-conflict dynamics. Much of his summary of research has merit, and his attempt at a more expansive view of conflict using new power conceptualizations is an admirable contribution to interaction theory. At the same time, a lack of coherence was found between the power sections of his essay and the conflict principles section, due to his sometimes inadequate assimilation of the two. Several of the principles were questioned as to their accuracy, and a number of limitations were identified by reference to alternative examples not drawn from the text.

The final hypothetical example of the solitary artist reveals a further possible limitation of the interactionist perspective in terms of its comprehensiveness. In addition, it emphasizes the role of communication — specifically language and silence — in conflict. Coleman's view does not go far enough in emphasizing this role. Power-conflict dynamics are possible in an interactionist framework only if there is communication. In an example where one party resists communicating, the conflict exists but the silent party stands outside the bounds of primary power, and thus somehow outside the conflict itself. Non-communication can thus contribute to a form of non-power-based conflict. Such cases are difficult to analyze using interactionist assumptions in which the communicatory process is not fully appreciated. By failing to elaborate on this important connection, Coleman's view shows itself to lack the full complexity it desires.

References

Coleman, P. T. (2006). Power and conflict. In M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, & E. C. Marcus (Eds.), The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice (pp. 120–141). San Francisco, CA: John Wiley.