This paper analyzes rail security in the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks, exploring how increased demand for rail transportation has made the industry a potential target for terrorist activity. The paper examines the historical shift from law enforcement concerns (robbery and pilferage) to modern homeland security threats, evaluates current security measures at rail yards, commuter stations, and long-haul passenger trains, and assesses cargo security protocols for hazardous materials. It argues that while federal agencies have implemented voluntary security action items, a comprehensive rail security strategy comparable to aviation security is needed to protect vulnerable access points, densely populated transit corridors, and critical infrastructure, particularly in the Northeast.
The railroad was once the primary mode of domestic transportation in the United States. Its dominance eventually waned because railroad owners attempted to monopolize the transportation industry. However, increased demand for products has spurred renewed demand for secure transportation networks in the post-September 11, 2001 world, where transportation infrastructure has become a target of choice for terrorists. The transportation network within the United States and internationally facilitates the intermodal transfer and delivery of services, goods, passengers, and materials as part of the national and international transportation network. The global supply, logistics, and freight transportation networks are supported mainly by maritime transportation, which has become highly efficient in terms of costs, capacity, and reliability. However, the rapid growth of maritime containerized shipping has placed intense pressures on inland freight transportation systems, particularly rail (Rodrigue, 2008).
The affordability and capacity of rail, which was once viewed as suffering a slow death by transportation experts, has revitalized the rail industry within the United States. Historically, protecting rail service was more of a law enforcement issue than a homeland security issue. The primary threat against rail service was robbery. In early times, Pinkerton Security provided protection for rail service to thwart the efforts of gangs that preyed on trains transporting passengers, gold, and money to banks (Sweet, 2006). Prior to September 11, 2001, the major threat presented to rail service was theft and pilferage of cargo by organized crime and petty criminals from train yards.
The Madrid Bombings caused Homeland Security professionals within the United States to issue warnings about possible terrorist threats against buses and trains, where terrorists would attempt to place bombs in luggage at bus and train stations because of a lack of security and screening procedures at these facilities (Sweet, 2006). The United States government has not taken threats against rail infrastructure as seriously as warranted, because there has not been a terrorist incident on the rail system within the United States (GAO, 2007). This has caused funding for security measures for rail infrastructure to be minuscule in comparison to what is allocated to protect and prevent attacks against aviation infrastructure. This approach by the United States government contradicts its overall posture on security procedures to thwart future terrorist attacks on transportation infrastructure, which includes trains and rail facilities that are very vulnerable to infiltration and attacks by terrorist groups both foreign and domestic (Sweet, 2006).
The perceived vulnerabilities and the attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in recommendations being made for the improvement of security at rail facilities, such as restricted access, restrictions on information about these facilities, increased security, and increased cybersecurity within rail information systems networks (Sweet, 2006). The Northeastern United States, the most densely populated area in America, is home to several major rail transit centers that are vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The loss of one of these major transit centers or disruption of service because of a terrorist attack can have an adverse impact on the global supply system and economy, because most of the major shipping ports and airports in this region depend on rail as an integral part of the intermodal global transportation network. This region and the United States would be unable to effectively function as the main logistics and supply center if these transportation assets are destroyed or suffer major damage in the event of a terrorist attack, even if there are no injuries or deaths.
The events of September 11, 2001 have created the need for increased cargo security measures at all transportation nodes, at the local, state, national, and international levels. Historically, cargo security was primarily used to prevent pilferage and the introduction of contraband via international shipments through rigorous inspections and oversight by customs and revenue officials worldwide. This was accomplished by reviewing entry documentation that accompanied such goods at the time of importation and, if necessary, a physical inspection of imported products was conducted by Customs officials. Cargo security programs developed post-September 11, 2001 require pre-shipment examination of exports by authorities in the country of origin (White House, 2010).
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has conducted assessments of vulnerabilities to freight rail with a primary focus on rail shipments that contain highly toxic material due to security concerns while these types of trains are in transit and traveling through densely populated areas. The category of hazardous materials considered to be the most dangerous to the public are Toxic Inhalation Hazards (TIH), which can be fatal if inhaled. TIH materials include chlorine used in water treatment and anhydrous ammonia used in agriculture. In addition, TSA has identified threats to critical infrastructure of the rail system such as bridges, tunnels, and signal towers, along with cybersecurity threats to rail system information networks (GAO, 2010).
On June 23, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation issued a list of 24 Security Action Items (SAIs) for the rail transportation of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials (GAO, 2010). These SAIs were voluntary measures, developed in collaboration with personnel from the rail industry, after field reviews and vulnerability analysis were conducted of railroad operations. The initial areas addressed in the analysis were system security, access control, and en-route security. Three supplemental SAIs were added in November 2006, which specifically addressed the movement of TIH railcars through 46 High Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs) (GAO, 2010).
These SAIs require railroads, freight railroad carriers, and certain rail hazardous materials shippers and receivers to have the capacity to report the location of individual security-sensitive materials cars within five minutes and the locations of all cars containing security-sensitive materials within 30 minutes. Security at rail yards consists of increased police presence and security access badges (GAO, 2009). There is not an increased comprehensive security plan in place for rail yards similar to what occurs at airports, due to the lack of credible threats to the rail system. Rail line security is almost nonexistent due to the multiple jurisdictions that rail lines transit. Authority is given to local police departments to enforce any violations of law that occur against rail lines within their respective jurisdictions.
There is no comprehensive security plan at commuter rail stations similar to what is found at airports. However, there is an increased police presence, bomb-sniffing dogs, enhanced surveillance equipment, and biological and chemical detectors such as Bioagent Autonomous Networked Detectors (BAND) for outdoors and Rapid Automated Biological Identification System (RABIS) for indoors (GAO, 2010). Security at commuter rail stations is provided by local transit police and other law enforcement personnel. Occasionally, TSA VIPR teams conduct operations within major transit facilities in an attempt to deter any possible attack.
Long-haul passenger travel on Amtrak presents a security challenge because trains travel through wide-open areas where they are vulnerable to attacks. An attack on a long-haul passenger train such as Amtrak can create major interruptions on the transportation network because several cargo rail and commuter rail services share the same lines. The only added piece of security that is present on long-haul passenger trains that is not present on commuter trains is that passengers are issued tickets with their names, which are verified against their government identification. The Railroad Police are responsible for security on long-haul trains and have deputized local law enforcement, giving them the ability to enforce laws on infractions conducted on long-haul passenger rail property located within their jurisdictions.
The different types of rail passenger services, which include commuter, light rail, and intercity, all share the same characteristics that make them vulnerable to an attack. The sheer number of access points and volume of ridership on rails make it impractical and very expensive to attempt to subject all rail passengers to aviation-type security screenings. The most effective way to secure the rail transportation network is by securing rail yards, using enhanced surveillance equipment, providing more control at access points to the system, increasing passenger screening on long-haul trains, and implementing an improved cargo security program.
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