Reforming the U.S. Congress: Key Structural Changes

Introduction: The Case for Congressional Reform

Congress may be the most powerful institution in the United States government, but it is certainly not the most efficient. The powers that the Constitution has granted this body have resulted in the creation of an oversized, inefficient institution full of self-serving politicians who are quite out of touch with the country's most pressing problems. It is important to bear in mind that reform of Congress has been proposed many times, which indicates that the clash between the public and Congress is not something new. Yet the lack of any sound corrective measures has only added to public anger and frustration.

There are several important ways in which Congress can be reformed, but we must first understand the reasons why changes are needed in its structure, policies, and operations. The American public needs solutions to everyday problems without the burden of ever-increasing taxes and significant cuts in Medicare funding. Yet because citizens find it difficult to make their concerns reach Congress, most of their problems remain unresolved.

Why is the public unable to reach Congress when their representatives are present in both the House of Representatives and the Senate? The answer is straightforward. Congressional districts are so large that individual representatives are unable to adequately represent the public. If there is one representative for approximately 600,000 people, it is unrealistic to expect that Congressman to meaningfully influence the whole institution. There should therefore be more districts covering smaller areas in order to increase the power of each individual voter. Similarly, with fewer representatives for a large share of the American population, the real problems of each district rarely reach Congress — and even when they do, quick action seldom follows.

Congress has also been severely criticized for the way candidates amass funds for their campaigns. It is widely believed that special-interest groups support their chosen candidates with heavy investment in election campaigns, which casts a negative influence on a representative's performance once he or she enters Congress. Some observers also argue that congressional terms should be shortened because longer terms promote lethargy and self-interest.

Overspending and Fiscal Irresponsibility

These are some of the central accusations against Congress. Longer terms of service can give representatives enough time to promote the interests of special groups without having to address the problems of the general public. However, shorter terms alone are unlikely to change the situation and do not constitute a particularly sound remedy. The more important step is to develop a system that would effectively monitor the activities of Congress members in order to minimize the abuse of power.

Some of the most well-known members of Congress served more than one consecutive term and yet proved highly productive. One such figure was Representative Howard Buffett, who served three consecutive terms beginning in the 1940s. A man of integrity, he was among the first to speak in favor of reforming Congress. He made clear that Congress's biggest problem was overspending — not the length of service. Strangely, more than half a century later, this problem persists and remains a primary cause of congressional inefficiency and irresponsible behavior.

Buffett wrote an article proposing sound monetary reforms, portions of which were reprinted in the Freemarket Gold & Money Report in 1998:

"Today Congress is constantly besieged by [special interest] groups seeking benefits from the public treasury. Congressmen find it difficult to persuade themselves not to give in to pressure groups. With no bad immediate consequence it becomes expedient to accede to a spending demand. The Treasury is seemingly inexhaustible. Besides, the unorganized taxpayers back home may not notice this particular expenditure — and so it goes. Because [a politician's] continuance in office depends upon pleasing a majority of the pressure groups, there is a natural propensity for over-spending. Rep. Buffett recognized this reckless tendency to be a political fact of life, with predictable and discouraging results if left uncontrolled." (Freemarket Gold & Money Report, 1998)

Overspending, or acting in a fiscally irresponsible manner, only adds to the troubles of the American public, which cannot afford such congressional approaches to economic management. It is therefore clear that important changes are needed in this area to help curtail reckless spending.

Campaign Finance and Special-Interest Influence

Apart from curbing fiscal irresponsibility, we need to keep special-interest groups from interfering in congressional matters. This can only be achieved if a positive alternative is found to the current system of campaign fundraising. It would be unrealistic to assume that, without an alternative proposal, Congress would be able to impose an effective ban on so-called "gift money."

The best approach is to require that at least 80 percent of campaign funds come from the district or state of the candidate. This means organizations and individuals operating in a given state would openly provide funds for their candidate's election campaign. There is a strong rationale for using local public funds in this way: elected representatives would be under greater pressure to serve their constituents, and they would be more motivated to address local issues in order to win re-election.

Tom Kean (2001) captured the entrenched resistance to campaign finance reform succinctly:

"Members of Congress are on trial. For years they've told constituents they favor campaign finance reform, confident that their leadership would never allow a bill to be posted for a vote... For most of the last half century, Democrats controlled the Congress. Republicans claimed they wanted to change the system. Democrats in power blocked every move. Suddenly, Republicans took control and positions were reversed. Democrats pushed campaign finance reform. Republicans, now in position of power, resisted. In fact, most incumbents in both parties were happy with the system. After all, almost all the money went to those in power, so year after year, those in power found ways to maintain the status quo. Committees bottled up reform efforts and members threatened filibusters so that most members never even had to vote in public to kill the offending bills." (Kean, 2001)

Conclusion: Toward a More Effective Congress

After carefully studying the problems and proposing sound reforms for the Congress, we can safely say that unless a concerted effort is made to improve the image of this institution, it will continue to face severe public contempt and criticism. We must urge Congress to allow the public and independent bodies to investigate the various scandals against it. Congress should also carefully listen to the grievances of the American public in order to develop a better and deeper connection with the people it represents.

Congress cannot solve the country's most pressing problems unless it develops an effective channel of communication between government representatives and the general public. Open and honest dialogue between the two parties can help each communicate its concerns to the other. Even though freedom of speech and of the press exist, these mediums cannot substitute for direct communication with those who can actually enact change. Structural reforms, combined with genuine accountability and improved public engagement, can transform this influential institution into the most effective governmental body it has the potential to be.

References

Kean, T. (2001, March 25). Congress must reform campaign funding now. The Record (Bergen County, NJ), p. 01.

Mann, T. E. (1994, March 29). Cynicism curbs reform of Congress. Newsday, p. A39.

To reform Congress, reform the dollar. (1998). Freemarket Gold & Money Report. Retrieved from http://www.fgmr.com/buffett.htm

Bush, G. H. W. (1992, April 3). Remarks to the Federalist Society of Philadelphia. Retrieved from http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1992/92040300.html