This essay critically examines the phenomenon of unauthorized software use, challenging the framing of it as "piracy" and questioning the credibility of software companies' anti-piracy claims. Drawing on Moores and Esichaikul (2010), Asongu (2014), and Stropkova, the paper argues that consumer ignorance of copyright law is not the primary driver of unauthorized software sharing. Instead, consumers apply the same ethical standards to software that they apply to physical goods, viewing sharing as a natural extension of ordinary behavior. The essay critiques inflated economic loss figures, dubious job-creation claims, and the broader corporate strategy of litigation over genuine public engagement, concluding that mutual disrespect between companies and consumers perpetuates the problem.
That most people do not "have the facts" about copyright law should surprise nobody. Copyright law is complex, often vague or nuanced, and there are multiple different copyright regimes operating across jurisdictions. No reasonable person would believe in something like a "24-hour rule," but there should be zero expectation that anyone other than copyright lawyers would have a firm grasp of the law's finer points.
The fact that people do not know about copyright law is, however, by no means the driving factor behind unauthorized software use β to dispense with the loaded word "piracy." We are talking about people who use software without authorization, not about hijacking, raping, or murdering it. The distinction matters, because the language used to frame the debate shapes how we think about the ethics involved.
Moores and Esichaikul (2010) highlight a couple of things worth considering here. First, they note that people like to share software, and that this sharing is a far more common occurrence than violations of most other areas of law. People tend not to use physical goods without paying for them, yet are far more likely to use non-physical goods like software without paying. Most people have only a rough familiarity with criminal law, yet tend to err on the side of caution when it comes to acts that might be deemed illegal. The same cannot be said about software use.
Ignorance of the finer nuances of copyright law may exist, but it does not meaningfully contribute to people's propensity for unauthorized software use or software sharing. There are, however, other explanations for the phenomenon worth examining.
The Moores article inadvertently highlights one important reason for consumer non-compliance: nobody trusts either the software companies or the law on this issue. Consider the widely cited claim that "counterfeiting and piracy cost the U.S. economy $200β250 billion a year, with the subsequent loss of some 750,000 jobs." The dollar figure is difficult to substantiate, and anyone with even a slight proclivity for critical thinking will recognize that there are no incremental job gains to purchasing a copy of MS Office. The product has already been made, and major software companies record massive profits β Microsoft, for example, operates with an approximately 80% gross margin. Whether they earn a few billion more or a few billion less has no meaningful correlation with job creation.
There is a significant credibility gap in such statements, as well as in claims of poverty from the world's wealthiest software, media, and clothing companies. Asongu (2014) offers a similarly questionable economic premise at the outset, suggesting that competition derives from intellectual property rights β when in fact it is profits, not competition, that IPRs are designed to protect. Anti-piracy discussions are too often riddled with this kind of intellectually careless fare; it is little wonder that consumers lend such arguments no credence. Stropkova falls into this trap as well. Economic value is not destroyed by unauthorized software use β it is transferred to the individual or organization that paid less for the software. Claims of associated health and safety risks are similarly spurious.
Moores (2010) attempts to understand the ethical perspectives of people who do use software without authorization. It is not piracy to lend a neighbor a hammer. Winemakers do not send in federal agents when you pour a glass of wine for a partner, and food companies do not sue people who host potlucks. Software and media companies, because their products are far easier to share, insist that their products operate on a different set of principles from all other consumer goods β and they have the laws to back them up.
What software companies characterize as cognitive dissonance on the part of consumers who share software instead of paying for it, consumers themselves see as a natural extension of the same behavior they exhibit with any other product. It should not be forgotten that consumers care about right and wrong considerably more than they care about the law β as anyone who has ever driven over the speed limit can attest. Knowing the copyright rules, then, is simply not related to following them.
Consumers do not perceive software as fundamentally different from any other product β something that, once purchased, can be shared as freely as a six-pack among friends or coworkers. The law makes this distinction; ethically and morally, consumers do not. A legal system heavily dependent on corporate political donations does not have a particularly credible track record of reflecting ordinary people's sense of right and wrong.
"Consumers apply everyday ethics, not copyright rules"
"Cultural values shape software sharing behavior"
Moores, T., & Esichaikul, V. (2010). Socialization and software piracy: A study. Journal of Computer Information Systems, Spring 2011, 1β8.
Stropkova, A. (n.d.). The ethical dimension of software piracy. In possession of the author.
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