Target-Centric Intelligence Analysis of Afghan Opium

Introduction

The current situation on the ground in Afghanistan illustrates how the production and sale of opium is undermining efforts to stabilize the country. This is making it more difficult to address long-term challenges through an enforcement-based approach — one that is similar to strategies used throughout history, such as eradication. In the past, both the Soviets and the Chinese utilized similar tactics, which proved ineffective. The long-term result has been that the problem continues to grow and become significantly worse (Derks, 2012).

To address these issues, a new strategy must be employed that targets the root causes of the problem. The target-centric model will help provide a way forward, incorporating more innovative ideas to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. Understanding how these objectives can be achieved requires an assessment of the target's nature and how it is populated using unclassified data.

Together, these elements will illustrate why the current policy is failing and identify the best avenues for rectifying the situation over the long term. This is the point at which the ISAF can achieve key benchmarks and support the establishment of a government that is responsive to the needs of its people — one that maintains strong relations with the international community and serves as an example of effective stabilization after decades of war.

The Target-Centric Model

The analytical framework being applied here is the target-centric approach. Its goal is to redefine the way intelligence is collected and analyzed by incorporating a number of different variables. All of these come together as part of a central network designed to understand what is happening from multiple perspectives. The most notable dimensions include economic, social, military, political, and governmental issues — the point at which more effective strategies can be developed to address key problems (Clark, 2004).

Clark (2004) captures the rationale for this approach well: "As America's enemies have changed and evolved, the American intelligence community has been forced to find more effective methods of managing intelligence analysis. Old hierarchical models of collection and analysis must give way to horizontal and networked solutions. The target-centric approach allows for more effective analysis, while better meeting stakeholder needs. This is achieved through discussions of framing effects, human terrain models, cyber collection, computer network exploitation, political and economic factors. The result is that day-to-day operations and policies must take these variables into account." These insights demonstrate why a new approach — one that examines the overall scope of opium production and usage from multiple perspectives — is necessary. This is the only way to combat the problem and create lasting changes in ISAF policies.

The nature of the target reveals why the current strategy for eradicating opium is ineffective. The ISAF has focused on destroying poppy crops without offering any alternative solutions. This approach is deeply flawed, because the Taliban and organized crime exploit the allure of higher profit margins to encourage farmers to continue growing these crops. They make the process easy for farmers by eliminating financial risks and offering lucrative rewards. Compounding this, these same incentives encourage local police to accept bribes and look the other way. From an economic standpoint, these are the primary reasons why the current policy is failing and has little prospect of success in the long term (Ackerman, 2014).

The Nature of the Target

The Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that, despite spending billions of dollars, the current approach is having no meaningful positive impact. Ackerman (2014) reports: "Opium cultivation is estimated to be at an all-time high in Afghanistan, despite the U.S. spending $7.5 billion to combat it. The billions spent by the State and Defense departments on counter-narcotics since 2002 has been for naught. Opium-poppy cultivation takes up 209,000 hectares (516,230 acres) of land in Afghanistan, a 36% increase since 2012. Beyond Afghanistan's borders, about three-quarters of the world's illicit opium originates from the country, with poppy cultivation concentrated almost entirely in the southern and western provinces. Those areas — particularly Helmand and Kandahar — were where the bulk of U.S. and UK forces were deployed during the 2010–12 troop surge. The interdiction efforts that the U.S. and its Afghan partners continue to perform, however, are concentrated in eastern Afghanistan and the capital of Kabul, a shift away from the areas of cultivation. Drug labs, storage sites, and major trafficking networks are concentrated in rural areas that are increasingly off-limits to Afghan forces due to the ISAF drawdown and declining security."

These insights show that the nature of the target is changing. ISAF forces have narrowed their focus from rural to urban areas, and eradication programs have effectively ceased, enabling production to increase (Clark, 2004). As a result, a new strategy is needed that addresses these challenges over the long term and targets the root causes of the problem. Until that happens, opium will continue to function as a cash crop that sustains farmers and the local economy (Clark, 2004).

The target-centric model addresses this by understanding the problem from multiple perspectives, improving the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the analysis, and revealing the full scope of the problem's impact on various stakeholders (Clark, 2004).

There are a number of unclassified sources that illuminate key aspects of the problem and the impact on poppy production. Each highlights how the situation is worsening due to inconsistency and ineffectiveness in addressing the root causes — a dynamic that encourages increased opium production and generates conflicting policies that effectively cancel each other out.

As a result, many counter-narcotics efforts fail to accurately understand what is happening on the ground because of diverging institutional objectives. For instance, Global Research published photographs of U.S. Marines patrolling inside an Afghan poppy field, with the flowers in bloom and a large cache ready for conversion into opium or heroin. The accompanying analysis stated: "It is well documented that the U.S. government has — at least at some times in some parts of the world — protected drug operations. The U.S. military has openly said that it is protecting Afghan poppy fields in order to appease farmers and government officials involved in the drug trade who might otherwise turn against the Karzai government in Kabul. Fueling both sides, the opium and heroin industry is both a product of the war and an essential source of continued conflict" ("Drug War? American Troops are Protecting Afghan Opium," 2014). These findings indicate that U.S. and Afghan authorities are, in practice, tolerating poppy cultivation out of fear that a harder line will undermine the authority of the central government. This illustrates how a new approach is needed to honestly comprehend and address what is occurring.

Conclusion

Derks, H. (2012). History of the opium problem. Brill.

Martin, A. (2014). How opium is keeping the U.S. in Afghanistan. Media Roots. Retrieved from http://www.mediaroots.org/opium-what-afghanistan-is-really-about/