Temporary Intrinsics: Perdurantism vs. Endurantism
This paper examines the philosophical problem of temporary intrinsics — the question of how a persisting object can possess incompatible intrinsic properties (such as being bent and being straight) at different times. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, Sally Haslanger, Theodore Sider, Dean Zimmerman, and William Lane Craig, the paper outlines three solutions Lewis proposed, evaluates the Perdurantist account of temporal parts, and considers whether the conflict between being bent simpliciter and being bent only at a time provides sufficient grounds to reject Endurantism in favor of Perdurantism. The paper also considers Perdurantism's own tensions with the concept of simpliciter property possession and the classic coincidence puzzle of the statue and the lump of clay.
- Introduction to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics: Frames the central question about persisting objects and intrinsic change
- Perdurantism and Endurantism: Core Distinctions: Contrasts temporal-parts view with whole-object persistence
- Lewis's Three Solutions to Temporary Intrinsics: Outlines Lewis's three proposed resolutions and Haslanger's critique
- Presentism, Simpliciter, and Temporal Qualification: Zimmerman and Craig on present-tense property possession
- Perdurantism and Four-Dimensionalism: Craig on perduring objects as four-dimensional world-line entities
- The Structural Account of Intrinsic Change: Brower's three-part schema for understanding intrinsic change
- Conclusion: Perdurantism, Endurantism, and the Coincidence Problem: Applies debate to statue-and-clay coincidence puzzle
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper clearly frames a central philosophical question at the outset and returns to it in the conclusion, giving the argument a focused and coherent arc.
- It engages directly with primary sources — Lewis, Haslanger, Sider, Zimmerman, and Craig — demonstrating genuine textual grounding rather than relying on secondary summaries alone.
- The structural account of intrinsic change (Brower's three-part schema) is foregrounded as a conceptual anchor, helping the reader track the argument across competing positions.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative philosophical analysis: it presents multiple competing theoretical positions (Perdurantism, Endurantism, Presentism) and systematically evaluates how each handles the same logical problem — the incompatibility of simultaneous intrinsic properties. By using Lewis's own admission that none of his three solutions fully satisfies, the paper shows how to use a theorist's self-critique as evidence in an argument.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by defining the problem through the lens of temporal parts and the Perdurantist/Endurantist divide. It then walks through Lewis's three proposed solutions and Haslanger's critique, before turning to Zimmerman's Presentist account of simpliciter predication. Craig's four-dimensionalism discussion follows, leading into Brower's structural account of intrinsic change. The paper closes by applying the debate to the statue-and-clay coincidence puzzle, testing both positions against a concrete philosophical case.
Introduction to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
This paper examines and explains the problem of temporary intrinsics and the Perdurantist solution to it. Specifically, it addresses whether the conflict between a thing being bent simpliciter and the thing only being able to be bent at a time is itself a reason to reject Endurantism in favor of Perdurantism — and how, if at all, Perdurantism might itself be at odds with the idea that persisting objects are bent simpliciter.
Some philosophers hold that the individual takes up time because they are held to have "different temporal parts at different times" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, p. 1). The spatial parts of a person would be represented by the feet, nose, and head, while the temporal parts would be the person as they were yesterday, the person as they are today, and the person as they will be tomorrow. Possessing different temporal parts means the individual exists at different times and possesses different properties at different times. From this view, the persistence of an individual is likened to extending through space: "it's all a matter of parts" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, p. 1).
This view is rejected by others who hold that the individual "persists through time as a whole" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, p. 1). The Endurantist perspective understands temporal parts to be the individual's parts that are either futurist or historic. Endurantists do hold that the individual has different spatial parts at different times and that the individual and the environment exchange molecules.
Perdurantism and Endurantism: Core Distinctions
Perdurantists claim there is a present, historic, and futuristic individual. In the discussion of temporal parts, the problem of temporary intrinsics as described by David Lewis is held to be important in this examination. Lewis states that persisting things "change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time. How is change possible?" (1986: 203–4, cited in Wasserman, n.d., p. 1).
Haslanger writes that Lewis did not believe that any of the three solutions he posited made metaphysical sense, and worries that "a temporary predication does not adequately capture the connection between an object and its intrinsic properties" (p. 508). Perdurantism holds that objects persist by "being spread over time just as composite three-dimensional objects are spread out over space… [and] persist by having temporal parts" (Smith, 2010, p. 1).
Theodore Sider defined an instantaneous temporal part as follows: "X is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df. (1) x exists at, but only at, t; (2) x is a part of y at t; and (3) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t" (2001, p. 59). Roderick Chisholm (1971), in his work "Problems of Identity," maintained that reflection on phenomenal experience reveals that persons do not have temporal parts (Smith, 2010, p. 1).
Lewis's Three Solutions to Temporary Intrinsics
Lewis recognized three solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics. The first solution states that, despite common belief, "shapes are not genuine intrinsic properties. They are disguised relations, which an enduring thing may bear to times" (cited in Wasserman, n.d., p. 1). The second solution, also stated by Lewis, holds that the properties possessed at the present are the only intrinsic properties a thing may possess, since other times are "like false stories; they are abstract representations, composed out of materials of the present, which represent or misrepresent the way things are" (cited in Wasserman, n.d., p. 1). Lewis writes that the third solution is that different shapes and different temporary intrinsics "belong to different things" (cited in Wasserman, n.d., p. 1).
Lewis states that the properties "bent and straight" could "at least sometimes be monadic: for instance when they are properties of momentary things. There is no reason in that case to take them as relations to times" (Craig, 2000, p. 179). Lewis further asks where the monadic properties of bent and straight have gone, specifically questioning: "What have they to do with our new-found bent-at and straight-at relations, and our new-found relational properties constructed from these relations?" (2002, p. 4).
Lewis claims there is no reason to assert that a momentary object that is bent stands "in the bent relation to the unique instant at which it exists. The relativizer, again, says that the persisting objects of this world are only bent in the sense that they stand in the bent-at relation to different times" (Wasserman, n.d., p. 4). From this view, no object has a shape simpliciter. According to Lewis, the temporary intrinsic properties of things "do not deserve the name intrinsic [unless they] are genuine properties, and a thing can have them simpliciter, without regard to any relationships to anything else" (1999, p. 188).
Lewis writes that under the hypothesis of endurance, nothing is left to assign bentness or straightness as simpliciter (2002, p. 4). While there may be some truth to the intuition that persisting objects can be bent simpliciter, this view is not consistent with the relativizer's position, because from that theorist's view "ordinary persisting objects are never bent simpliciter — they only stand in the bent-at relation to various times" (Wasserman, n.d., p. 6).
Conclusion: Perdurantism, Endurantism, and the Coincidence Problem
The question addressed in this study concerns whether the conflict between a thing being bent simpliciter and the thing only being able to be bent at a time is itself a reason to reject Endurantism in favor of Perdurantism — and how, if at all, Perdurantism might itself be at odds with the idea that persisting objects are bent simpliciter. To put this into perspective, the question is whether Perdurantists accept that "the lump [of clay] and the statue are distinct coinciding objects" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, p. 1). The answer given is "in principle, yes, but this would be strategically unwise: accepting the possibility of complete coincidence without identity leaves perdurantism with no advantage over the standard endurantist account of coincidence" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, p. 1).
The Perdurantist would do well to claim "that the statue and lump of clay are one and the same object, then come up with some explanation of why they appear to have different properties" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, p. 1). The Endurantist is in a better position regarding permanent coincidence, since whatever solution is adopted will additionally deal with permanent coincidence, even though in some cases adjustments are needed.
The dilemma of whether the lump of clay and the statue are the same object — or distinct objects that exchange molecules with the environment — has been debated for many centuries. The debate between Perdurantists and Endurantists, both of whom hold that they have valid grounds for their respective positions, is likely to continue well into the future.
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