Why Truman Dropped the Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima Analysis

Overview of Maddox's Argument

Robert James Maddox's article "The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb" presents a number of nuanced reasons why President Truman ultimately gave the order for the atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. Maddox offers persuasive justifications for Truman's decision, drawing largely on an examination of evidence from the Japanese side. Japanese military policy appears to have necessitated the American military response, as various facts on the public record indicate.

Japan's Military Posture and Declared War Policy

Maddox notes first that the Japanese were in a position to continue hostilities for a relatively long time. He observes that in 1945 "the Japanese had more than 2,000,000 troops in the home islands, were training millions of irregulars, and for some time had been conserving aircraft that might have been used to protect Japanese cities against American bombers." In other words, Japan was preparing for an American invasion it intended to repel with as much force as could be mustered.

On June 8, 1945, a Japanese government conference adopted a document entitled "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War." Its stated policy, as quoted by Maddox, was that the Japanese would "prosecute the war to the bitter end in order to uphold the national polity, protect the imperial land, and accomplish the objectives for which we went to war." As Maddox notes darkly, "Truman had no reason to believe that the proclamation meant anything other than what it said."

Casualty Estimates and the Invasion Question

Truman's own justification, given in his memoirs and reported by Maddox, was that 500,000 American lives would have been lost in an invasion of Japan, making the use of nuclear weapons justified as a means of preventing that toll. Truman's figures have since been criticized as self-serving. Critics have pointed to a report from the Joint War Plans Committee that estimated roughly 40,000 potential American deaths — though the total climbed to nearly 200,000 "casualties" in the military sense when the wounded and missing in action were included.

Yet this dispute seems like a mere quibble because, as Maddox notes, "when the bombs were dropped, fighting was still going on in the Philippines, China, and elsewhere." With America war-weary, even the lower estimate might have been more than Truman could ask the public to bear, particularly with a re-election campaign to consider.

Conclusion: The Logic Behind Truman's Decision

Truman's decision was based more on close observation of, and intelligence regarding, the Japanese. Their expressed military policy indicated an intention to prolong the conflict as long as possible in the event of an invasion. Truman himself estimated that American losses would be heavy; in any case, American infantry deaths were occurring elsewhere — in the Philippines and in China — even as the bombs were dropped. Indeed, one Japanese soldier, the famous Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda, hiding in the jungles of the Philippines, would continue fighting for as long as possible and did not surrender until 1974, which may say something about the accuracy of Truman's estimate of Japanese military determination.

Finally, the Japanese appeared likely to involve the Soviets — diplomatically or even militarily — as a means of driving a wedge into the uneasy American alliance. Considering the subsequent partition of Berlin and the descent of the Iron Curtain, it was hardly in American interests to allow this. In all events, it was Japan that gave Truman the cue that something significant would be necessary to end the war. Even the policy of dropping two bombs was a testament to Truman's estimate of Japanese willingness to continue fighting. Truman had been informed by intelligence that if only one bomb were dropped, the Japanese would treat it as a pure anomaly — and this is precisely what happened, as Japan's military leadership refused to concede that the bomb was even atomic. The second bomb on Nagasaki was thus necessitated by the stated policy of Japanese military leadership.